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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers the influence of the writing of Samuel Beckett on that of Paul 
Auster, John Banville and J.M. Coetzee through the lens of Romantic irony, as 
formulated by Friedrich Schlegel and, later, Paul de Man. The broad argument is that the 
form of irony first articulated by the Jena Romantics is brought in Beckett’s work to 
something of an extreme, and that this extremity represents both one of his most 
characteristic achievements and a unique and specifically troublesome challenge for 
those who come after him. The thesis hence explores how Auster, Banville and Coetzee 
respond to and negotiate this irony in their own work, and contrasts their respective 
responses. Put briefly, I find that all three writers to one extent or another deflect 
Beckett’s irony, while engaging with it: Auster adopts certain stylistic and structural 
aspects of Beckett’s work, but on the whole reaches fundamentally different 
epistemological and existential conclusions; Banville engages closely with the 
epistemological and existential challenge posed by Beckett’s irony, and attempts to 
balance this with a contrasting sense of the capacity of art and the imagination to make 
meaning of the world; and Coetzee, after an initial attempt at stylistic imitation, moves 
away from this but remains fundamentally influenced by certain insights into 
subjectivity and ethical relation he derives from Beckett’s work. Of Auster’s work, I 
consider most closely ‘White Spaces’ and The New York Trilogy, arguing that the 
former represents a transitional development toward the tone, perspective and voice of 
the latter; of Banville’s, Doctor Copernicus and Eclipse, contrasting the former’s 
confidence in human capacities for knowledge of the world and the self with the latter’s 
more Beckettian skepticism and disenchantment; and of Coetzee’s, In the Heart of the 
Country with Waiting for the Barbarians, showing how the latter abandons the former’s 
marked Beckettian stylistic traces while continuing to evidence the influence of 
Beckett’s work in the depiction of matters such as subjectivity, language and 
interpersonal relation. By way of conclusion, I consider how such later writing might 
reshape or alter our understanding of Beckett’s work, and propose directions for further 
research into the place of Romantic irony in Modern and contemporary fiction.
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I trace the influence of the writing of Samuel Beckett on that of three 
writers of the generation following his, Paul Auster, John Banville and J.M. Coetzee, 
through an analysis of the way in which the later writers adopt, adapt, negotiate, deflect 
and develop the irony I consider characteristic of Beckett’s work. This irony is framed 
primarily in the terms first proposed by Friedrich Schlegel and later rearticulated by 
Paul de Man.1 I take this aspect of Beckett’s work to represent something of a high-
water mark of a movement initiated (if not solely at the very least in significant part) by 
Schlegel and the Jena Romantics, and one that has informed Western conceptions of and 
attitudes to art and aesthetic discourse since that time. The ways in which this irony is 
negotiated in the work of these later writers can hence be read as demonstrating a 
continuity in the contemporary era of important aspects of Romantic literary and 
aesthetic praxis and theory, and thus provides a reliable and perspicuous barometer of its 
relevance to our current culture of letters – for good and ill: the fact that all the writers 
considered in this study are white, heterosexual men may be taken to indicate a certain 
narrowness in the scope of these concerns. There are obviously other aspects to 
Beckett’s legacy, and other ways of understanding it – as performances of Waiting for 
Godot in war-torn Sarajevo and hurricane-devastated New Orleans attest. Nevertheless, 
it does seem to me that the aspect of the writing that I focus on is among the most 
idiosyncratic and typical, and hence among those that most clearly define Beckett’s 
achievement. 
 My argument is that irony, as defined and espoused by Schlegel, is closely 
bound up with a conception of art as a pre-eminently efficacious site of what Jacques 
                                                          
 
1 Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1991); Paul de Man, ‘The Concept of Irony’, in The Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrzej Warminski 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996); Paul de Man, ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’, in Blindness and 
Insight: The Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, ed. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1986). 
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Rancière terms ‘dissensus’. 2  The fundamental continuity between Romantic and 
modernist aesthetic practice and thinking is the prizing of art for the sake of intervention 
into and reframing of the terms of social, cultural, and political configurations in a 
manner in which political forms, being parts of such configurations, are in important 
ways unable to do.3 The Romantic preoccupation with the revolutionary and the utopian 
is the clearest marker of this, and it is based on a perception of the individual as always 
necessarily exceeding any social, cultural or political role she may find herself identified 
with, and a correlative ability – freedom – to transcend, question, and transform these. 
(J.M. Coetzee’s proposition, in the essay ‘The Novel Today,’ regarding the ability of 
fiction to challenge the formulation of the choices open to the subject in a given political 
regime expresses precisely the same idea.)4  
Rancière’s idea of dissensus similarly has to do with the ways in which the field 
of the political is opened up to that which exceeds it, or that which it occludes. In 
Rancière’s somewhat idiosyncratic use of the term, ‘politics’ is opposed to 
authoritarianism: political action is the demand by a self-recognizing political subject 
for just and equitable modes of governance and social organization.5 This contestation 
of the status quo is what makes ‘politics’ dissensual, and the nexus between politics, 
conceived of thus, and modern art is demonstrated by Rancière’s use of the term ‘the 
distribution of the sensible’. ‘The distribution of the sensible’ is the specific set of 
sanctions established by a given social regime controlling what – or who – can and 
cannot be thought, said, seen, heard: 
Politics occurs when those who ‘have no’ time take the time necessary to front up 
as inhabitants of a common space and demonstrate that their mouths really do 
emit speech capable of making pronouncements on the common which cannot be 
reduced to voices signalling pain. This distribution and redistribution of places 
                                                          
 
2 For a discussion of this idea, see Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents, ed. Steven Corcoran 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009) and The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (London: 
Continuum, 2006). 
3 See, e.g., Ernst Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory (Cambridge: CUP, 1993). 
4 J.M. Coetzee, ‘The Novel Today’, Upstream 6.1 (1988). 
5 This is stated perhaps most clearly and succinctly in ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, Theory and Event, 5.3 
(2010): n.p. http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.york.ac.uk/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.3ranciere.html. 
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and identities, this apportioning and reapportioning of spaces and times, of the 
visible and the invisible, and of noise and speech constitutes what I call the 
distribution of the sensible.6 
Political action hence involves an interruption of the distribution of the sensible for the 
sake of exploding a given social configuration in order to allow admittance to what – 
who – has hitherto been excluded. Importantly, Rancière understands modern art to be 
involved in an exactly analogous redistribution of the sensible: ‘the relationship between 
aesthetics and politics consists in … the way in which the practices and forms of 
visibility [and in the case of literature, by implication, language] themselves intervene in 
the distribution of the sensible and its reconfiguration’ (ibid., 25).7 
This is an observation connected to, and strengthened by, Derrida’s claim that 
the modern Western conception of literature, the ‘institution’ of literature since the 
eighteenth century (and by extension that of the arts more generally), is one grounded in 
the ‘the socio-juridico-politico guarantee’ vouchsafed to the writer to say anything: 
this institution of fiction which gives in principle the power to say everything, to 
break free of the rules, to displace them, and thereby to institute, to invent and 
even to suspect the traditional difference between nature and institution, nature 
and conventional law, nature and history. … The institution of literature in the 
West, in its relatively modern form, is linked to an authorization to say everything, 
and doubtless too to the coming about of the modern idea of democracy.8 
While Derrida marks the point of the appearance of this institution as the eighteenth 
century, its – specifically political – dissensual potential is emphasized especially 
                                                          
 
6 Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents, 24–5. 
7 It should be noted that in such definitions Rancière is being more prescriptive than descriptive: ‘There 
are not always occurrences of politics, though there always exist forms of power. Similarly, there are not 
always occurrences of art, although there are always forms of poetry, painting, sculpture, music, theatre 
and dance’ (Aesthetics and Its Discontents, 26). 
8 Jacques Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature: An Interview with Jacques Derrida’, in Acts 
of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), 37. Importantly: ‘Not that it depends on a 
democracy in place, but it seems inseparable to me from what calls forth a democracy, in the most open 
(and doubtless itself to come) sense of democracy.’ 
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sharply in the nineteenth, and its continuities with modernist and subsequent aesthetic 
concerns are limned especially clearly at this point. 
I read Schlegel’s valorization of irony as proceeding from a perception closely 
connected to that of the dissensual dimension of art: as no conceptual configuration can 
give full account of the brimming potentialities of the subject, the trope of irony 
provides an appropriate discursive analogue of the perpetual self-transcendence this 
leads to; as he puts it, ‘Irony is the clear consciousness of eternal agility, of an infinitely 
teeming chaos.’9 Just as the dissensual capacity of art is premised on its freedom with 
respect to inherited or imposed schemes, irony instantiates the subject’s necessary and 
inevitable exceeding of any horizon attributed to her. Irony, like dissensus, involves the 
subversion and disruption of conceptual schemata by the offering of an alternative 
perspective, which makes possible a renewed conception of the schema it disrupts and in 
this way vouchsafes the possibility ‘to break free of the rules, to displace them’. For 
Rancière, this is the basis of the ability and requirement of Modern art to place in 
question those values and precepts taken as given.10 
Such a positing of alternative points of view, and hence the dissensual disruption 
of categories, is made possible by the way in which literature suspends and puts into 
play thetic procedure. As Derrida puts it, ‘poetry and literature have as a common 
feature that they suspend the thetic naivety of the transcendent reading’: 
Poetry and literature provide or facilitate ‘phenomenological’ access to what 
makes of a thesis a thesis as such. Before having a philosophical content, before 
being or bearing such and such a ‘thesis’, literary experience, writing or reading, 
is a ‘philosophical’ experience which is neutralized or neutralizing insofar as it 
allows one to think the thesis; it is a nonthetic experience of the thesis, of belief, 
of position, of naivety, of what Husserl called ‘the natural attitude’. The 
phenomenological conversion of the gaze, the ‘transcendental reduction’ he 
recommended is perhaps the very condition (I do not say the natural condition) of 
literature. But it is true that, taking this proposition to the limit … the 
                                                          
 
9 Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, 100 (fragment 69). 
10 Rancière, ‘Aesthetics as Politics’ and ‘The Ethical Turn of Aesthetics and Politics’ in Aesthetics and its 
Discontents; and ‘The Distribution of the Sensible’ in The Politics of Aesthetics. 
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phenomenological language in which I’m presenting these things ends up being 
dislodged from its certainties (self-presence of absolute transcendental 
consciousness or of the indubitable cogito, etc.) and dislodged precisely by the 
extreme experience of literature, or even quite simply of fiction and language. 
(Ibid., 45–6) 
As with my characterization of irony, Derrida’s description of literature emphasizes its 
capacity to exceed a given configuration and hence to place in play, to disrupt, the 
arrangement of the terms on which it is founded. While I take due care not to conflate 
the bracketing Derrida here suggests as characteristic of the modern institution of 
literature and the irony I see instantiated with especial force and acuity in Beckett’s 
writing, there is certainly a not insignificant degree of overlap between them. As Derrida 
himself puts it, 
Paul de Man was not wrong in suggesting that ultimately all literary rhetoric in 
general is of itself deconstructive, practising what you might call a sort of irony, 
an irony of detachment with regard to metaphysical belief or thesis, even when it 
apparently puts it forward. No doubt this should be made more complex, ‘irony’ 
is perhaps not the best category to designate this ‘suspension’, this epochē, but 
there is here, certainly, something irreducible in poetic or literary experience. 
Without being ahistorical, far from it, this trait, or rather retrait, would far exceed 
the periodizations of ‘literary history’, or of the history of poetry or belles-lettres, 
from Homer to Joyce, before Homer and after Joyce. (Ibid., 50) 
Literature’s ability to say anything is fundamentally connected to such metaphysical 
irony, such non-thetic theses: the freedom granted to the literary with respect to the 
discursive is precisely what makes possible the bracketing of otherwise fixed 
assumptions, and through this the renewed engagement with them, that Rancière 
considers to be made available through dissensus.11 
An important consideration in this schema is the starkly contrasting treatments of 
these two aspects, political dissensus and metaphysical irony, at the hands of history 
                                                          
 
11 Rancière, ‘Aesthetics as Politics’ and ‘The Ethical Turn of Aesthetics and Politics’ in Aesthetics and its 
Discontents; and ‘The Distribution of the Sensible’ in The Politics of Aesthetics. 
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since early Romanticism. The utopian pretensions of aesthetic dissensus have been 
steadily and inexorably deflated, as the political and social inefficacy of that on which 
they were based has increasingly been demonstrated and the technologization and 
rationalization of the world has proceeded apace. Adorno’s aesthetic thinking is perhaps 
the best example of this deflation.12 In this scheme, Modern art comes to represent 
merely the capacity to reject the terms of an increasingly commodified and rationalized 
modern world: its historically and socially redemptive valence shrinks to the inference 
of some positive alternative from one’s rejection of all options with which one is 
presented, without this being given any definite form or incarnation – indeed, it being 
necessary for it not to be given any form or incarnation in order to retain what 
ambivalent redemptive valence it may possess. The Romantic assertion of the freedom 
and transcendence of the individual comes from this perspective to seem the first, 
violent throes of the passing of a humanistic paradigm in the face of a world in which 
what had hitherto been taken for granted as ‘human’ could be so no longer. 
Irony, in contrast, appears to have become more and more central to a certain, 
currently rather prominent and influential, aesthetic regime. In this perspective, it is 
taken as being almost axiomatic that works of art do not make claims or propose 
arguments, that they are to be encountered and engaged with through a different set of 
conventions and procedures than are, for example, political propositions. Derrida’s point, 
quoted above, regarding the licence granted literature to say anything, and the 
connection of this to an ideal democratic practice, seems a reasonable framing of this: in 
allowing the bracketing of the thetic, irony makes possible an interrogation of the 
positionality of the position itself, and hence the conception of its boundaries and 
contraries. In this way, throughout this development from early Romanticism to the 
present, irony has thus retained its dissensual character: it is the trope that is always 
stepping beyond the terms of a given configuration, a ‘permanent parabasis’ 
                                                          
 
12 As expressed perhaps most clearly and emphatically in the posthumously published Aesthetic Theory, 
ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1997). 
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(‘permanent Parekbase’), as Schlegel has it.13 Unshackled from Romantic metaphysical 
confidence in the absolute and epistemological assurance in the capacities of the 
individual imagination, however, the initially limited ambit of the operability of irony’s 
corrosive energies steadily expands, from Byron, through Flaubert, to writers such as 
Kafka and Beckett, with whom metaphysical irony reaches a disquieting intensity. 
Important contributory factors in this expansion and proliferation of irony are the 
specific changes that Romanticism brought about in Western literature. 
As Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe argue in The Literary 
Absolute, the conception of literature formulated by the Jena Romantics that continues 
to hold considerable sway in Western thought – indeed, remains that which defines 
‘literature’ – is a response to the Kantian conception of the inaccessibility of the pure 
ideas of reason to intuition. From its inception, hence, the romantico-modern literary has 
been defined by a certain relationship to the unrepresentable. In the thought of Schlegel 
and the early Romantics, irony plays a crucial role in the presentation of the 
unrepresentable: directly invoking the Kantian problematic, Schlegel claims, ‘an idea is 
a concept perfected to the point of irony, an absolute synthesis of absolute antitheses’.14 
Rodolphe Gasché glosses this thus: 
An idea, consequently, continuously transcends the synthesis, or sublation that it 
achieves. It is destructive of the form of the idea itself as not fully adequate to its 
concept. An idea that unifies and brings into infinite interchange two absolutely 
antithetical thoughts is always only a self-presentation of the idea as such, and 
must therefore, ironically, destroy its own actualization.15 
As I argue in subsequent chapters, Beckett’s fiction (and via him that of the later 
writers considered in this thesis) manifests precisely such a vacillation, such an 
                                                          
 
13 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Zur Philosophie’ (fragment 668), in Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe (Vol. 
XIIX), ed. Ernst Behler (Munich: Schöningh, 1972), 85. ‘Parabasis’ refers to the conventional interlude in 
the action of classical Greek comedy in which the actors left the stage and the chorus, stepping outside of 
the theatrical space, addressed the audience directly, usually on subjects totally unrelated to the dramatic 
action. Aristophanes’s works provide perhaps the best examples of this (see e.g. The Wasps, trans. D. 
Barnett (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988)).   
14 Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, 33 (fragment 121).  
15 Rodolphe Gasché, ‘Ideality in Fragmentation’, foreword to Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, xiv–xv.  
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engagement with an impossible obligation: the very name The Unnamable indicates the 
centrality of such a preoccupation to the work. In other ways, however, Beckett parodies 
certain of the most prominent of the Romantic’s concerns through a reductio ad 
absurdum. The idea of the subject-work tied up with the notion of Bildung 16  is 
thoroughly satirized in Beckett’s work, as, ultimately, is the facility of art or irony to 
provide access to the realm of pure ideality. In this respect, then, Beckett’s is a meta-
irony, one that subjects the Romantic project to its own devices and achieves unsettling 
results. This also means, thus, that one can see Beckett’s work as representing the 
fulfilment or culmination of this particular strand of enquiry, which makes it of 
momentous significance to Modern literature and thought. 
An analysis of the work of Paul Auster, John Banville, and J.M. Coetzee is of 
interest in the context of such considerations for a number of reasons. All three 
explicitly avow their indebtedness to Beckett’s work. All three have achieved a certain 
degree of pre-eminence in the contemporary Anglophone literary world, in slightly 
different ways and in different milieux, and they can thus, without too much 
contestation, be taken to represent an influential and prominent field of the current world 
of international English letters. (The number of other potential candidates for this list is 
indicative of the breadth of Beckett’s influence, and the range of contemporary literature 
that to some extent or another takes its cue from him.) An analysis of these writers’ 
work is hence instructive on the matter of the lasting legacy of Beckett’s achievement, 
the creative possibilities opened up by his work, and the direction in which a certain 
branch of the novel has developed since the middle of the last century. Consideration of 
the work of these three later writers and their response to Beckett’s work also sheds light 
on the significance of Beckett to our present moment: what aspects of his work can be 
appreciated anew, what aspects have lost their relevance, and the ways in which the 
significance of the work has changed, or endured, since the time of its first appearance. 
My choice of these writers for consideration is determined largely by the way I 
approach Beckett. I find Adorno’s, Stanley Cavell’s and Simon Critchley’s readings of 
Beckett to be those that best articulate what I find most interesting about the work, and I 
                                                          
 
16 As discussed, for example, by Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe in The Literary Absolute, 32. 
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see my own reading as following on from these. All of these readings are concerned 
with the ways in which Beckett’s work challenges a given schema in which a particular 
understanding of ends subordinates other factors as means; all see Beckett’s work as 
deconstructing such oppressive conceptions, and hence as being intrinsically 
philosophical, insofar as it mounts a challenge to particular conceptual arrangements 
whereby attitudes, values and beliefs are justified and defended. My interest in irony in 
Beckett’s work and the challenges it poses to interpretation, and my reading of the 
depiction of subjectivity, can be understood to proceed from a consideration of 
Adorno’s ideas on Endgame’s challenge to instrumental rationality, Cavell’s ideas on 
the same play’s disruption of eschatological and teleological beliefs, and Critchley’s 
ideas on Beckett’s work’s self-deconstructive dismantling of meaning and 
interpretation.17   
In this thesis, given that the legacy I consider is that comprised of three novelists, 
I am most concerned with Beckett’s novels. As I understand Beckett’s achievement in 
the form to represent something of an extremity, I am interested in delineating the 
development to this extreme: how forms, themes, styles and devices are adopted and 
intensified to achieve the particular effects I see them achieving. These seem to me most 
clearly evidenced in the progression of the trilogy, 18 and it is hence to these three novels 
that I devote most attention, while making occasional reference to other works.         
The first chapter first provides a discussion of the idea of influence that informs 
this study, and then outlines my conception of Beckett’s irony, with specific reference to 
the trilogy, through Schlegel’s and de Man’s treatments of the concept. In the second 
chapter I discuss Auster’s, Banville’s and Coetzee’s recorded or published statements on 
Beckett’s work and its significance for their own, and then consider the significance of 
                                                          
 
17 I have written on these readings at greater length in ‘Endgame and the Meaning of Meaninglessness’, 
JLS, 26.1 (2010): 179–190. 
18  While I am aware that Beckett resisted the characterization of Molloy, Malone Dies and The 
Unnamable as a ‘trilogy’, I adopt the term for these three novels in this thesis for a number of reasons: the 
implied circularity of the form, with the end of the last novel gesturing toward the beginning of the first; 
the reappearance of characters from earlier novels in later ones; and statements by the narrators that 
appear to encourage the reader to view the three novels as linked (e.g., inter alia, that at the very 
beginning of Molloy: ‘This time, then once more I think, then perhaps a last time, then I think it’ll be over, 
with that world too. Premonition of the last but one but one’ (M, 4)). 
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the three writers’ statements on style for an understanding of the Beckettian legacy. 
Chapters three, four and five respectively provide analyses of the presence and 
modulation of such ironic techniques in the work of Auster, Coetzee and Banville. In 
order to provide a sense of the varying significance of this influence over the course of 
the authors’ careers – of the ways in which it either wanes or waxes – in each case I 
compare two works that demonstrate a significant difference or development in this 
respect. In the case of Paul Auster, these are near-consecutive works, the prose poem 
‘White Spaces’ (1980) and the novels comprising The New York Trilogy (1985–86), 
with the former being taken to demonstrate the ways in which Auster arrives at his own 
idiomatic statement of Beckettian irony, and the latter read as an expanded application 
of the possibilities opened up by it. For Coetzee, I compare In the Heart of the Country 
(1977), with its relatively blatant Beckettian style, tone, and even allusions, with 
Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), which adopts a markedly different register. In doing 
so I demonstrate that, while the later Coetzee jettisons the stylistic habits that 
superficially and obviously mark the earlier novel as proceeding in a Beckettian vein, 
the structure of the narrative and its depiction of subjectivity and human relationship are 
based on an irony that has much in common with Beckett’s, and that Coetzee’s fiction 
can hence be seen to demonstrate fundamental and lasting traces of Beckett’s influence. 
In the case of Banville’s work, I compare the early Doctor Copernicus (1976), with its 
relatively perspicuous narrative mode and optimistic conclusions about the possibilities 
of human knowledge of the world, with the later Eclipse (2000) in order to demonstrate 
that, from an early affinity with an almost Romantic view of the capacities of the 
imagination and perception, Banville’s later work adopts a far more ironic attitude 
toward these matters, drawing closer to a Beckettian view of subjectivity that is 
profoundly skeptical of the possibility of real knowledge of the world or the self.19 By 
way of conclusion, I consider the ways in which such later writing has made possible a 
renewed engagement with Beckett’s work: aspects of the latter that had previously not 
                                                          
 
19 The arrangement of the chapters is intended to reflect, as discussed in greater detail later, my perception 
of the relative depth of these three writers’ engagements with and influence by Beckett, moving from the 
least profound (Auster) to the most (Banville). Chapter two is hence arranged to mirror this. When I refer 
to all three authors in a list-like manner, I do so alphabetically, to avoid an implied imputation of priority. 
11 
 
been appreciated and are now more prominent, aspects previously noted that are now 
cast in a different light, and previously prominent aspects that now appear somewhat 
diminished in importance. 
A detailed description of the model of influence that informs my inquiry is 
provided at the beginning of chapter one. For the present, it suffices to indicate that I am 
not so much interested in anxieties of influence and misprision as in the ways in which 
the technical, stylistic and thematic innovations of Beckett’s work open up possibilities 
for later writers, and what this says about the significance of Beckett’s achievement and 
what significance it has for our understanding of later literature. In ‘Kafka and His 
Precursors’, Borges claims that consideration of later writers’ adoptions and adaptations 
of earlier writers’ work casts light on the earlier work and renews or recasts our 
understanding of it.20 One might say that I turn Borges’s idea on its head: I am interested 
in attempting to obtain a better understanding of these later writers’ work by considering 
it through the heuristic of a Beckettian genealogy. In contrast to the agonistic view of 
influence proposed by Harold Bloom, such a legacy is based on and maintained by 
elective affinity: it is the effect of a continuing relevance and value of the given body of 
work, and it can be discerned in the later writers’ development and continuation of 
themes and techniques proposed in the former. This is not to claim that there are no 
agonistic aspects to the relation. It seems clear that the two forms of engagement can 
occur simultaneously, in various combinations; in this case I confine my analysis to 
those dimensions of influence that are most conscious and present to awareness. Nor is 
it to claim that such transmission is uncomplicated: given the corrosiveness of Beckett’s 
irony, all three later writers do struggle to one extent or another with it, which leads to 
crucial deflections in their treatment of it, but this struggle is of a different order to that 
conceived of in Harold Bloom’s understanding of influence. 
A number of works dealing with Beckett’s influence on various writers and his 
place in contemporary letters have recently been published (with the centenary of his 
birth in 2006 providing the occasion for a number of them): the monographs Since 
                                                          
 
20 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Kafka and His Precursors’, in Labyrinths, ed. Donald Alfred Yates (London: 
Penguin, 2000), 25. 
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Beckett: Contemporary Writing in the Wake of Modernism by Peter Boxall (2009), J.M. 
Coetzee and the Novel: Writing and Politics after Beckett by Patrick Hayes (2010), and 
Beckett and Contemporary Irish Writing by Stephen Watt (2009), and the collections 
Beckett after Beckett (2006), edited by Anthony Uhlmann and Stanley Gontarski, and 
Beckett at 100: Revolving It All (2008), edited by Linda Ben-Zvi and Angela 
Moorjani.21 The Oxford seminar on the topic, Samuel Beckett: Debts and Legacies, has 
also provided important interventions in this field, many of which have been published 
in the collections that resulted from this: Beckett’s Literary Legacies (2007), edited by 
Matthew Feldman and Mark Nixon; the volume of Samuel Beckett Today/Aujourd’hui 
entitled ‘Samuel Beckett: Debts and Legacies’; and the 2013 collection Samuel Beckett: 
Debts and Legacies.22 This study has most in common with Boxall’s work, in that both 
seek to trace some broad aspects of Beckett’s influence on contemporary writing. My 
approach differs from his, however, in that I focus on one aspect of Beckett’s 
achievement, irony, and provide an analysis of how it has been incorporated into certain 
examples of contemporary literature, whereas Boxall’s study touches on a greater 
variety of aspects of Beckett’s work and legacy, and a more diverse range of 
contemporary writers. The strength of the approach adopted here, it seems to me, is that 
it allows for a clear delineation of one specific branch of contemporary Beckettian 
influence, with a strong characterization of its implicit epistemological basis and 
rhetorical scope. I do not hope to claim that only one aspect of Beckett’s work is of 
interest in this respect, but I do feel that narrowing the focus to the matter of irony is a 
particularly good way to situate Beckett’s work and that of the three later writers in the 
context of broader developments in Western literary history, as well as to isolate certain 
crucial philosophical underpinnings of this development and the work whereby it is 
                                                          
 
21 Peter Boxall, Since Beckett: Contemporary Writing in the Wake of Modernism (London: Continuum, 
2009); Patrick Hayes, J.M. Coetzee and the Novel: Writing and Politics after Beckett (Oxford: OUP, 
2010); Stephen Watt, Beckett and Contemporary Irish Writing (Cambridge: CUP, 2009); Anthony 
Uhlmann and Stanley Gontarski, eds, Beckett after Beckett (Gainesville, FL: UP of Florida, 2006); Linda 
Ben-Zvi and Angela Moorjani, eds, Beckett at 100: Revolving It All (New York: Oxford UP, 2008). 
22 Matthew Feldman and Mark Nixon, eds, Beckett’s Literary Legacies (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars 
Press, 2007); Erik Tonning, Matthew Feldman and Matthijs Engelberts, eds, ‘Samuel Beckett: Debts and 
Legacies’, Samuel Beckett Today/Aujourd'hui, 22 (2010); Peter Fifield and David Addyman, Samuel 
Beckett: Debts and Legacies (London & New York: Bloomsbury Methuen Drama, 2013). 
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developed. As touched on briefly above, I understand Boxall’s conception of the 
‘broken tradition’ that Beckett engenders to be a very apt way of characterizing his 
significance for later writers. Unlike Boxall, I do not characterize it primarily in 
historical or political terms: where Boxall’s broken tradition is a result of Anglo-Irish 
displacement and alienation, that which I delineate in this thesis is connected to the 
history of the novel and the nature of modernity, as discussed in connection with 
Bakhtin’s thinking above. It might well be claimed that such a use of Boxall’s idea 
traduces it, running counter to the gist of the original argument. In my defence I would 
point out that, while this is a somewhat distant extrapolation, Boxall himself situates 
Banville, who is neither Protestant nor Anglo-Irish, within this broken tradition. The 
way Banville takes up this position is not discussed – his belonging to this tradition is 
simple asserted at various moments in the essay – but this perception would seem to 
indicate that the basis of this tradition could be framed in different terms. These could be 
alternative, perhaps broader, historico-political co-ordinates, or, as in my conception, 
rhetorical, aesthetic and philosophical bases. This is not to say that my conception 
cannot be articulated in historical or political terms; interesting discussions could no 
doubt be had about the significance of such responses in late capitalist culture and the 
extent to which they either acquiesce in or provide a locus of resistance to various 
economic, historical and political forces. It is simply the case that such are not my 
primary concerns here. 
This does however raise the question of the possibility of tracing a political 
dimension to the discussion carried out in this thesis. As my drawing on the work of 
Adorno and Rancière might indicate, I am interested in the way that, in modernity, the 
aesthetic relates to the political and other dimensions of culture. While I do not engage 
with the political implications of these question directly, my thinking has been informed 
by these thinkers’ shared idea that the aesthetic represents a site of contestation, a means 
whereby prevailing modes of perception, justification and explanation can be challenged 
and dismantled on terms other than those made possible by these modes themselves. I 
do see the work of all of the writers considered here to exemplify this aspect of the 
aesthetic to one degree or another (another reason to characterize such a tradition as 
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‘broken’ – or perhaps as a ‘tradition of breakage’), but I do not engage with political or 
historical dimensions extensively here.       
While I draw on Hayes’s work extensively in my discussion of Coetzee’s work 
in this thesis, his study does not deal with the other writers on which I focus, and the 
overlap between my work and his is hence limited to this material. There are certain 
areas of limited overlap between this study and Stephen Watts’s book. Most 
prominently, perhaps, his idea of ‘retrofitting’ coincides to some extent with the use to 
which I put Borges’s notion of writers creating their own precursors. There is far more 
to distinguish the two enterprises, however. There is the question of content: my work 
focuses exclusively on novels, where his does so only to a limited extent, and does not 
adopt a specific geographic focus, where his is concerned specifically with Ireland. The 
animating impulses of the respective enquiries also contrast to some extent. Watts 
frames his understanding of influence largely in the Bloomian terms of agon and anxiety, 
extrapolated via national genealogies and concerns; as I have indicated, I am interested 
in elective affinities, and the way these provide or are used to negotiate national, 
historical or political constraint. 
Of work that has been done on Beckett and Romanticism, that dealing with 
Schlegel’s irony has the most overlap with this study. Andrew Eastham’s view of the 
similarities between Beckett’s work and Schlegel’s conception of irony is that to which 
my own is closest. In his essay ‘Beckett’s Sublime Ironies: The Trilogy, Krapp’s Last 
Tape, and the Remainders of Romanticism’, Eastham argues that Beckett uses Romantic 
irony to stage an encounter with the sublime. Like me, Eastham understands Beckett’s 
irony in the trilogy to enact an ‘abyssal’ evacuation of subjectivity.23 Also, in a manner 
analogous to my sense that irony in the four writers considered here arises from 
interminable dialectics that do not admit of conceptual resolution, and hence as 
undermining the capacities of representation and comprehension, Eastham considers 
irony to be ‘the appearance of the infinite within the horizon of representation’ and thus 
to ‘appear as the limits of representation are experienced’ (ibid., 118).   
                                                          
 
23 Andrew Eastham, ‘Beckett’s Sublime Ironies: The Trilogy, Krapp’s Last Tape, and the Remainders of 
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Chapter I: Beckett’s Irony 
 
In this chapter, I spell out my understanding of the nature of the irony present in 
Beckett’s work by way of a discussion of various conceptions of the term, drawing 
primarily on the thought of Friedrich Schlegel and, following him, Paul de Man, and 
contrast these with what I term ‘allegorical’ modes. I also touch on the significance of 
the idea for the work of Auster, Banville and Coetzee at a number of junctures. 
Thereafter, through a discussion of the formal and stylistic strategies adopted in 
Beckett’s trilogy, I describe the specific ways in which his work instantiates a Romantic 
irony such as discussed by Schlegel, with specific focus, in the final section, on the 
depiction of subjectivity in the works. Because I see this irony as having important 
implications for Beckett’s legacy and the response of later writers to it, however, I first 
elucidate my understanding of the relation of influence as considered in this study. 
 
‘if indeed one can be “successor” to a crisis’: a model of influence 
 
The model of influence I adopt in this study is derived from the three authors’ own 
comments on their relation to Beckett’s body of work, an analysis of the style, structure 
and theme of the novels in question, and a consideration of Bakhtin’s theories of the 
genesis, development and nature of the novel as a literary form. The first of these is 
carried out in the following chapter, and the second will comprise the majority of this 
dissertation. It is to the last, Bakhtin’s theory of the novel, the implications of this for a 
construal of influence and intertextuality in the genre, and the ways in which this differs 
from Harold Bloom’s idea of influence, that I here turn. 
Harold Bloom’s thesis, outlined in Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry, has 
become the most influential treatment of the subject of influence insofar as it concerns 
poetic texts and authors. In Bloom’s understanding, influence is a matter of rivalry, in 
which ‘strong poets’ seek to overcome their forebears by ‘misreading … so as to clear 
imaginative space for themselves.’24 The anxiety referred to in the title is the instigating 
                                                          
 
24 Harold Bloom, Anxiety of Influence (New York: Oxford UP, 1973), 5. 
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impetus for such misreading: the burden of history and the weight of tradition confront 
the poet as a challenge to be overcome, and the poet’s response to such a challenge is to 
misread, in one or a number of possible ways, his or her forebears in order to make 
possible their own contribution to it. 
There is an explicitly Oedipal dimension to this model, and Bloom claims that 
Freud, along with Nietzsche, serves as the major influence on his theory (ibid., 8). The 
almost inevitable recourse to familial vocabulary when discussing the question of 
influence (‘forebear’, ‘heir’, ‘lineage’) may serve to strengthen this point of view, as 
would certainly – at least in the case of the writers under consideration at present – 
authors’ own accounts of their attitude, evaluation and response to exemplary 
predecessors. I do not want to deny that such elements are an important aspect of the 
relation of subsequent writers to prior; what I claim is that these comprise one aspect of 
the matter of influence, but do not account for all that is involved in the matter of an 
individual author’s response to a literary forebear or tradition. 
The particular point I wish to contest is Bloom’s assertion that the history of 
literature – or at least of poetry – consists in a progressive decline. As he puts it, 
The young citizen of poetry … quests for an impossible object, as his precursor 
quested before him. That this quest encompasses necessarily the diminishment of 
poetry seems to me an inevitable realization, one that accurate literary history 
must sustain. The great poets of the English Renaissance are not matched by their 
Enlightenment descendants, and the whole tradition of the post-Enlightenment, 
which is Romanticism, shows a further decline in its Modernist and post-
Modernist heirs. The death of poetry will not be hastened by any reader’s 
broodings, yet it seems just to assume that poetry in our tradition, when it dies, 
will be self-slain, murdered by its own past strength. (Ibid. 62) 
While Bloom does claim that ‘strong’ works of literature are in a crucial sense 
engendered by the struggle of writers with tradition, a conception of literary history such 
as that outlined above implies a necessary and irrevocable impediment of later works by 
earlier: the more ground that has been covered, the more material used, the less there 
remains for those who come after to do. 
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An example of a contrasting understanding of the interaction is to be found in 
Derek Attridge’s The Singularity of Literature, which draws on Kant’s account of the 
nature and function of originality in artistic and technical traditions.25 In this construal, 
an exemplary, original work can, and usually does, elicit and engender responses. A 
strikingly original treatment of a given form, a new presentation of a particular topic or 
another such innovation can make possible subsequent works that follow on from and 
develop the innovation of the prior work by way of further innovation. Where the 
Bloomian construal concentrates on the personal, emotive aspects of influence, Kant 
focuses on the technical development of a specific field, and the possibilities opened up 
by innovation. A consequence of this difference is the fact that, in the Bloomian model, 
the history of poetry is a steady diminishment, a gradual shrinking of possibility and 
resources, whereas, in the Kantian view, renewal is possible in the form of original 
responses to epochs, materials, conventions, and forms. An explanation for this 
difference may perhaps be found in the nature and aims of poetry – as Bakhtin 
understands them – and the ways in which these differ from those of other forms of 
literature, art and general human endeavour. 
Bakhtin claims in his essay ‘Epic and Novel’ that the novel differs from other 
genres primarily in its relation to the past. The epic, preeminent among and, in Bakhtin’s 
account, synecdochic for poetic forms, speaks from and takes place in an ‘absolute past’ 
which ‘is the single source and beginning of everything good for all later times’.26 The 
past, here, as the source and origin of tradition, is valorized to an extreme degree, and is 
treated with a sacred reverence. Proximity to this past confers value, and aesthetic and 
temporal priority hence coincide; conversely, the further something is from the source, 
the less value it has (another formulation of the idea of the steady diminishment of 
accomplishment posited by Bloom). This is necessitated by the ‘formal-substantive 
characteristic’ of epic poetry: ‘its reliance on impersonal and sacrosanct tradition, on a 
commonly held evaluation and point of view – which excludes any possibility of 
another approach – and which therefore displays a profound piety toward the subject 
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26 Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘Epic and Novel’, in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, 
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described and toward the language used to describe it, the language of tradition’ (ibid., 
17). The novel, in contrast, breaks down the barrier of absolute distance instantiated in 
the epic, speaking from and addressing the present. Even when set in and concerned 
with the past, its procedures, register and sensibility are contemporary, and meant to 
bring the subject matter closer rather than to elevate it. The pious attitude to tradition is 
replaced with curiosity and a willingness to question accepted notions and forms, among 
which, importantly, are other genres and works of literature. Sanctity and seriousness 
are replaced with familiarity. 
An important point is that ‘[i]t is precisely laughter that destroys the epic, and in 
general destroys any hierarchical (distancing and valorized) distance’ (ibid., 23). As 
Bakhtin points out, in a passage worth quoting at some length, 
Everything that makes us laugh is close at hand, all comical creativity works in a 
zone of maximal proximity. Laughter has the remarkable power of making an 
object come up close, of drawing it into a zone of crude contact where one can 
finger it familiarly on all sides, turn it upside down, inside out, peer at it from 
above and below, break open its external shell, look into its centre, doubt it, take 
it apart, dismember it, lay it bare and expose it, examine it freely and experiment 
with it. Laughter demolishes fear and piety before an object, before a world, 
making of it an object of familiar contact and thus clearing the ground for an 
absolutely free investigation of it. Laughter is a vital factor in laying down that 
prerequisite fearlessness without which it would be impossible to approach the 
world realistically. As it draws an object to itself and makes it familiar, laughter 
delivers the object into the fearless hands of investigative experiment – both 
scientific and artistic – and into the hands of free experimental fantasy. (Ibid.) 
Important in this analysis is the connection between the comic and the prosaic, between 
humour and the quotidian, a connection exemplified by the seminal Modern novel Don 
Quixote. The centrality of a comic attitude to the diminishing of epic distance and the 
creation of the novel would seem to suggest that any model of influence that relates to 
the form would necessarily need to factor in comedy. 
Auster’s, Banville’s and Coetzee’s attitudes and responses to Beckett’s work are 
likely to be informed by something more than a reverence for the past and a sense of the 
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oppressive weight of tradition. This is due, as argued above, to the nature of the novel 
itself, but also to the nature of Beckett’s achievement with the medium, one of the most 
striking of consequences of which is an undermining, a restructuring, of conceptions of 
influence and tradition. Beckett’s achievement in some senses recapitulates, in the 
shorter history of the modern European novel nested within Bakhtin’s more expansive 
view (whereby the naturalist novel, having become the epic of the bourgeoisie, is then 
itself subverted by non-naturalist forms), precisely the disruption and destabilization 
Bakhtin attributes to ‘the novelistic’ itself. As Peter Boxall puts it, 
[O]ne of the most significant of Beckett’s legacies, I would argue, is a conception 
of legacy itself, a conception of influence, which does not depend upon such 
opposition between past and future generations, between father and son, between 
parent and child. In Beckett’s writing, the father is as likely to belong to the 
future as he is to the past, just as those who register Beckett’s influence tend to 
think of him not as a parent to be slain, but as a possibility to be glimpsed.27 
From this perspective, Beckett’s influence, like that of the novel in general, is thus, 
rather than a citadel to be stormed, the spectral authority that cannot be made present, 
the castle K. continuously fails to approach.28 
 The shift between the Bloomian and Bakhtinian conceptions of tradition and 
influence may correspond to and follow an understanding of the relationship between 
the political and aesthetic, and hence the nature and function of literature. In situations 
in which, or to people to whom, the sources and grounds of power and authority seem 
self-evidently justified, the aesthetic partakes of such authority, and is thus justified, 
through its reflection, supplementation and explication of it. The Aeneid, The Divine 
Comedy or Paradise Lost are exemplary instances of what literature in this conception 
can and should be. When the basis of power seems less self-evidently justified, the 
strength of the aesthetic lies in its power of contestation – not of this or that position or 
regime, but of assertion in general, in its ability to destabilize and put into play any and 
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all positions. Jacques Rancière’s notion of dissensus and the importance of this in 
Modern art articulates a situation such as the latter particularly well.29 
 Toward the beginning and for a large portion of the novel’s history the 
subversive energies Bakhtin identifies operated to relatively strictly circumscribed ends. 
Like carnival, such parody is a temporary inversion for the sake of perpetuating the 
status quo; the disruption, authorized and constrained, ultimately reinforces prevailing 
power bases. In the modern era, however, such potentialities assume a valence beyond 
that completely constrained by political-aesthetic norms, manifested through an irony 
that troubles the possibilities of simple prescriptive accounts of ethics, authority, and 
power. Such a form of literature thus instantiates something of Rancière’s dissensus 
discussed above, a form of opposition to a given ‘distribution of the sensible’ through 
subversion of its organizing tenets.30  
There is something of such an opposition through subversion in Peter Boxall’s 
characterization of Beckett’s work as belonging to a ‘broken tradition’. 31  Boxall 
delineates a tradition in Irish writing that he sees as dealing with a certain cultural and 
geographic dislocation through an embracing and emphasis of this very dislocation. 
Considering most prominently Maria Edgeworth, Elizabeth Bowen and Beckett 
(although Banville’s work is also included in this trajectory), Boxall argues that the 
distorted presentation of (specifically Irish) place in such work reflects an Anglo-Irish 
sense of estrangement that finds a solution in a renunciation of unproblematic 
attachment or belonging. Such a renunciation is crucial to the establishment of an 
authentic Irish identity: ‘An Irish tradition here is founded upon the disappearance of 
Ireland, because it is only through such disappearance, such failure of reference, that the 
experience of living in cultural suspension can be accurately or authentically evoked’.32 
Such a self-positing on the part of Anglo-Irish literature in a position of minority 
parallels Bakthin’s understanding of the novel itself as occupying a decentred, non-
traditional space. Significantly for my project, considering as it does the question of 
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influence and legacy, Boxall considers such decentring to pose specific challenges in 
respect of responding to and following after such writers: as they situate themselves in a 
position removed from or oblique to tradition, writers who attempt to follow after them 
need to some extent or another to similarly achieve such obliquity. As Boxall puts it, 
‘For those who come after Beckett, it is necessary to find a way of belonging to this 
broken, dislocated tradition, to find a way to speak with a voice that comes at once from 
within and outside the face.’33 I endeavour, in the remainder of this study, to trace the 
ways in which Auster, Banville and Coetzee go about doing this. 
 Given my invocation of Bakhtin’s thought, it may seem odd that I make use of 
the term ‘influence’ at all, rather than organizing my analysis around intertextuality. I 
have chosen to do so because I see the relationship between Beckett and these later 
writers as, in Elke D’Hoker’s words, more than ‘merely a matter of stylistic winks and 
intertextual nods’.34 Instead, it consists in a response to and development of innovations 
in the use of the form of the novel, which in the progression from Murphy (1938) to The 
Unnamable (1953) Beckett profoundly de- and reforms, and a continuation, 
complication and extension of thematic concerns. These are issues that can be accounted 
for and explicated on the basis of the notion of intertextuality, but the formative role 
Beckett’s work plays in all three writers’ development would suggest that the interaction 
may be better apprehended through the notion of influence. 
 This is not to say that I shall not make reference to the intertextual play between 
these texts; there is much explicit and implicit echoing of and response to themes, form 
and narrative strategies. Certainly, my analysis, concerned as it is in large part with the 
logic of the development of a particular form of the novel, has need of recourse to a 
concept that entails the inter-illumination of texts. However, as Boxall indicates, among 
the most intriguing of Beckett’s legacies is a particular notion of legacy itself, of the 
ways in which relations to the future and the past are possible, and this is a matter better 
approached by way of influence. 
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I now turn to a discussion of Beckett’s achievement, with specific emphasis on 
the irony of his work, preparatory to the later elucidation of the influence of this on later 
writers. In writing here on irony, I follow most closely the thinking of Friedrich Schlegel 
and, following him, Paul de Man. Furthermore, as de Man does,35 I shall contrast the 
phenomenon with a certain conception of allegorical reading and writing in order to 
clarify it through opposition. Broadly stated, if allegory obtains its effects through 
correspondence, correlation, and contiguity, irony works by divergence, disjunction, and 
disruption; where allegorical modes of reading and writing emphasize and focus on the 
possibility of transparent and unambiguous interpretation, ironic modes seek to place the 
possibility of understanding and meaning in question and to disrupt the processes 
whereby significance is created or elicited. 
 
 ‘the rapture of vertigo’: irony and its others 
 
In all of its manifestations, irony involves ignorance or incomprehension. From 
Sophocles to Swift, Socrates to Sokal, the effect of irony hinges on the speaker or 
addressee, or both, of a given statement, actual or implied, not fully knowing or 
understanding the significance of what is being said. In A Modest Proposal, for example, 
the speaker fails to recognize the horror of what he is proposing; in Flaubert, the 
understanding of the irony is heavily dependent on and inflected by the awareness of the 
possibility of not understanding it, of the consciousness of an implied buffoon. As 
Wayne Booth points out, this can operate within the parameters of a fairly structured 
and stable rhetoric such that the divergence between what is said or written and what is 
meant is easily and instinctively resolved by anyone who is familiar with the form, or it 
can be more unstable and far-reaching, exerting disruptive effects that are not quite as 
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easily accounted for.36 Booth labels Beckett’s irony ‘infinitely unstable’, and considers 
it finally to be a form of nihilism, much as Hegel and Kierkegaard claim of Romantic 
irony. I differ with this point of view, as shall be discussed in some detail later in this 
chapter. The form of irony with which I am here concerned, as Gary Handwerk 
describes it, ‘involves not only the perception of someone else’s blindness, as in 
dramatic irony, but an enacted awareness of the factors that make everyone subject to 
repeated bouts of blindness.’37 
It is Schlegel who transforms the previously prevalent understanding of irony 
from that of a relatively narrow rhetorical device to the more broadly ranging sense of 
existential or cosmic incongruity, which I will argue is a result of a perception of a 
structural irony, the term is usually attended with today.38 The question of irony is 
central to Schlegel’s entire enterprise, and he treats of the subject in a suitably ironic 
manner. One consequence of this is that no clear and unequivocal definition of irony can 
be proposed. As J. Hillis Miller writes, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to state in so many words a ‘concept of irony’ …. 
Why this difficulty? It is because irony is, in the end, or perhaps even from the 
beginning, when there is no more than a ‘touch of irony’ in a discourse, 
unreasonable, incomprehensible. Irony is ‘Unverständlichkeit’ or 
‘incomprehensibility’ as such, as Schlegel's essay ‘On Incomprehensibility’ 
abundantly shows in its comic failure to be entirely reasonable and perspicuous 
about irony.39 
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Nevertheless, Schlegel does offer a number of formulations that may be read as 
gesturing toward a definition of the phenomenon. Perhaps the most interesting of these, 
at least in connection with Beckett’s trilogy, is that of ‘a permanent parabasis’.40 
Paul de Man, picking up on and extending this (with due caution that 
‘[d]efinitional language seems to be in trouble when irony is concerned’41), defines 
irony as ‘the permanent parabasis of the allegory of the tropes’ (ibid.), making reference 
to the necessarily confused nature of any attempt to treat of irony in rhetorical or 
tropological terms. As de Man puts it, 
Trope means ‘to turn’, and it’s that turning away, that deviation between literal 
and figural meaning, this turning away of the meaning, which is certainly 
involved in all traditional definitions of irony, such as ‘meaning one thing and 
saying something else’, or ‘praise by blame’, or whatever it may be – though one 
feels that this turning away in irony involves a little more, a more radical negation 
than one would have in an ordinary trope such as synecdoche or metaphor or 
metonymy. Irony seems to be the trope of tropes, the one that names the term as 
the ‘turning away’, but that notion is so all-encompassing that it would include all 
tropes. And to say that irony includes all tropes, or is the trope of tropes, is to say 
something, but it is not anything that's equivalent to a definition. (Ibid., 614–5) 
This trouble is evident, and very clearly so, as early as Quintilian’s treatment of 
the subject. As Gordon Teskey notes, Quintilian defines allegory as ‘continued 
metaphor’ and irony as ‘other speaking’ (saying the opposite of what one means),42 
treating irony as a class of allegory. As Teskey points out, however, ‘one cannot … by 
extending a metaphor, say the opposite of what one means’,43 and Quintilian’s system 
thus snags on the question of whether or not allegory encompasses irony entire. The 
solution is seemingly ad hoc: 
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Quintilian elsewhere states that irony can manifest itself either in the realm of 
figures or in that of tropes, and that figurative irony can have nothing to do with 
tropes such as metaphor and its extended form, allegory. Even for him there are 
species of irony that appear to escape enclosure by allegory, although their escape 
is equivocal. The first of these escapees ‘derives its name from negation’ and is 
called antiphrasis, ‘opposite speaking’. Quintilian’s uncertainty as to the inclusion 
of irony in allegory turns on whether antiphrasis, as absolute opposition, is a sport 
of irony or its radical essence. If antiphrasis is irony’s essence, than all moods of 
irony, from affectionate teasing to saeva indignatio, must threaten the very 
existence of what allegory has to affirm: the logocentric coherence of its 
meanings, grounded in the material unity of its signs – in a word, polysemy. 
(Ibid., 56–7) 
If allegory represents an almost Hegelian system in which the tropological motions of 
language are all finally sublated into an encompassing unity, irony represents the 
remainder, the very possibility of difference that can never be incorporated into an 
economy of the same. This is why it is a permanent parabasis of the allegory of the 
tropes: irony consists in stepping outside the circumscribing schema that accounts for 
meaning and that produces a sum significance without remainder, by taking the 
tropological turn through 180 degrees, such that obliquity becomes diametric opposition. 
This is the source of Hegel’s, and, thereafter, Kierkegaard’s, objections to 
Schlegelian irony, which both characterize as ‘absolute infinite negativity’. Kierkegaard 
claims that it ‘is negativity because it only negates; it is infinite because it negates not 
this or that phenomenon; and it is absolute because it negates by virtue of a higher which 
it is not. It is a divine madness which rages … and leaves not one stone standing on 
another in its wake.’44 Hillis Miller clarifies the source of Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s 
opposition to Schlegelian irony as stemming from the following: 
If irony is infinite absolute negativity, saying no to everything, it is therefore a 
permanent suspension or parabasis. Once you have got into this state of 
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suspension you cannot get out of it or go on progressing through some Aufhebung 
or sublation toward the eventual fulfillment of the absolute Idea. Irony is 
antithesis without any possibility of synthesis at a higher stage. It is an aporia in 
the etymological sense: a dead end or blind alley in thought, beyond which it is 
impossible to progress.45 
It is this aspect of the phenomenon that elicits the charges of nihilism. Importantly, 
however, it also implies that the ironic position is a necessarily non-thetic one. As 
Schlegel puts it, irony ‘contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism 
between the absolute and the relative, between the impossibility and the necessity of 
complete communication.’ 46  This characterization echoes an idea of Adorno’s on 
Modern art – ‘The transition to the discursively recognized universal by which the 
politically reflecting particular subject hopes to escape atomization and powerlessness is 
in the aesthetic sphere a desertion to heteronomy’47 – and the implications of the two 
points for discursive practice are analogous. 
 There is, however, a third way between the Schlegelian and Hegelian positions, 
and this is well articulated in Lloyd Bishop’s distinction between the modalities of 
French and German Romantic irony. Bishop considers Beckett to be among the most 
recent of examples of a specifically French tradition of Romantic irony. For Bishop, 
German Romantic irony as exemplified by Schlegel is marked by a euphoric ‘certainty 
of transcendence’,48 an attitude that, while recognizing the incommensurability of the 
finite and the absolute, is nevertheless at no point especially troubled by questions about 
the place of human consciousness in the cosmos as a result of this. Schlegel’s claim that 
‘Irony is clear consciousness of eternal agility, of the infinitely teeming chaos’, for 
example, continues to lay stress on the subject’s ‘clear consciousness’, and the place and 
identity of such an awareness in ‘the infinitely teeming chaos’ does not arise as a 
problem. In contrast to this, Bishop claims that French Romantic irony, represented by 
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such figures as Diderot, Stendhal, Flaubert, and Beckett, ‘involves the perception and 
artistic expression of unresolved ambivalence, contradiction, and paradox in human 
nature (including the hero and the author), of relativism in the realm of human values, 
and of a radical agnosticism in epistemological and metaphysical matters’ (ibid.). 
 The German Romantic point of view is characterized by an awareness of 
insurmountable epistemological constraints coupled, despite this, with a supreme faith in 
the capacities of the imagination. Kant’s understanding of the sublime is a good example 
of this: the very perception of human limitation serves merely to reassert the 
unlimitedness of the imagination, which is thus reaffirmed even by the fact of its failure. 
The persistence of tragedy in German Romanticism is similarly explained by this 
fundamental confidence in the human capacities to come to terms with the world. In 
contrast, as Bishop points out, the French equivalent of this is marked by a much deeper 
skepticism regarding the commensurability of our understanding and the world it seeks 
to account for, and is thus characterized by a tragicomic, absurd vision of humanity. 
This sort of Romanticism, and this sort of irony, is marked by a clear-eyed awareness of 
the partiality, limitation and presumptuousness of any claim to knowledge and 
understanding, which entails that the treatment of such matters invariably partakes of a 
deflation of pretensions and a diminution of human capacities. 
 Beckett’s work is certainly, and perhaps more than any other writer’s, marked by 
a ‘radical agnosticism in epistemological and metaphysical matters’.49 In interviews and 
non-fictional writing he repeatedly expresses the conviction that the world does not 
admit of human comprehension. (One thinks of the passage in Molloy (1951), parodying 
another Romantic prone to transcendent swoons: ‘he said, life is a thing of beauty … 
and a joy forever. … I said, Do you think he meant human life?’ (M, 172).) Tom Driver, 
for example, recalls Beckett saying, ‘When Heidegger and Sartre speak of a contrast 
between being and existence, they may be right, I don’t know, but their language is too 
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philosophical for me. One can only speak of what is in front of him, and that now is 
simply the mess.’50  
A central preoccupation of Beckett’s work is the negotiation of the implications 
of this insight for art. For instance, ‘Three Dialogues’ with Georges Duthuit are a 
sustained exploration of the possibilities and potentialities for art in the wake of the 
collapse of Western metaphysical certainties, and copies of notes taken from lectures 
delivered by the writer at Trinity in 1930 record that he was, through the unfavourable 
comparison of Balzac with Flaubert, at that point already conceptualizing Modern art in 
terms of its admittance of uncertainty and ambiguity.51 Tom Driver recalls an especially 
lucid avowal of this aesthetic: 
What I am saying does not mean that there will henceforth be no form in art. It 
only means that there will be new form, and that this form will be of such a type 
that it admits the chaos and does not try to say that the chaos is really something 
else. The form and the chaos remain separate. The latter is not reduced to the 
former. That is why the form itself becomes a preoccupation, because it exists as 
a problem separate from the material it accommodates. To find a form that 
accommodates the mess, that is the task of the artist now.52 
The emphasis placed here on form can be used to make sense of Beckett’s reading of 
certain French writers: Flaubert, for example, famously spoke of wanting to write a 
novel that would be about nothing and simply be pure form; Dan Gunn speculates that 
Beckett’s explanation of his decision to write in French as stemming from ‘the need to 
be ill equipped’ (mal armé) might perhaps be a bilingually punning reference to ‘the 
poet who made impotence so central to his oeuvre, Mallarmé.’53 Given this, it seems not 
overly contentious to contend that Beckett’s sense of a writing without style is 
intimately connected with his desire to create a form that admits the chaos. 
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Rather than a definable position, irony is manifest as an élan, a certain 
comportment toward others, ideas and the world that consists in the awareness of 
antitheses that admit of no sublation. The ‘feeling of the indissoluble antagonism 
between … the impossibility and the necessity of complete communication’ is the 
source of the attitude to the work urged by writers such as Stanley Cavell, T.W, Adorno, 
Simon Critchley and Jean-Michel Rabaté, and that would seem necessarily to inform 
any response to literature, and Beckett’s work in an especially intense, acute manner. 
Critchley discusses Derrida’s ‘good metaphor’ for such reading, the dredging machine.54 
Critchley sees the metaphor as implying that ‘whatever transcendental, metalinguistic or 
hermeneutic key is employed to unlock the text, such a matrix will always let the text 
fall back and remain as a remains.’55 Critchley is here responding to Derrida’s claim 
that, in Beckett’s writing, ‘The composition, the rhetoric, the construction and the 
rhythm of his works, even the ones that seem the most “decomposed”, that’s what 
“remains” finally the most “interesting”, that’s the work, that’s the signature, this 
remainder which remains when the thematic are exhausted.’ 56  This, again, draws 
attention to the importance of style in the attempt to come to terms with Beckett’s work: 
the trace that remains after the thematics have been exhausted, the texture and tone that 
persist in signifying after the significance – or the lack thereof – has been accounted for. 
This similarly implies that the ironic mode comes down to a question of style. 
The point is well made by Maebh Long: 
Writing so as to acknowledge the structural reworking(s) of irony involves a 
certain style, an engagement with a work that recognises within its singularity a 
force of reworking that explodes the text beyond its author, form, language, event. 
That is, each singular event is both produced and undone by the potential of 
the mark to be hyphenated to itself and other marks through infinite, aleatory 
(dis)connections. This ‘style’, which is also form or structure, performs a 
certain contamination of genres and discourses; the philosophical and the 
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literary, the public and the private, the fictional and the autobiographical, etc. 
Structural irony is therefore neither specifically humorous nor specifically 
bleak, although it can be manipulated to produce laughter and tears.57 
Long’s argument that the ‘style’ in which structural irony consists has the effect of 
disrupting demarcations between registers and forms would suggest an affinity with 
Bakhtin’s notion of the novelization of genres, and her definition of the technique as 
residing in ‘form’ or ‘structure’ resonates with my foregoing discussion of Beckett’s 
work. The idea of the simultaneously productive and disruptive effects of the 
phenomenon also falls directly in line with Schlegel’s and de Man’s characterizations. 
This latter implies, as Long indicates, the necessity of an awareness of the inescapable 
provisionality of any interpretation of such writing, and the need to be prepared 
perpetually to reposition and rethink hermeneutic schemata due to the ‘infinite, aleatory 
(dis)connections’ it sets in motion. 
 As almost everyone who writes on irony recognizes, the phenomenon is not a 
thetic one; it plays with and parodies thetic procedures, and in so doing obtains a 
perspective on them that they themselves are not able to, but it is not about the taking of 
positions. Irony operates on the paradox of positionality embodied in the assertion of a 
limit, as Blanchot’s response to and development of Levinas’s thought aptly 
demonstrates. In a Festschrift for Levinas, Blanchot describes how his encounter with 
the philosopher when they were students made him aware of a conception of philosophy 
as perpetual vigilance: 
Philosophy would be our companion forever, day and night, even in losing its 
name, becoming literature, knowledge, or nonknowledge – or becoming absent. 
Our clandestine friend, about whom we respect – we love – that which did not 
allow us to be linked to her, while having a premonition that there was nothing 
awake in us, nothing vigilant, including even sleep, that was not due to her 
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difﬁcult friendship. Philosophy or friendship. But here philosophy was precisely 
not an allegory.58 
Blanchot does not elaborate on this final point (that such a philosophy is precisely not 
allegory), but his aim in using it seems sufficiently well substantiated by the argument 
that follows. Levinas’s philosophy is characterized as an engagement with an 
insurmountable ‘skepticism’, meant not in the sense in which it is used in either ancient 
or modern philosophy59 but as the force of that which is ‘otherwise than being’,60 of that 
which ontology traduces. Such skepticism is the effect of the Other, its unknowability 
and inapproachability, and it is irrefutable because any refutation must occur in the order 
of the same, and hence be a refutation not of that which escapes conception but of some 
(mis)representation of it: ‘Skepticism is easily refuted, by a refutation that leaves it 
intact’.61 The impossible relation to such skepticism is the central focus of Levinas’s 
philosophy, which hence does ‘not afﬁrm anything that is not surveyed by an 
indefatigable refuter, to whom he does not yield, but who obliges him to go further, not 
outside of reason, into the facility of the irrational or of mystical effusion, but toward 
another reason, toward the other as reason or exigency’ (ibid.). 
The implications of this position for a feasible method for philosophy, Blanchot 
claims, produce the distinction Levinas draws, in Otherwise than Being, between the 
saying and the said. The said signifies a closed economy of reference, in which, as in 
allegory, the validity of the substitution of same for other, the movement from word to 
meaning, is assured by the control of the dominating scheme: ‘Through the said, we 
belong to order, to the world (the cosmos); we are present to the other with whom we 
can deal as equals – we are contemporaries’ (ibid., 148–9). ‘Through Saying’, in 
contrast, 
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we are torn from that order, but without order quietly disappearing into disorder: 
noncoincidence with the Other, the impossibility of being together in simple 
simultaneity …. On the contrary, we are subjected, laid bare (in a laying bare that 
is not presence or unveiling), a risky laying bare of oneself, obsessed or besieged 
through and through, to the point of ‘substitution’ – one that almost does not exist, 
existing only for the other – in the ‘one for the other’ relation. This relation must 
not be conceived as identiﬁcation, for it does not pass through being, nor is it 
simply nonbeing, for it measures the incommensurable. It is a relation of absolute 
impropriety, of strangeness and interruption. (Ibid.) 
This conception of ‘saying’ converges with my understanding of Beckettian irony: both 
work to rupture ontology, to fissure language in such a way as to interrupt its 
interruption of alterity. 
Blanchot, importantly, and very differently from Levinas, sees literature as 
playing, or able to play, as significant a role in this form of responsibility as philosophy. 
Levinas’s view of the relation of literature to the ethical can without distortion be 
claimed to be Platonic (in form and derivation), distrustful of the persuasive valence of 
rhetoric and uneasy about the irresponsibility of fiction.62 Blanchot, in contrast, sees 
literature as the form of discourse best able to disrupt mastery and self-enclosure to 
bring about a Levinasian ethical relation to the other. Literature is, in this view, 
essentially ethical (in the Levinasian sense of the term), bringing about the renegotiation 
of the category of the same through an encounter with an alterity that eludes, subverts 
and undermines conceptual schemes. Discussing the effect of the il y a, which he calls 
‘one of Levinas’ most fascinating propositions’,63 Blanchot writes: 
it draws us towards the uncertain outside, endlessly talking outside the truth – in 
the manner of an Other whom we cannot get rid of simply by labelling him 
deceitful (the evil genius), or because it would be a joking matter, since this 
speech, which is only a perfidiously maintained laughter, is nonetheless 
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suggestive. At the same time, this speech escapes all interpretation and is neither 
gratuitous nor playful. In the end it is sober, but as the illusion of seriousness, and 
it is thus what disturbs us most, since this move is also the most apt to deny us the 
resources of being itself, such as place and light. Perhaps all this is a gift of 
literature, and we do not know if it intoxicates while sobering, or if its speech, 
which charms and disgusts, doesn’t ultimately attract us because it promises (a 
promise it both does and does not keep) to clarify what is obscure in all speech – 
everything in speech that escapes revelation, manifestation: namely, the 
remaining trace of nonpresence, what is still opaque in the transparent. (Ibid., 49–
50) 
The terms in which the il y a is here described – it ‘escapes all interpretation and is 
neither gratuitous nor playful’ – correspond closely to the way in which I have thus far 
characterized the effect of irony. The long and dense history of theorization of the 
phenomenon also in some way indicates that irony both does and does not keep its 
promise ‘to clarify what is obscure in all speech – everything in speech that escapes 
revelation, manifestation: namely, the remaining trace of nonpresence, what is still 
opaque in the transparent.’ 
 Like Orpheus, whom Blanchot describes as wanting ‘to look into the night at 
what night is concealing – the other night, concealment made visible’,64 the reader’s 
desire to gain access through language to that which is by definition precluded by 
language can only proceed by way of a certain law-like transgression that is nevertheless 
not reducible to a law. Irony is the strategy whereby this series of contradictions is 
achieved. The movement of irony is analogous to that described above whereby 
philosophy traverses its own limits in the establishing of them, whereby the thinking of 
the limit is simultaneously the thinking of the excess of the limit. Such an un-delimitable 
vacillation is the reason why an ethical philosophy, like Orpheus’s inspiration, is 
‘precisely not allegory’: the interpretation of allegory operates within a restricted 
economy, in which correlation and abstraction – meaning – operate with clearly 
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circumscribed parameters, without excess, while the ethical stance is turned always 
toward, open to, exactly that excessive, inassimilable trace. As Johan Geertsema has 
argued, and as a glance at the history of the term since Schlegel makes clear, irony is the 
trope whereby Western thought has safeguarded this force of interruption. One might, if 
one felt so inclined, claim that literature, or art generally, is the institution whereby 
Western culture has safeguarded it.65 
 Of the authors considered in this study, this schema is most relevant to the work 
of J.M. Coetzee, given the number of responses to his work that read it as performing 
and exploring a markedly Levinasian engagement with the other, and given the 
emphasis on allegory in readings of his fiction. 66  Central to the textual strategies 
whereby Coetzee achieves this is an ironic undermining of allegory exactly analogous to 
the infinite dialectic between skepticism and responsibility discussed above. A certain 
form of allegory is elicited precisely for its habitual mode of conclusion to be 
interrupted, a particular motion of interpretation initiated in order to be perverted, and 
the sense of failed comprehension engendered thus enacts the ontological slippage that 
Levinas considers fundamental to the ethical relation. 
 I see this enacted in Beckett’s trilogy, where the narrators’ attempts to tell stories, 
achieve certainty, or order their experience invariably give way to more and more 
extensive and irresolvable ambiguity and incomprehension. An equivalent process 
seems almost inevitably to occur in any attempt to make sense of this writing. The effort 
to derive a meaning from this work that so persistently and thoroughly undermines its 
own would surely entail very close scrutiny of the assumptions and categories that 
inform the notion of interpretation itself. And yet, confronted with a text, a work of art, 
we cannot but try to make sense of it, even if that sense is finally a rejection of the 
notion of sense itself, and the endeavour hence destined to failure. 
 ‘No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better.’67 
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‘something gone wrong with the silence’: irony in Beckett 
 
Among the most prominent and consistently agreed on aspects of Beckett’s work is the 
volatile and unstable irony it performs and puts into play. In all of this writing a certain 
principle of irony is instantiated with such rigour and intensity that it becomes the 
discursive equivalent of a universal acid: this sort of ‘ironic temper’, as Paul de Man 
puts it, ‘can dissolve everything, in an infinite chain of solvents’.68 It is for this reason 
that Beckett’s writing is among the best examples of Northrop Frye’s claim that the 
ironic mode, which begins in ‘realism and dispassionate observation’, when pushed to 
far enough of an extreme, ‘moves steadily toward myth’.69 That is, what begins as an 
explicitly un-metaphysical form achieves – precisely through the rigorous and stringent 
renunciation of metaphysical recourse – something approximating metaphysical gravity. 
Parallels, for example, between Malone Dies (1951) and Aeschylus’s Prometheus, or the 
trilogy and the Divine Comedy, exemplify this. This is not, however, to discount the 
unique and consistent comic aspect of almost all the works. One of the most difficult 
aspects of discussing Beckett’s work is maintaining an awareness of, and giving equal 
emphasis to, the subtle balance that is struck between these two modalities. Bakhtin’s 
comment about the ‘ambivalent laughter, at the same time cheerful and annihilating’70 
that is elicited by the proto-novelistic forms is a particularly apt characterization of the 
tone of Beckett’s writing. 
The undermining of pieties and proprieties carried out through the diminishing of 
hierarchical distance is also a central feature, as is the inscription of a reflexive 
awareness of the ironies and instabilities of any particular point of view. Further, like the 
originary move away from distanced, hierarchically valorized subject matter and forms 
that Bakhtin sees as having made the novel possible, Beckett’s characteristic literary 
innovation consists in the incorporation of the low, the unnameable, the nothing, of 
content assumed essentially inimical to aesthetic expression. The similarity of early 
work such as Murphy to Menippean satire, which fits squarely into the category of pre-
                                                          
 
68 Paul de Man, ‘The Concept of Irony’. 
69 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957), 42. 
70 Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘Epic and Novel’, 15. 
36 
 
novelistic parodic forms, has long been noted. 71  The work of the middle and later 
periods, though, evolves in a more complex, subtle direction. My argument in this 
section is that the quasi-metaphysical irony instantiated by Beckett’s fiction and drama 
is a result of a following through with the comic, parodic energies alluded to by Bakhtin 
with such scrupulous rigour that, through some sort of meta-ironic reversal, they attain 
an almost metaphysical gravity (what is invoked in notions such as the absurd and so 
on). In contrast, passages of conventionally elevated register are attended by an 
inescapable hilarity. The discourse – whether on the stage or page – meanders between 
these two poles, with neither being accorded ultimate priority. 
By ‘meta-ironic’ I here refer to the nihilistic valence of the work, instantiated in 
the prevailing emphasis on finitude, ignorance, and impotence. The production or 
appreciation of irony often implies superiority over someone else, of being in on a joke 
at another’s expense or of seeing another’s ideas as deluded. This is the case, for 
example, in novels of Flaubert’s such as Madame Bovary and Bouvard et Pécuchet, in 
which characters’ sentimentality and unthinking conventionality are implicitly ridiculed 
from a position that sees through these. In order for this to be the case, the irony has to 
be stable, and bounded by a clear demarcation that separates two types of positions: 
those that fall within the demarcation, which are subject to irony; and those outside of 
this demarcation, which are not. In contrast, Beckett’s writing, as instantiated for 
example in the structure and style of the trilogy, can be seen to subject this specific 
stance to a destabilization that produces an irony of one greater degree, an irony of irony, 
which instantiates the ‘infinite vertige’ de Man considers characteristic of modern, post-
Romantic irony, and which, I will argue, characterizes the structure of the trilogy. 
Such a rendering ironic of irony is paralleled by the description in Watt of the 
‘risus purus’: ‘the laugh laughing at the laugh, the beholding, the saluting of the highest 
joke, in a word the laugh that laughs – silence please – at that which is unhappy’ (W, 40). 
In comparison with the ‘intellectual laugh’, which ‘laughs at that which is not true’, and 
the ‘ethical laugh’, which ‘laughs at that which is not good’, this is described as ‘the 
dianoetic laugh’, which, it is implied, laughs at the very capacity of the human mind to 
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find things funny, that is, to believe in its ability to establish a position of sufficient 
clarity and perspective to be able to recognize the incongruent and the absurd, and to 
distinguish this from that which is not it.72 
It is in this sense that I understand Nell’s statement in Endgame that ‘Nothing is 
funnier than unhappiness’: it is precisely that which we cannot accommodate, accustom 
ourselves to, or comprehend, and which thus disrupts security and certainty, that is the 
source of the laugh of laughs, the response that recognizes the inability of understanding 
to equip us for life in this world. Importantly, this recognition in and of itself precludes 
the possibility of recourse to the tragic as a means of accounting for the condition, as it 
undermines the confidence in human fitness for the world that is a necessary 
precondition for the tragic to hold. Instead, the only possible attitude is a tragicomic one 
that, in recognizing the limitations and absurdities inherent in the condition of having 
insufficient epistemological purchase on existence even to be sure of the extent to which 
this is the case, becomes subject to the infinite slippage of an unbounded, unstoppable 
irony. 
While such seems to me something like the general tone and register of, if not all 
of Beckett’s writing, then certainly the trilogy, it is a remarkably broad, diffuse 
phenomenon, and is thus elusive and difficult to pin down. It is, however, to a large 
extent instantiated through the accumulation of discrete and more clearly definable 
ironic techniques. Lloyd Bishop, for example, identifies the following seven modalities 
of irony in Beckett’s writing: ‘the ambivalent deflation of the hero’, ‘deflation of the 
narrator’, ‘authorial self-parody’, ‘self-reflexive irony’, ‘the self-deconstruction of the 
narrative’, ‘an explicit recognition by hero, narrator and implied author of the 
paradoxical coexistence of contraries of which the human condition is composed’, and 
‘an intangible ironic spirit hovering over the entire work and aimed not only at God and 
man but at the work itself and its author’.73 It is something like this last, the ‘intangible 
ironic spirit hovering over the entire work’, that I hope to pin down and describe in this 
section. While it may supervene on the other six, more delimited, forms of irony, this 
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seems to me a qualitatively different phenomenon, and one that because of this poses 
rather different challenges to interpretation and has different implications for the 
tradition than do the others. 
Perhaps the least clear-cut of these is the matter of ‘authorial self-parody’. There 
are numerous instances of what can be taken as ‘authorial self-parody’ in Beckett’s non-
literary writings and in interviews; as Bishop points out, he claims that the trilogy 
occurred to him when he became aware of his own ‘stupidity’, and there are many other 
examples of the author’s disparagement of his own work (ibid., 189). It seems far more 
the case, however, that such represents the author’s genuine opinion, rather than a 
consciously ironic self-parody such as one finds in Byron (Childe Harold and Don Juan, 
for example)74 or other writers who employ the technique. 
Similarly, while there are clear instances of the author’s use of events, places or 
people from his own life in his writing, as is thoroughly detailed in James Knowlson’s 
biography, 75  this is by no means necessarily self-parodic, and the material in such 
instances is almost invariably thoroughly worked on and altered, and used for obvious 
aesthetic and thematic ends. Therefore, while it is possible to establish relatively 
conclusively the points at which the author is making reference to himself or his life, 
and the source of these, it is difficult to identify clear and unequivocal moments of 
authorial self-parody in the novels or plays themselves. The tone and subject of the 
works in question further complicate such identification. 
As these are without exception novels about the failure of authority over the 
narrated material and the collapse of the faculties whereby sense is made of the self and 
the world, they can be read as commenting on Beckett’s own understanding of his 
aesthetic praxis. (Nevertheless, it must be said that such a point of view is finally 
supported by extra-textual evidence in the form of interviews and the author’s own 
critical writing, rather than by winks and nudges in the works themselves.) As is the 
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case in Krapp’s Last Tape, this aspect of the writing may thus be read as an 
encouragement to read the characters as surrogates for Beckett himself, and, in this way, 
as a parody of a certain set of notions of authorship. In making such a claim, however, I 
am by no means urging that Beckett’s work be read as veiled autobiography or 
confession, or that the ultimate meaning of it be reduced to something of this nature. 
Rather, this aspect of Romantic irony serves to bring into question the relationship of the 
author to the work – another prominent theme of the trilogy – and to destabilize any 
easy resolution of this. If such is the case, it is to some extent possible to see the 
sentiments expressed by the narrators of the novels of the trilogy as expressing, to one 
degree or another, the author’s own views, and thus as carrying out a fundamental 
authorial self-parody. 
The other three of the first four aspects of irony Bishop mentions (‘the 
ambivalent deflation of the hero’, ‘deflation of the narrator’, and ‘self-reflexive irony’), 
however, are strongly evident in Beckett’s work. They are also staples of both Bakhtin’s 
understanding of the novelization of literature and Romantic irony, and are an inevitable 
consequence of an admitting of multiple points of view in the attempt to give voice to 
the immanent plurivocity of experience. Byron, for example, provides many instances of 
deflation of the hero and narrator, and this is something of which it is almost impossible 
not to be aware in Beckett’s work. Molloy and, by the conclusion of his narration, 
Moran are figures able to move only by crawling, a collection of unruly tics and urges 
bound together only very loosely by a vague and crumbling sense of a goal to be 
accomplished. Like their psyches, and perhaps to be read as figures for these, their 
bodies steadily give way, fall apart, and rebel against them. Malone is not even mobile, 
and the narrowing of the horizons of his concerns serves to render him absurd, while 
with the advent of the Unnamable we are presented with something well and truly sub-
human, physically and spiritually. 
As the stories of these heroes are narrated in the first person, such a depiction of 
their failures and shortcomings serves similarly to deflate the narrator. This sort of 
deflation plays a crucial role in the creation of the prevailing general ironic sense that 
shades the narrative as a whole. One aspect of this occurs through, for example, aspects 
such as Molloy’s admission of the unreliability of his memory, or the obstructions to the 
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Unnamable’s acquisition of a clear perspective on things implicit in his physical, and 
metaphysical, condition, which alert the reader to the fact that much of the narration 
needs to be treated with a degree of skepticism on the basis of simple sensory or 
cognitive unreliability, as the narrators themselves readily admit. Malone, for example, 
when describing the conditions in his room, writes, ‘In the beginning it was different. 
The woman came right into the room, bustled about, enquired about my needs, my 
wants. … All that must be half imagination’ (MD, 9). Moran toward the conclusion of 
his narration provides a very good example of what I am here describing: 
But I also said, Yet a little while, at the rate things are going, and I won’t be able 
to move, but will have to stay, where I happen to be, unless someone comes and 
carries me. Oh I did not say it in such limpid language. And when I say I said, 
etc., all I mean is that I knew confusedly things were so, without knowing exactly 
what it was all about. And every time I say, I said this, or I said that, or speak of a 
voice saying, far away inside of me, Molloy, and then a fine phrase more or less 
clear and simple, or find myself compelled to attribute to others intelligible words, 
or hear my own voice uttering to others more or less articulate sounds, I am 
merely complying with the convention that demands that you either lie or hold 
your peace. For what really happened was quite different. (M, 89) 
Such a statement undermines the reliability or veracity of everything that has gone 
before, casting everything that has been and is to be related in doubt. This is one of the 
principle ways in which ‘the self-deconstruction of the narrative’ is brought about, by 
creating an interminably and inescapably paradoxical relation between the text and any 
interpretation thereof. The narrative’s ambivalence about its own signification means 
that the attempt to interpret it must of necessity be – to some extent, at least – an attempt 
to establish the significance of this ambivalence. 
The course of the trilogy presents a steady intensification of a structural irony of 
this sort, which finds its beginning in the second portion of Molloy. Moran’s narration, 
which can be, and usually is, read as the chronological beginning of the trilogy, begins, 
‘It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows’ (M, 95); the narration ends, ‘Then I 
went back into the house and wrote, It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. 
It was not midnight. It was not raining’ (M, 184). The concluding few sentences thus 
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place in question the entire narrative of the protagonist’s development to that point, a 
development that has – if one could call such a ‘development’ – consisted in the steady 
disfigurement of Moran’s body and mind. This sort of explicit contradiction of 
statements, which frames Moran’s otherwise largely perspicuous narration to render it 
unreliable, intrudes at moments into Malone’s ramblings and becomes in The 
Unnamable something of a compositional principle, such that in the final nine-page 
sentence of the novel almost every assertion is immediately followed by its own 
negation: ‘that’s all I know, it’s not I, that’s all I know, it’s not mine, it’s the only one I 
ever had, that’s a lie, I must have had the other, the one that lasts, but it didn’t last, I 
don’t understand, that is to say it did, it still lasts, I’m still in it, I left myself behind in it, 
I’m waiting for me there, no, there you don’t wait, you don’t listen, I don’t know’ (U, 
134). 
Another crucial aspect of such structural irony is the problematic identity of the 
narrating subject. Schlegel’s definition of irony – ‘a permanent parabasis’ – provides a 
particularly apt description of the structure and technique of Beckett’s trilogy. The idea 
of a permanent parabasis entails a mise en abyme, a perpetual stepping outside of a 
given narrative into another narrative, out of which one steps into yet another, and so on 
ad infinitum. One example of this is provided in Malone Dies, in which Malone’s 
narration alternates between the attempt to tell stories and various comments, reflections, 
and meditations on these attempts. Much of the narrative is thus comprised of parabasis 
– or, as Genette terms the narrative equivalent of the dramatic technique, ‘metalepsis’76 
– that consists in comment on the ‘story’ itself. A similar thing occurs in the first portion 
of Molloy, with the narrator pausing to comment on his failure of memory, his inability 
to describe something, or his general and overwhelming unreliability. As Wolfgang Iser 
puts it, 
the perceptions recorded in Molloy’s monologue are constantly accompanied by 
reflections on how they took place and what conditioned the manner in which 
they took place. Thus a single act of perception often releases a chain-reaction of 
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self-observation, as the narrator seeks to find out what brought about the act and 
why it took the form it did take. This process is sometimes taken so far that the 
original perception and the self-questionings that spring from it become 
completely dissociated.77 
Such a dissociation between chains of reflection and their object is among the primary 
means whereby the perpetual metalepsis is achieved, and is a central aspect of the 
enactment of subjectivity performed in the trilogy. I shall turn to this subjectivity after a 
brief exploration of the presence in Beckett’s work of what Bishop terms the 
‘paradoxical coexistence of contraries of which the human condition is composed’.78 
I have touched on the subtle interplay of comic and tragic modulations in 
Beckett’s work previously, which has the effect of, if not providing ‘explicit 
recognition’, at least in some way enacting such ‘paradoxical coexistence of contraries’. 
This awareness of contraries is to my mind evidenced in, for example, the relationship 
between the tramps in Waiting for Godot. Despite the thoroughgoing brute facticity79 of 
the existences there depicted, as well as the contrasting relationships organized almost 
entirely around domination and subservience (Pozzo/Lucky), solicitude for one 
another’s wellbeing and fraternal care and concern bespeak the continued possibility of 
elementary forms of communion. Nagg and Nell in Endgame present another good 
example of this, and one similarly contrasted with the coercive interactions of Hamm 
and Clov, an element that helps account for the surprising frequency of moments of 
warmth and tenderness in an oeuvre that is scrupulously consistent in its adherence to an 
aesthetic of disenchantment. 
An awareness of irresolvable contraries also seems to me a central factor in 
Beckett’s understanding of the condition of subjectivity. As he said in an interview with 
Tom Driver, ‘If life and death did not both present themselves to us, there would be no 
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inscrutability. If there were only darkness, all would be clear. It is because there is not 
only darkness but also light that our situation becomes inexplicable.’80 The author’s 
fondness for the line, ‘Do not despair; one of the thieves was saved. Do not presume; 
one of the thieves was damned’ 81  similarly articulates an acute sense of such 
irresolvable contrariety and the metaphysical absurdity that inevitably results from it, 
and is a crucial aspect of his attitude and response to skepticism. 
The implications of this for personal experience and identity are well articulated 
by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in a passage cited by Iser in his discussion of the depiction 
of the self in Beckett’s work: 
We know that there are errors only because we possess truth, in the name of 
which we correct errors and recognize them as errors. In the same way the 
express recognition of a truth is much more than the mere existence within us of 
an unchallengeable idea, an immediate faith in what is presented: it presupposes 
questioning, doubt, a break with the immediate, and is the correction of any 
possible error. Any rationalism admits of at least one absurdity, that of having to 
be formulated as a thesis. Any philosophy of the absurd recognizes some meaning 
at least in the affirmation of absurdity.82 
For Merleau-Ponty, identity, the positing of the self to the self, rests on an originary, 
arbitrary, affirmation that, ‘because it is anterior to revealed truth and error, makes both 
possible’ (ibid., 296). 
 The trilogy, in contrast, works its way back to a moment prior to this originary 
affirmation, and in doing so undoes the possibility of both truth and error, opening onto 
an infinite skepticism. This is where I locate ‘the intangible ironic spirit hovering over 
the entire work’, the permanent parabasis of identity instantiated by precisely the 
subject’s attempt to establish a coherent identity. I therefore turn now to a discussion of 
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the presentation of subjectivity offered in the trilogy and the connection of this to 
skepticism, and conclude with a discussion of the relevance of the notion of Romantic 
irony to an understanding of this irresolvable nucleus of subjectivity and skepticism. 
 
‘as for myself, that unfailing pastime’: the irony of subjectivity 
 
Certain comments Molloy, Malone and the Unnamable make indicate that one and the 
same voice narrates all the stories of the trilogy (and even earlier of Beckett’s novels, 
such as Murphy), steadily shedding personae in a progression toward the true self. For 
example, the narrator claims, ‘All these Murphys, Molloys and Malones do not fool me. 
They have made me waste my time, suffer for nothing, speak of them when, in order to 
stop speaking, I should have spoken of me and me alone. … It is now I shall speak of 
me, for the first time. I thought I was right in enlisting these sufferers in my pains. I was 
wrong’ (U, 14). This is then continued in the course of The Unnamable itself, with the 
narrator calling himself at various times Basil, Mahood, and, finally, Worm. By the time 
the narrator resorts to the last of these, the self-consciously contingent nature of the 
designation and the process thereof is strongly emphasized: ‘But it’s time I gave this 
solitary a name, nothing doing without proper names. I therefore baptise him Worm. … 
I don’t like it, but I haven’t much choice’ (U, 51). The idea that the various stories 
narrated and personae adopted over the course of the trilogy are all emanations of the 
same identity is further substantiated by the very beginning, where the narrator of 
Molloy says, ‘This time [Molloy], then once more I think [Malone Dies], then perhaps a 
last time [The Unnamable], then I think it’ll be over, with that world too. Premonition of 
the last but one but one’ (M, 4). This would seem to indicate that each successive 
narrator of the trilogy is inaugurated by way of a metalepsis from the previous one, each 
narrative consisting in a stepping aside from the one before into a less mediated, more 
direct commerce with the audience. The steady reduction in traditional literary 
accoutrement and the apparatus of plot and scenery from novel to novel, and the 
increasing amount of direct narrative comment – Malone’s musings, the Unnamable’s 
attempt to establish a certain statement – also support such a reading. 
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There is however every indication that the narrative will never produce the self-
coincidence so devoutly to be wished, and the entire project is fundamentally and 
inescapably impossible: ‘there might be a hundred of us and still we’d lack the hundred 
and first, we’ll always be short of me’ (U, 52). Malone, for example, writes, ‘My 
concern is not with me, but with another, far beneath me and whom I try to envy …. To 
show myself now, on the point of vanishing, at the same time as the stranger, and by the 
same grace, that would be no ordinary last straw. Then live, long enough to feel, behind 
my closed eyes, other eyes close’ (MD, 20–1). The possibility that he is in the above 
passage referring to the Unnamable is strengthened by the Unnamable’s claims that, 
To tell the truth I believe they are all here, at least from Murphy on, I believe we 
are all here, but so far I have seen only Malone. Another hypothesis, they were 
here, but are here no longer. I shall examine it after my fashion. Are there other 
pits, deeper down? To which one accedes by mine? Stupid obsession with depth. 
Are there other places set aside for us and this one where I am, with Malone, 
merely their narthex? … No, no, we have all been here forever, we shall all be 
here forever, I know it. (U, 3) 
Such duplication of personae arises, it seems, from an attempt to conclude the narration 
by giving voice to the ‘true self at last’, for the speaking subject to coincide with the self 
that is the subject of the speech. That this goal is connected to the desire for silence and 
non-being is indicated by Molloy’s saying, ‘What I’d like now is to speak of the things 
that are left, say my goodbyes, finish dying’ (M, 3), an attitude shared by Malone. The 
unidentified ‘They’, however – what Hugh Kenner calls the ‘Committee of the 
Zeitgeist’83 – ‘don’t want that’, and the Unnamable claims, ‘I am obliged to speak. I 
shall never be silent. Never’ (U, 1). 
This can be construed as a desire for conclusion, for the self to overcome the 
duality, the multiplicity, of being both subject and object, of being both speaker and that 
which is posited by speech. (Molloy, for example, claims that, ‘To restore silence is the 
role of objects’ (M, 10).) The telling of stories is undertaken for the sake of finishing the 
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story, and ending the interminable discourse of the self with the self. The failure of this 
to happen, though, would seem to indicate that the novels demonstrate that any positing 
of a conclusive identity begs the question as to who posited it, thus again opening up the 
question of the self. In the flight from ‘shapelessness’ and ‘speechlessness’, every 
invention of the self is necessarily partial and leaves a remnant of the self unexpressed, 
which thus leads to a further ‘relapse to darkness’. The paradox is enacted by Malone 
Dies and The Unnamable in different ways: Malone’s death, the ostensible subject of the 
narration, can by definition not be part of the first-person narrative, while the very title 
of The Unnamable names this impossible obligation of designating identity. 
The self-deconstructive irony at work in these novels can thus be seen to enact 
the infinitely recursive relation of the self to the self that is the irresolvable nexus of 
identity. Asja Szafraniec discusses the depiction of subjectivity in Beckett’s work with 
reference to Derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s model of consciousness as immediate self-
presence. As she puts it, Derrida demonstrates that the relation of the self to the self 
is never pure, but always built on a more fundamental difference. The relation to 
the other and the relation to self are two inseparable aspects of the same moment, 
two poles between which the ‘I’ is suspended in endless movement. This 
functions just as does a mirror reflection when two mirrors are facing each other, 
involving not only the movement outside to the reflecting surface and back but 
also the other way around. I reflect myself in the other, yet at the same time I am 
the mirror in which the other, in whom I am reflected, is reflected in me. No 
constitution of the self is possible without this endless movement, but with it, no 
constitution of the self is absolutely originary or complete.84 
While the structural analogy between the image here employed and the mise en abyme 
implied in the notion of permanent parabasis I have spelt out is of tangential interest, 
this description of the basis of subjectivity – or, as Szafraniec, following Derrida, terms 
it, the ‘effects of subjectivity’ or ‘the subjectile’ – perfectly captures the condition 
described and enacted by the narrators of the trilogy. 
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The simultaneous necessity and impossibility of existing thus is the source of the 
compulsion to go on speaking, to attempt relentlessly to give voice to that which cannot 
be named, which is also presented, in my reading, as enacting a central aspect of 
subjectivity. In such a vision and depiction of subjectivity, the self is always decentred, 
and thus engaged in a perpetual renegotiation of identity in order to establish a position 
of stable subjectivity. As Helga Schwalm puts it, this depiction revolves around ‘the 
pivotal paradox of identity or self-consciousness envisaged as self-reflection. … [T]he 
Beckettian self/subject endeavours to see itself, to turn itself into an object. … [but in] 
Malone Dies and The Unnamable it is further and further contracted into the self 
reflecting on the impossibility of self-reflection.’85 
 As Beckett’s ‘creatures’86 indicate, this is interminable: any identity adopted 
becomes eccentric to the self, and the only possible stance is one of continuous 
repositioning. While in many respects the trilogy appears to pursue the evacuation of 
subjectivity, the reduction of the possibilities of the self to nothing, its structure can 
more accurately be read as enacting the phenomenological implications of the 
ontological basis of self-consciousness. This is cast in starkest relief in situations in 
which one is thinking about oneself, in which the self is the object of cognition, which 
Wolfgang Iser’s discussion of the depiction of subjectivity in Beckett’s work deals with 
particularly well. 
Iser, beginning from Nietzsche’s view of mental activity as ‘a selection, a 
simplification, an attempt at forming a gestalt … a completely active reformation’,87 
argues that the process of the trilogy demonstrates the implications of this for the 
attempt to give expression to the self. (The etymology of the very term ‘express’, and 
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the metaphor of communication and selfhood it implies are worth bearing in mind at this 
juncture.) To think of the self, and, hence, to give expression to it, one must necessarily 
falsify it through such simplification and reformation; as Molloy puts it, ‘you must 
choose, between the things not worth mentioning and those even less so. For if you set 
out to mention everything you would never have done, and that’s what counts, to be 
done, to have done’ (M, 39). The desire to express the true self is hence a contradictory 
one. Iser cites Merleau-Ponty’s thought in relation to this: ‘When I try to pass from this 
interrogative state to an affirmation, and a fortiori when I try to express myself, I 
crystallize an indefinite collection of motives within an act of consciousness. … My 
absolute contact with myself, the identity of being and appearance cannot be posited, but 
only lived as anterior to any affirmation.’88 
The narrators’ desire to give expression to themselves thus results in their 
creating alternative selves, and the problem they are trying to solve in doing so simply 
proliferating. The process is described with reference to Molloy’s narration: 
This reflection is embedded in a process which Molloy would like to narrate but 
which he has to falsify because the convention of narration has its own laws …. 
Narration sets out to convey something which cannot possibly be conveyed by it, 
and so any narrative representation must inevitably lie. Molloy is fully aware that 
both the presentation and the communication of any given reality can only result 
in the alteration of that reality ….89 
Molloy’s recognition of this, according to Iser, leads him to want to contextualize, 
supplement, qualify and explain his statements, such that ‘a single act of perception 
releases a chain-reaction of self-observation …. Thus the conscious mind turns its 
attention away from the interpretation of things and onto its own actual processes of 
interpretation’ (ibid.). And because precisely the same limitations pertain to the attempt 
to interpret the faculties of interpretation as to interpret things, and because, crucially, 
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the self is in central ways constituted precisely by these faculties of interpretation, this 
leads to the infinite metalepsis of subjectivity described previously. 
 Iser describes subjectivity in Malone Dies as being ‘a ceaseless dialectic that is 
never synthesized’ (ibid.). This dialectic involves a movement between two modes of 
awareness the text repeatedly contrasts. For example, toward the very beginning of his 
narration Malone contrasts ‘earnestness’ with ‘playing’: 
This time I know where I am going, it is no longer the ancient night, the recent 
night. Now it is a game, I am going to play. I never knew how to play, till now. I 
longed to, but I knew it was impossible. And yet I often tried. … But it was not 
long before I found myself in the dark. That is why I gave up trying to play and 
took to myself for ever shapelessness and speechlessness, incurious wandering, 
darkness, long stumbling with outstretched arms, hiding. Such is the earnestness 
from which, for nearly a century now, I have never been able to depart. From 
now on it will be different. I shall never do anything any more from now on but 
play. No, I must not begin with an exaggeration. But I shall play a great part of 
the time, the greater part, if I can. But perhaps I shall not succeed any better than 
hitherto. Perhaps as hitherto I shall find myself abandoned, in the dark, without 
anything to play with. Then I shall play with myself. (MD, 4) 
‘Playing’ is here synonymous with telling stories. Malone almost immediately before 
this passage, in an explicit explanation of the attitude and approach he has chosen to 
adopt toward his situation, says, ‘I will not weigh upon the balance any more, one way 
or another. I will be neutral and inert. … While waiting I shall tell myself stories’ (MD, 
3–4). In the passage itself he refers to the elicitation of characters in which story-telling 
consists: ‘I began to play with what I saw. People and things ask nothing better than to 
play, certain animals too. All went well at first, they all came to me, pleased that 
someone should want to play with them. If I said, Now I need a hunchback, immediately 
one came running, proud as punch of his fine hunch that was going to perform’ (MD, 4). 
It is also well worth recalling that within the first few pages of his narration Molloy 
similarly says, ‘What I need now is stories’ (M, 9). 
 This centrality of the creation of stories is further emphasized by the repeated 
use of the word ‘invent’ throughout the trilogy. Molloy, for example, says, ‘Saying is 
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inventing. Wrong, very rightly wrong. You invent nothing, you think you are inventing, 
you think you are escaping, and all you do is stammer out your lesson, the remnants of a 
pensum one day got by heart and long forgotten, life without tears, as it is wept’ (M, 29). 
Malone for his part claims, 
Live and invent. I have tried. I must have tried. Invent. It is not the word. Neither 
is live. No matter. I have tried. … But at each fresh attempt I lost my head, fled to 
my shadows as to sanctuary, to his lap who can neither live nor suffer the sight of 
others living. … After the fiasco, the solace, the repose, I began again, to try and 
live, cause to live, be another, in myself, in another. … But little by little with a 
different aim, no longer in order to succeed, but in order to fail. What I sought, 
when I struggled out of my hole, then aloft through the stinging air toward an 
inaccessible boon, was the rapture of vertigo, the letting go, the fall, the gulf, the 
relapse to darkness, to nothingness, to earnestness, to home …. (MD, 19–20) 
An interminable dialectic such as Iser identifies seems to be clearly described here. 
Because, as Schwalm points out, ‘language affords neither self-reference nor the flight 
into pure fiction’,90 the subject, desiring to be conclusively expressed, is never released 
from the interminable need to go on giving voice to this failure of self-coincidence in 
the hope, paradoxically, of achieving it. 
Involved in this depiction, then, is the transposition of skepticism to a 
phenomenological scheme, and the exploration of the implications of this for 
subjectivity. As I have shown, the presentation of this in the trilogy operates on the basis 
of an irresolvable irony at the centre of subjectivity such that the self’s relation with 
itself is always necessarily disrupted and opaque. Such irony is pervasive and all-
encompassing, arising in the very instant of awareness, and thus colours all products of 
thought. The remorseless clarity with which Beckett’s fiction lays this quandary bare 
means that those who seek to follow him, in whichever manner or means, are almost 
inevitably obliged to contend with it. 
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Chapter II: Influence and Testament 
 
Not least among the reasons for the choice of authors considered in this study are the 
frequent references made by all three to Beckett’s writing. In interviews, essays, 
speeches and editorial comment, Auster, Banville and Coetzee have all explicitly 
indicated the importance of Beckett’s work for their own conception and practice of 
literature. It is important to emphasize at this point that I do not claim that these, or any 
other, authors’ comments on their own work are uncomplicated, or even consistent. As 
Coetzee, with skepticism characteristic of his views on this particular point, puts the 
matter in an essay entitled ‘Homage’, ‘a reader versed in the vicissitudes of 
autobiography will receive what I say with due caution’.91 Nevertheless, the consistent 
concern with and importance accorded to Beckett’s work by the three authors in 
question would seem to warrant an overview of their views and opinions on the 
significance of the former’s achievement. Such an undertaking is further justified by 
their striking similarity, in tone and perspective. In contrast to the heavily theoretical 
treatment which has been the norm in academic discussion of Beckett’s writing, the 
focus of Auster’s, Banville’s and Coetzee’s comments and writings is often on the style, 
technique and emotional force of the fiction. I discuss the significance of this in the final 
section of this chapter, after first discussing the three writers’ respective comments on 
Beckett’s life, work and influence. 
 
‘the morality of a good sentence’: Paul Auster 
 
Paul Auster recalls having had ‘the good fortune to meet Beckett a few times in Paris – 
several one-on-one conversations with him that lasted hours – and to have corresponded 
with him over the years.’92 They chatted of this and that, but Auster singles out one 
memory because ‘it made such a deep impression on me and it taught me so much about 
what it means to be a writer.’ He recounts the following incident: 
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[A]t some point during the conversation, Beckett told me that he had just finished 
translating Mercier et Camier, which was his first French novel; it had been 
written about twenty-five years earlier. I had read the book in French and liked it 
very much, and I said, ‘A wonderful book.’ I was just a kid, after all. I couldn’t 
suppress my enthusiasm. Beckett shook his head and said, ‘Oh no, no, not very 
good. In fact, I’ve cut out about twenty-five percent of the original. The English 
version’s going to be a lot shorter than the French.’ And I said (remember how 
young I was), ‘Why would you do such a thing? It’s a wonderful book. You 
shouldn’t have taken a word out.’ He shook his head and he said, ‘No, no, not 
very good, not very good.’ We went on to talk about other things, and then, out of 
the blue, ten or fifteen minutes later, apropos of nothing, he leaned forward across 
the table and he said to me, very earnestly, ‘You really liked it, huh? You really 
thought it was good?’ This was Samuel Beckett, remember. And not even he had 
any idea of what his work was worth. (Ibid.) 
Auster’s affection for the older writer is quite apparent here, as is his enthusiasm for the 
work, and the picture that emerges of Beckett – scrupulously self-doubting, humble to a 
fault – is very endearing. (This latter, though, is perhaps based on a mistaking of general 
aesthetic fastidiousness for diffidence: Bram van Velde recounts how, when he showed 
Beckett some of his paintings and indicated that he was rather pleased with them, 
Beckett replied, ‘There’s really no reason to be.’93) 
Of his first reading of Beckett (Malone Dies), Auster writes: 
while I have no doubt that I am reading something important, something brilliant, 
a part of me resists it, and I walk away from the book feeling admiration but not 
love. This has often happened to me with the writers I care about most, the 
writers I consider to be great writers. Their work is so original, so utterly different 
from anything you have encountered before, that at first you don’t know what to 
make of it.94 
                                                          
 
93 Charles Juliet, Conversations with Samuel Beckett and Bram van Velde, trans. Tracy Cooke et al. 
(London: Dalkey Archive Press, 2009), 95.  
94 Paul Auster, Mountains to the Sea DLR Festival Address, Sept. 8, 2010, http://www.podcasters.tv/ 
episodes/the-beckett-address-12138461.html>. 
53 
 
Then he reads Molloy, and he is ‘inside it, incredulous’: 
By midsummer 1966, I have read every word Beckett has published: every novel, 
every story, every poem, every play. Imagine the joy, the demonic pleasure, the 
mad and improbable ecstasy that filled my nineteen-year-old heart when I 
stumbled across a passage like this one from Watt [‘Personally, of course, I regret 
everything. Not a word, not a deed, not a thought …’]. (Ibid.) 
Auster singles out the delight occasioned by the reading of Watt for specific mention, 
with emphasis placed on the comedy of the novel. Further, he dwells on the significance 
of the technical and stylistic accomplishment of the writing, which so arrested his 
attention as a writer. 
Auster claims that, ‘I thought [Beckett] had solved the writing of prose’ (ibid.), 
and the effect of this impression seems to have steered Auster away from any attempt 
intentionally to absorb or adopt the influence. Rather, he says that ‘early on in my 
attempts to become a writer, I was almost crushed by him. The force of his brilliance 
and originality was something that I couldn’t even see my way around.’ While this 
comment testifies to Auster’s admiration for the work, it may seem – made, as it is, in 
response to the question as to whether there is any direct influence of Beckett on his 
work – to lend support against concluding in the affirmative: he makes it clear that he 
felt it necessary to desist from trying to write before he’d sufficiently worked his way 
out from ‘under the spell of Beckett’. Nevertheless, Auster continues, ‘It was later, when 
I was about thirty, that I had the courage to start writing prose again, and by then I’d 
grown up enough not to feel intimidated. I wasn’t thinking about Samuel Beckett then, 
or anybody else. I had my own things to say, but I think if there’s any person who 
marked me, I can’t think that it would be anyone but Beckett’ (ibid.). These comments 
must, however, be read in light of subsequent autobiographical comments. In the 
collection of his correspondence with Coetzee, Here and Now: Letters (2008–2011), 
Auster makes his reluctance to accept the invitation to give the talk in which they were 
made clear.95 The implication appears to be that the influence, such as it is, has been 
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entirely subsumed into Auster’s own fictional projects, and hence entirely worked 
through. 
 The influence remains apparent in the thematic concern with destitution and 
dismemberment, both physical and mental, and in the metafictional aspects of the 
cognitive games the fictions play; The New York Trilogy (1985–1986) displays this most 
clearly, but traces remain in later novels such as Travels in the Scriptorium (2007). 
While not as obviously as is the case in Banville’s and Coetzee’s fictions, or to the same 
extent, Auster’s prose also bears traces of the stylistic influence of Beckett’s, in, for 
example, the spareness and uninflected tone of the narrative voice. There is a significant 
difference between Auster’s fiction and that of the other three writers, though, in the 
relative absence of elements of the grotesque, to which topic I turn at a later point. 
 
‘our only duty – inexplicable and futile of attainment’: J.M. Coetzee 
 
J.M. Coetzee has consistently and frequently written and spoken on Beckett throughout 
his literary and academic career. This in itself is testament to the author’s importance to 
the reclusive South African, who has displayed an increasing reluctance to give public 
lectures since achieving literary recognition. The fact that a significant percentage of the 
exceptions to this trend relate to Beckett would seem to indicate a particular affection 
for or interest in the Irish writer and his work. 
A piece that in some ways sums up Coetzee’s reception of Beckett’s work and 
example is that published in Beckett Remembering/Remembering Beckett.96 Speculating 
on what might have happened had Beckett secured and accepted the position for which 
he applied at the University of Cape Town in 1937, and remained there until Coetzee 
enrolled as an undergraduate in 1957, Coetzee writes, 
Since I would have been no less resistant to adopting Professor Beckett or anyone 
else as a spiritual father than Professor Beckett would have been to adopting me 
as a spiritual son, I would in all likelihood have left South Africa once I had 
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graduated – as indeed happened …. But I would certainly not have spent my time 
at the University of Texas labouring over a doctoral dissertation on Professor 
Beckett’s prose style. (Ibid.) 
There is something very apt about this being included in a book on Samuel Beckett 
subtitled ‘Uncollected Interviews with Samuel Beckett and Memories of Those Who 
Knew Him’: in this imagined history, Beckett might be Coetzee’s very own Godot. I say 
that this is characteristic of Coetzee’s reception of Beckett because this paradoxical 
affiliation by mutual refusal of affiliation – in imputing to Beckett a tendency toward 
dis-affiliation analogous to that he proclaims for himself, Coetzee implies a fundamental 
sympathy between the two – is a particularly clear articulation of a non-positionality and 
non-affiliation for which Coetzee takes his cue from Beckett but which, as could only be 
the case, he must then ultimately elaborate on in his own style. This elaboration was 
carried out through close study and much work, and is apparent in the development of 
Coetzee’s early works. 
Coetzee’s first formal treatment of Beckett’s work was his doctoral dissertation 
of 1969. 97  The thesis conducted a computer-based stylistic analysis of the English 
fiction, combining, in many ways, Coetzee’s prior interests in linguistics, computer 
programming, and literature. While Coetzee has since questioned the method and 
procedures employed therein (saying of the project that ‘we find precious little about 
Beckett that we might not have guessed’ (DP, 21)), David Attwell identifies some of the 
major preoccupations of Coetzee’s own fiction reflected in the aspects of Watt that are 
singled out for analysis. As Attwell puts it, 
The emphasis of Coetzee’s observation, concentrating on Beckett’s struggle with 
history – a struggle encoded in prose narrative – is characteristic of Coetzee’s 
own work. … If history is a determining and circumscribing force, the question 
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remains, what form of life is available to prose narrative as it attempts to 
negotiate that determination and circumscription?98 
Coetzee himself, though, has consistently characterized the main influence of 
Beckett on his writing as one arising from style, rhythm and ‘sensuous’ elements. As he 
puts it in an interview included in Doubling the Point, ‘Beckett’s prose, up to and 
including The Unnamable, has given me a sensuous response that hasn’t dimmed over 
the years’ (DP, 20). In the semi-autobiographical Youth, the protagonist John is 
described as finding his first reading of Watt ‘so funny that he rolls about laughing. 
When he comes to the end he starts again at the beginning’ (Y, 155). The sheer delight 
expressed in this statement provides strong evidence for the fact that, as Derek Attridge 
points out, Coetzee’s immediate, and enduring, response has been not to ‘the famous 
negativity that is so often taken to be Beckett’s trademark’ but rather ‘the Irish author’s 
handling of language’, his style.99 
Coetzee says, of his dissertation and other academic essays written early in his 
career,100 
Beckett has meant a great deal to me in my own writing – that must be obvious. 
Most writers absorb influence through their skin. With me there has also been a 
more conscious process of absorption. … The essays I wrote on Beckett’s style 
aren’t only academic exercises, in the colloquial sense of the word. They are also 
attempts to get closer to a secret, a secret of Beckett’s that I wanted to make my 
own. (DP, 25) 
This secret is one of style, of, perhaps most especially, rhythm (‘the deepest lessons one 
learns from other writers are, I suspect, matters of rhythm, broadly conceived’101), and is 
something Coetzee considers thoroughgoing: 
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a style, an attitude to the world, as it soaks in, becomes part of the personality, 
part of the self, ultimately indistinguishable from the self. To put it another way: 
in the process of responding to the writers one intuitively chooses to respond to, 
one makes oneself into the person whom in the most intractable but also perhaps 
the most deeply ethical sense one wants to be. (Ibid.) 
This affinity is, however, restricted to specific periods of Beckett’s work. 
Coetzee esteems the trilogy and the late prose highly, but differs in his evaluation of the 
work of the period between these two. His primary objection is to the increasingly 
‘mechanical’ nature of the application of the principle of reduction: Coetzee talks of ‘the 
corner into which [Beckett] had painted himself in The Unnamable’ and claims that, in 
the works of the 1960s and ’70s, ‘the interrogation of the trapped, geworfen self ha[s] a 
mechanical quality, as though it were accepted from the beginning that the questioning 
was futile.’102 In contrast, 
with Company (1980), Ill Seen Ill Said (1981), and Worstward Ho (1983), we 
emerge into clearer water. The prose is suddenly more expansive, even, by 
Beckettian standards, genial. … [T]here is in these late pieces a sense that 
individual existence is a genuine mystery worth exploring. The quality of thought 
and of language remains as scrupulous as ever, but there is a new element of the 
personal, even the autobiographical: the memories that float into the mind of the 
speaker clearly come from the early childhood of Samuel Beckett himself, and 
these are treated with a certain wonder and tenderness. … The key Beckettian 
word ‘on’, which had earlier had a quality of grinding hopelessness to it (‘I can’t 
go on, I’ll go on’) begins to take on a new meaning, if not of hope, then at least of 
courage. (Ibid.) 
The strength of the influence also appears clearly to wane over the course of 
Coetzee’s career. Coetzee frames this in terms reminiscent of Eliot’s attitude to 
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influence,103  describing his early engagement with Beckett’s writing as involving a 
desire to make the above mentioned ‘secret … my own …. And discard, eventually, as it 
is with influences’ (DP, 25). Here and Now: Letters (2008–2011) is instructive in this 
regard. Coetzee there writes, 
I’ll be attending a conference on Samuel Beckett in the UK next month. 104 
Foolishly I consented to do an e-mail interview with one of the organizers 
beforehand, on the subject of my relations with Beckett. As he and I are 
discovering, I don’t have anything new to say about Beckett and perhaps don’t 
even have a relation with him. I certainly wouldn’t be the kind of writer I am if 
Beckett had never been born, but that sort of debt – call it a debt, for want of a 
better word – is best not scrutinized. I’d rather simply pay my silent respects at 
the SB shrine or the SB temple (I’ve never visited the SB gravestone).105 
In the lecture ‘Eight Ways of Looking at Beckett’, Coetzee compares Beckett’s 
writing, in which alterity is largely an internal aspect of consciousness and subjectivity, 
and in which the world thus depicted is extensively solipsistic, with Melville’s depiction 
of Ahab and his encounter with the natural other. There, Coetzee wonders what would 
have happened if someone who wrote with Beckett’s ‘anguished, teeth-gnashing … 
comedy’ had had the ‘imaginative courage to dream up the whale’ – to, in other words, 
engage with the external other, ‘the brain that comes from another universe of discourse, 
thinking thoughts according to its own nature, beyond malign, beyond benign, thoughts 
inconceivable, incommensurate with human thought’.106 
 Patrick Hayes argues that Coetzee is here thinking of himself, and of his 
combination of Beckett’s mordant style with a more embodied and situated narrative 
voice and theme, of the ‘critical assimilation in which the prose style … is brought 
                                                          
 
103 As described in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, in Selected Essays, 1917–1932 (London: Faber, 
1932). 
104  This was the ‘Samuel Beckett: Out of the Archive’ conference held in York in June 2011. The 
interview is by Lawrence Rainey, David Attwell, and Benjamin Madden, ‘An Interview with J. M. 
Coetzee’, Modernism / Modernity, 18.4 (Nov. 2011). 
105 Paul Auster and J.M. Coetzee, Here and Now. 
106 Coetzee, ‘Eight Ways of Looking at Samuel Beckett’, Samuel Beckett Today/Aujourd’hui 19 (2008): 
24. 
59 
 
together with a more expansive and politicized definition of what is at stake in the 
“nothing.”’107 Coetzee’s antipathy to the works of the middle period is related to this: he 
objects to the ‘disembodied’ nature of the works, saying, 
Beckett's later short fictions have never really held my attention. They are, quite 
literally, disembodied. Molloy was still a very embodied work. Beckett's first 
after-death book was The Unnamable. But the after-death voice there still has 
body, and in that sense was only halfway to what he must have been feeling his 
way toward. The late pieces speak in post-mortem voices. I am not there yet. I am 
still interested in how the voice moves the body, moves in the body. (DP, 23) 
 Nevertheless, those of Beckett’s works which aroused Coetzee’s interest have 
exercised a deep and lasting influence on his fiction. In what seems a significant 
admission, he claims, ‘As soon as I began reading Beckett I knew I was reading 
someone whose sensitivity to the nuances of weight, coloration, provenance, and history 
of individual words was superior to mine’.108 Elsewhere he states, 
Beckett was an artist possessed by a vision of life without consolation or dignity 
or promise of grace, in the face of which our only duty – inexplicable and futile 
of attainment, but a duty nonetheless – is not to lie to ourselves. It was a vision to 
which he gave expression in language of a virile strength and intellectual subtlety 
that marks him as one of the great prose stylists of the twentieth century.109 
The extent to which such statements are applicable to Coetzee’s own work is perhaps an 
indication of the way Beckett has influenced it. 
 
‘not progress, optimism or delusions, but words alone’: John Banville 
 
A striking similarity between John Banville and Samuel Beckett is their shared 
expression of reservations about the conduciveness of their own, Irish culture and 
                                                          
 
107 Hayes, J.M. Coetzee and the Novel, 50.  
108 Coetzee, ‘Homage’ 
109 Coetzee, ‘Samuel Beckett, the Late Fiction’, 172–3. 
60 
 
society to their pursuit of their art. Beckett, disillusioned by the often conservative, 
programmatic attitude to art in Ireland, spent most of his adult life in Paris, while 
Banville has claimed that the fact that he happens to live in Dublin is entirely accidental. 
Banville has also repeatedly rejected any claims that his writing is in some essential way 
‘Irish’, preferring to think of himself as situated within a more cosmopolitan, primarily 
European, culture of letters. He has said, for example, that ‘I feel part of my culture. But 
it’s purely a personal culture gleaned from bits and pieces of European culture of four 
thousand years. It’s purely something I have manufactured.’110 
 The question as to the extent to which Banville can be said to belong to a 
specifically Irish canon and tradition has been highly contested, which I will address at 
greater length at a later point in this study. For the moment, it is sufficient to quote the 
author’s views on the attitude to language he considers characteristic of Irish people in 
order to assess the extent to which Beckett’s and Banville’s shared heritage plays a part 
in any affinity that may exist. Banville, in a talk given at Iowa University in 1981, 
claims that, 
The writer’s problem with language, if problem it be, is nicely illustrated in the 
case of Ireland. … For the Irish, language is not primarily a tool for expressing 
what we mean. Sometimes I think it is quite the opposite. We have profound 
misgivings about words. We love them – all too passionately, some of us – but 
we do not trust them. … What I am talking about is something subversive, 
destructive even, and in a way profoundly despairing. Listen to any group of Irish 
people conversing, from whatever class, in whatever circumstances, and behind 
the humour and the rhetoric and the slyness you will detect a dark note of 
hopelessness before the phenomenon of a world that is always out there.111 
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The attitude to language spelt out here is highly applicable to both Banville’s and 
Beckett’s fiction, and serves as a useful point of entry into consideration of the writers’ 
relationships to their homeland, and the effect of their homeland on their fiction. 
Banville claims to have read Molloy ‘[v]ery early on’, and says ‘it was a great 
revelation to me – the idea that a writer could speak in such a completely self-absorbed 
way, not dealing with characters or human interests – the usual stock-in-trade of the 
novelist. It was great to discover that linguistic beauty could be pursued as an end in 
itself.’112 Growing up in Ireland, and given the sort of fiction he would come to write, 
Banville would almost certainly have been aware of Beckett as a prominent literary 
figure from a very young age. As he puts the matter, ‘for Irish writers … our literary 
forebears are enormous. They stand behind us like Easter Island statues, and we keep 
trying to measure up to them, leaping towards heights we can’t possibly reach. I suppose 
that’s a good thing, but it makes for a painful early life for the writer’ (ibid.). Among 
such difficulties must almost certainly be counted Nightspawn (1971), Banville’s first 
novel, which the author has claimed ‘is very much influenced by Beckett. Much too 
much so.’113 
A point related to this is Banville’s comment about Joyce and Beckett expressed 
in interview with Hedwig Schwall. While altogether too unequivocal – and, finally, 
reductive – to be entirely reliable, as Derek Hand points out,114 the attitude outlined 
therein serves well to highlight Banville’s own conception of the lineage of his fiction. 
Having claimed that ‘every Irish writer has to’ follow either Joyce or Beckett, Banville 
asserts: ‘I go in a Beckettian direction.’115 
John Kenny differs with Banville on this point, arguing that the author is ‘the 
true inheritor of two distinct Irish literary traditions represented by James Joyce on the 
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one hand and Samuel Beckett on the other’. 116  While I don’t think a reading of 
Banville’s novels supports this contention particularly well – as will be spelt out in 
greater detail in later sections – there can be little doubt that Joyce has been an important, 
and formidable, presence throughout Banville’s career. Indeed, a compelling argument 
for a distinctly Bloomian (Harold, that is, not his ‘amiable namesake’ Leopold117) case 
of anxiety of influence could be made on the basis of Banville’s own comments: ‘When 
I think of Joyce I am split in two. To one side there falls the reader, kneeling speechless 
in filial admiration, and love; to the other side, however, the writer stands, gnawing his 
knuckles, not a son, but a survivor’.118 
Banville’s understanding of these two differing directions closely resembles 
Beckett’s view of his own response and relationship to Joyce’s work. Joyce, according 
to Beckett, aspires to an encyclopaedic completion, an art which progressively 
intensifies expressive significance. 119  His own work, in contrast, he considers an 
exercise in reduction: the work proceeds by way of a systematic stripping away of 
expressed content and expressive possibility. This point of view is perhaps most 
explicitly laid out in the much quoted ‘Three Dialogues’ with George Duthuit. There, 
Beckett articulates a vision of an art which, rather than aspiring toward ‘more authentic, 
more ample, less exclusive relations between representer and representee’,120 takes as its 
starting point – and goal – the ‘expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with 
which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to 
express, together with the obligation to express’ (ibid., 103). 
Banville, similarly, claims that, while Joyce’s work consists in ‘a triumphant 
acceptance of the world, a feat of inclusivity which bestows its epiphanic glare equally 
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upon the mystery of the Trinity and advertisements for Bile Beans’,121 Beckett’s art 
depends ‘not on Joycean richness and playfulness, but on deliberate shrinkage of 
material and elimination of literary ornament, an art that sought its apotheosis in 
failure.’122 Given this, it seems only logical that ‘[a] large part of Beckett’s inspiration 
was a set of technical problems, one of which was how to get the maximum effect from 
the minimum of means. … After Auschwitz, said Adorno, the writing of poetry is a 
scandal. Yes, Beckett might have added, and it was thus also before Auschwitz. To 
speak at all is to overstate.’123 
The extent to which the sentiment of the final sentence above expresses 
Banville’s own convictions is evidenced by his statement, in a eulogy for Beckett, that 
‘[a]ll literary artists in their heart want to write about nothing, to make an autonomous 
art, independent of circumstance. (The artist, as Kafka puts it, is the man who has 
nothing to say)’,124 and accounts for the integral influence of Beckett’s work on his 
prose. The tensions and stylistic pressure exerted by the attempt to write narrative in full 
mind of the implications of such a point of view – of having nothing to express, and 
nothing with which to express, along with the obligation to express – inform and shape 
Banville’s work as profoundly as they do Beckett’s. 
Banville’s early novels, until at least The Newton Letter (1982), must strictly be 
said to depict such a condition rather than to enact it, as Beckett’s mature fiction does. 
However, a shift initiated in the Frames trilogy is completed with the novels of the ‘late 
period’ (as John Kenny characterizes it, beginning with Eclipse).125  This change is 
largely made possible by the move from the third-person narrative, in novels such as 
Doctor Copernicus and Kepler (1981), to the first-person of subsequent ones, and the 
possibilities thus afforded for a style of narrative in which the imperative to go on and 
the impossibility of doing so are inextricably interwoven, in which the simultaneous 
need for and impossibility of narrative can be enacted through the self-reflexive, myopic 
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doubling backs of memory and fabrication. (It is worth remembering that in Beckett’s 
case this particular effect was also achieved only after a number of experiments with 
various, similar, techniques, such as, for example, Murphy, and involved the significant 
step of beginning to write in French.) Banville’s admiration for the fidelity with which 
Beckett engages this conundrum is obvious. As he puts it, ‘The result, especially in the 
trilogy, in Godot and in the last, highly condensed texts from Company onward, is one 
of the most profound, sustained artistic explorations of the enigma of human life and 
death that world literature has yet produced.’126 
While a number of Banville’s comments about Beckett indicate that he considers 
the older writer’s career a paradigmatic example of the committed artistic life, the above 
comment sheds light on the question as to which stages of Beckett’s work resonate most 
deeply with the later writer. In an evaluation similar in many respects to that of Coetzee, 
Banville excludes the works written between the trilogy and Company (1980) from this 
particularly elevated praise. Of these, he writes ‘After … How It Is (1961), the texts 
became shorter and shorter as the author pared down his material, until he achieved a 
kind of “white-out” in such pieces as Imagination Dead Imagine (1966), and All Strange 
Away (1976)’. 127  Unlike Coetzee, however, he does not express any particular or 
systematic objection to the fiction of this period. Rather, he writes, 
The effort, the concentration, the risk involved in this continuing throwing-out of 
literary ballast provided a rare and exemplary instance of artistic good faith. 
Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s devoted Beckett readers greeted each 
successively shorter volume from the master with a mixture of awe and 
apprehensiveness; it was like watching a great mathematician wielding an 
infinitesimal calculus, his equations approaching nearer and still nearer to the null 
point. Surely after this, we would say, the only possible advance will be into total 
silence at last. … Yet somehow Beckett always found an escape route, no matter 
how strait the tunnel or how bleak the view at the end of it. (Ibid.) 
                                                          
 
126 Banville, ‘The Painful Comedy of Samuel Beckett’.  
127  John Banville, ‘The Last Word’, New York Review of Books, Aug. 13, 1992, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ archives/1992/aug/13/the-last-word/. The misleading dates provided 
(All Strange Away (1964) preceded Imagination Dead Imagination (1965)) are Banville’s own. 
65 
 
This is a particularly good encapsulation of the admiration mentioned above, the 
appreciation for the ‘good faith’ with which Beckett adhered to his aesthetic convictions. 
Banville refers explicitly to Beckett’s influence on himself and his generation of 
writers as ‘a model of probity and tenacity which is a secret source of strength in an age 
when literature itself seems under threat’,128 and writes elsewhere, 
He was an example to us all – I wonder if he realized just what an example he 
was to my generation of writers? I hope he did. We have to struggle with him, as 
the son must always struggle with the father to be free, but, if he had not been 
there, an abiding presence, we would have found it that much harder to resist the 
threats and blandishments of a debased time. (Ibid.) 
There are obvious similarities here to Bloom’s account of literary influence in the 
allusion to the struggle of father and son, and the stages through which Banville’s 
relationship to Beckett’s work has proceeded – thrall, rejection, modulated relation – 
appear to chart the dialectic of such an engagement.129 It is perhaps because of this that, 
of the three later writers considered in this thesis, Banville exhibits the most consistent 
and thoroughgoing influence of Beckett’s work. Nevertheless, according to Banville, at 
least, admiration is one thing, but, ‘[f]or an artist to influence, in a positive, organic way, 
those who come after him, he must first of all be loved’,130 and it is this response (in 
contrast, for paradigm example, to that to Joyce discussed above), that seems the most 
salient aspect of the response. 
Of the various stages of Beckett’s work, the late prose is singled out as most 
strongly eliciting such a response. Banville considers the works from Company until 
Beckett’s death ‘the pinnacle of his art’ and ‘one of the most beautiful, profound, and 
moving testaments in the literature of [the twentieth] century.’131 While there is still an 
eye on the technical ingenuity of ‘finding new strategies to get around the silence’ in 
this attitude (ibid.), Banville seems to accord these works this importance far more as a 
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result of their having moved beyond, or found a new way through, the process of 
diminution to establish a mode in which sentiments of community and belonging – 
however attenuated – can be voiced. In these late works, Banville contends, Beckett 
found ‘a new access of inspiration … a final efflorescence’ (ibid.). Importantly, however, 
Banville claims – with reference to the often overlooked lyricism of certain passages of 
the earlier work, and the significant fact, so crucial to the tone of the works, that 
‘Beckett’s narrators, even in their worst extremes of anguish, profess a deep fondness 
for the world’ – that ‘the fictions of the 1980s represent no real change of direction but 
merely an intensification of concerns that were always present but repressed in favour of 
the ferocity of Beckett’s sensibility in the immediate postwar period’ (ibid.). 
Understanding the nature of these concerns, of which the late works represent 
such an intensification, elucidates Banville’s major debt to and inheritance from Beckett. 
In response to the question ‘What do they mean, these strange, fraught, desperate 
fictions?’, Banville claims: 
I believe that all of Beckett’s work, from the fumblings of the hapless Belacqua in 
More Pricks than Kicks to the final, benighted groping for speech in ‘what is the 
word’, is first and fore-most a critique of language, of the deceptiveness of words, 
and of our illusions about what we can express and the value of expression, and 
that it was his genius to produce out of such an enterprise these moving, 
disconsolate, and scrupulously crafted works. (Ibid.) 
The preoccupation with expression, its modes, means and ends, is one that is central to 
all of Banville’s fiction, and relates to the salient lesson he learns from Beckett’s work. 
Beckett’s ‘supreme achievement’, for Banville, ‘was to have shown us that the horror 
and cruelty of the world … can be redeemed through the beauty and power of language 
– language and nothing more, not progress, optimism or delusions, but words alone.’132 
This observation, I feel, goes much of the way toward explaining the extent to which the 
influence of Beckett’s work on the writers with which this study is concerned is a matter 
of style. 
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‘style makes the man’ 
 
As Coetzee has observed, much of the force of Beckett’s work derives from the 
absurdity inherent in a dualist account of the relationship between mind and body, 
coupled with the impossibility of not, to some extent, ascribing to such an account.133 In 
Coetzee’s work too, as well as the novels of Banville considered in this study, the 
incommensurability of the body and its passions with the dictates of reason are central 
preoccupations. Auster’s work, in contrast, is highly cerebral, and the concerns from 
which its effects are derived can most properly be said to be epistemological. (This is 
not to say that such epistemological concerns are not present in the other two writers’ 
engagements with Beckett, but rather that the emphasis accorded these elements varies.) 
Nevertheless, Auster’s work depicts and enacts processes of undoing to as great 
an extent as these others, and the style whereby this is carried out functions in analogous 
ways. As Coetzee says of Beckett, in terms I think applicable to all the writers under 
consideration here, the work is comprised of ‘an energy of quite a savage order, under 
the control of a syntax of the utmost lucidity. The thought was like a ravening dog; the 
prose was like a taut leash.’134 (Banville describes the narrative register of The Newton 
Letter, in terms applicable to his entire oeuvre, and especially the late period, as ‘a very 
poised voice, a perfectly controlled tone relating something that’s completely 
chaotic.’)135 To some extent, this effect derives from a contrast between substance and 
style, which allows the processes of stripping away and undoing performed by the works 
to be carried out without sentimentality or melodrama. There is however another sense 
in which the technique enacts precisely that which it describes, or rather, in Beckett’s 
work, the enacting is precisely that which is enacted; style is substance.136 Although the 
nature of the chaos figured forth in Auster’s work, the locus of the destitution, may 
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differ from that of these other authors, such a juxtaposition plays as central a role in his 
prose as it does in Beckett’s, Banville’s or Coetzee’s. 
Furthermore, the metastylistic lesson Auster learns from Beckett’s prose has 
much in common with Coetzee’s assertion, quoted above, about the way in which 
influences become, in some ways, part of the make-up of the self. For example, Auster 
claims that Beckett’s work evidences ‘the morality of a good sentence, the dignity of a 
good sentence, the effort it takes to write a good sentence, and the truth that has to be 
radiating inside you in order to do it well.’137 In this sense, it is clear that the influence 
extends beyond matters of theme and style to encompass something akin to the notion of 
comportment alluded to above. 
This is further substantiated by Auster’s understanding of the trajectory of the 
development of Beckett’s fiction. He claims, for example, that, 
Beckett, who begins with little, ends with even less. The movement in each of his 
works is toward a kind of unburdening, by which he leads us to the limits of 
experience, to a place where aesthetic and moral judgments become inseparable. 
This is the itinerary of the characters in his books, and it has also been his own 
progress as a writer. (Ibid.) 
Such an inseparability of aesthetic and moral judgment is implicit in the style itself, in 
the principals of reduction of means and renunciation of ornament. Thus, while 
Beckett’s influence on Auster is that of style at a second degree – because, as he, and 
other writers, put it, Beckett’s is ‘a style so distinctive that it resists all attempts at 
imitation’ (ibid.) – it is nevertheless, by his own admission, present, in similar ways and 
to similar effect as in the fiction of Coetzee and Banville: in the sense of the almost 
ethical significance of style, in the commitment to an art that eschews delusion and false 
hope in favour of a stringent and thorough interrogation of the act of narrative itself, and 
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in the taut, sparse, essentially humble narrative voice which is at all times certain only of 
its own uncertainty.138 
  The emphasis Auster, Banville and Coetzee place on the question of style in 
discussing Beckett’s influence may seem ironic when Beckett’s own claim that he chose 
to begin writing in French because it is a language ‘without style’139 is borne in mind. 
While there is, as Auster points out,140 an element of playfulness in this comment, the 
development of Beckett’s prose from Murphy to The Unnamable nevertheless consists 
largely in a conscious and consistent eschewal of the resources of conventionally poetic 
language in an attempt to attain as thoroughly prosaic, non-associative a register as 
possible. Such a project, in fact and in practice, actually coincides by and large with the 
attempt to write without style, and it is thus, at first glance, peculiar that these later 
writers single this out as among the most significant of Beckett’s legacies. 
 There is something profoundly paradoxical about this. Various comments 
Beckett made on his decision to write in French support the contention that it involved 
an escape from the figural resources of language: he is recorded as having said that the 
problem with English for him was that he ‘couldn’t help writing poetry in it’,141 and, 
coinciding as it did with his realization that his preferred mode, in contrast to Joyce’s 
hyper-referential intensification, lay ‘in impoverishment, in lack of knowledge and in 
taking away, in subtracting rather than in adding’, 142  the shift can thus also be 
understood to be a way of bringing this about. While such would probably be the case 
for any writer choosing to work in any non-native language, the specificity of French 
with respect to this is foreshadowed in Dream of Fair to Middling Women (1932): 
The uniform, horizontal writing, flowing without accidence, of the man with a 
style, never gives you the margarita. But the writing of, say, Racine or Malherbe, 
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perpendicular, diamanté, is pitted, is it not, and sprigged with sparkles; the flints 
and pebbles are there, no end of humble tags and commonplaces. They have no 
style, they write without style, do they not, they give you the phrase, the sparkle, 
the precious margaret. Perhaps only the French can do it. Perhaps only the French 
language can give you the thing you want.143 
A useful way into an understanding of what I take these writers to be talking 
about in this regard is Coetzee’s comment, quoted above, about the ethical dimension of 
the question of style for an author. Coetzee equates ‘style’ with ‘an attitude to the 
world’, 144  which I see as corresponding to an idea of Adorno’s, often repeated in 
Aesthetic Theory, and thereby to Beckett’s, Kafka’s and Banville’s assertions about the 
artist being someone with nothing to say. Adorno writes, ‘Although art in its innermost 
essence is a comportment, it cannot be isolated from expression, and there is no 
expression without a subject. The transition to the discursively recognized universal by 
which the politically reflecting particular subject hopes to escape atomization and 
powerlessness is in the aesthetic sphere a desertion to heteronomy.’145 
I take Adorno here to mean by ‘comportment’ something analogous to Coetzee’s 
‘attitude to the world’, an orientation of subjectivity toward others and objects. The 
definitive feature of aesthetic comportment, for Adorno, lies in the way it differs from 
instrumental rationality’s telos of domination: aesthetic comportment is a bearing that 
does away with the ‘principle of the I, that internal agent of repression’ by undermining 
the strict polarities of subject and object (ibid., 246). However, because art ‘cannot be 
isolated from expression’, the work of art and the artist are thus re-inscribed in, and re-
inscribe, the discourse and systems whereby the ‘internal agent of repression’ is 
instituted. This is why the ‘transition to the discursively recognized universal’, while 
absolutely necessary, ‘is in the aesthetic sphere a desertion to heteronomy.’ (This may 
also be a useful gloss of Beckett’s credo, ‘Fail better’.) 
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 A more specifically literary articulation of this interaction is to be found in 
Blanchot’s ‘The Gaze of Orpheus’. In this essay, Blanchot characterizes the verbal 
artist’s work as the attempt to bring something fundamentally and essentially non-
discursive into discourse, to bring, as he puts it, the essence of darkness, ‘the other night, 
concealment which becomes visible’, to light.146 The attempt is one that necessarily fails: 
‘All we can sense of inspiration is failure, all we can recognize of it is misguided 
violence’ (ibid., 102). 
But if inspiration means that Orpheus fails and Eurydice is lost twice over, if it 
means the insignificance and void of the night, it also turns Orpheus towards that 
failure and that insignificance and coerces him, by an irresistible impulse, as 
though giving up on failure were much more serious than giving up on success, as 
though what we call the insignificant, the mistaken, could reveal itself – to 
someone who accepted the risk and freely gave himself up to it – as the source of 
all authenticity. (Ibid.) 
Hence, following Adorno’s and Blanchot’s analyses of the operations of aesthetic 
creation, what demands expression is that which, by definition, cannot be expressed, and 
any expressive power one may hope for arises from the failure to express it. This is the 
sense in which ‘the artist is the person who has nothing to say’. Coetzee’s fiction depicts 
and enacts this process particularly well, in, for example, novels such as The Master of 
Petersburg (1994) and Waiting for the Barbarians, in which the instigating force for 
narration is the pressing sense of the need to give voice to that which exceeds and 
undermines discourse.   
Style, I argue, can be conceived of as the literary manifestation of aesthetic 
comportment, the trace of that bearing which, fundamentally antithetical to ‘the 
discursively recognized universal’, attempts to find expression therein.147 This is also 
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the origin of those resources of figuration and, in Beckett’s case particularly, 
disfiguration of ‘ordinary’ language whereby the literary achieves its effects. Something 
of the role this would come to play in Beckett’s writing was indicated in the ‘German 
Letter of 1937’. Here, the young writer articulated his emerging sense of the way formal 
innovations that had been implemented in music and the visual arts in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries needed to find an equivalent in literature:  
more and more my own language appears to me like a veil that must be torn apart 
in order to get at the things (or the Nothingness) behind it. Grammar and Style. 
To me they seem to have become as irrelevant as a Victorian bathing suit or the 
imperturbability of a true gentleman. A mask. Let us hope the time will come, 
thank God that in certain circles it has already come, when language is most 
efficiently used where it is being most efficiently misused. … To bore one hole 
after another in it, until what lurks behind it – be it something or nothing – begins 
to seep through; I cannot imagine a higher goal for a writer today.148  
While it is important to note that he would later describe this as ‘German bilge’149 (an 
attitude not unusual among the older writers’ pronouncements on his own writing), this 
statement of intent is indicative of the ideas that informed Beckett’s earlier efforts. On a 
basis of a reading of the texts themselves, such a project appears to animate the work up 
to and including The Unnamable at least in part. The portion of the letter from which the 
above quotation is taken begins with Beckett claiming, ‘It is indeed becoming more and 
more difficult, even senseless, for me to write an official English’.150 Along with the 
claim that his decision to begin writing in French was motivated by the fact that one 
‘can’t help writing poetry in it’, the more extensive explanation he gave Lawrence 
Harvey of this point makes clearer the connection between such preoccupations and the 
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question of literality in style: ‘French represented a form of weakness by comparison 
with his mother tongue. Besides English because of its very richness holds out the 
temptation to rhetoric and virtuosity …. The relative asceticism seemed more 
appropriate to the expression of being, undeveloped, unsupported, somewhere in the 
depths of the microcosm’. 151  Beckett’s attempt to write ‘without style’ is hence 
connected to a desire to eschew the figurative and rhetorical resources of language in 
favour of a greater and greater linguistic impoverishment and disfiguration.  
The significance of such disfiguration in Beckett’s writing relates to the fact that 
an extensive portion of its effects, both bathetic and pathetic, arise from the subversion 
of literary discourse and of figure and idiom that has calcified into cliché. Beckett’s 
narrators apprehend the world and use language in a weirdly literal manner, uncanny in 
the ways it brings the foundations of tropes and habits of speech, and thought, taken to 
be perspicuous under scrutiny, thus making the familiarity of the conventions of 
language strange. As Elizabeth Barry puts it, Beckett’s narrators’ ‘incomprehension or 
misunderstanding of this verbal phenomenon [cliché] often results in their understanding 
its metaphors literally and so making revealingly inappropriate use of it. This in turn 
disarms the cliché’s rhetorical power and questions its initial premise.’152 A result of this 
is that ‘[s]uch language no longer passes for second nature’ (ibid., 20). 
This technique, if that is not too mechanical a term for something the 
significance of which extends well beyond the strictly technical, is also central to the 
stylistic effects of Auster’s, Banville’s and Coetzee’s writing. Banville’s writing is 
saturated with a linguistic hyper-awareness of this sort that sees through habitual uses of 
language that pass for ‘second nature’ to a more uncanny double of this that shadows it 
(as Barry (ibid.) and Cavell (discussed in more detail below) argue a literal apprehension 
of language is able to do).153 The extraordinary refinement of the phrasing, diction and 
rhythm contributes to it, as does his choice of intensely cerebral, self-conscious narrator-
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protagonists. Among the funniest and most poignant aspects of Banville’s writing stem 
from the potential of speech to lead its users into absurdity. The protagonist of Shroud 
(2002), Axel Vander, catching himself thinking that he has lost someone ‘for good’, 
observes ‘for good: how the language mocks us’ (S, 372). Max Morden, the protagonist 
and narrator of The Sea (2005), exhibits similar turns of thought. A portion of his 
narration proceeds, ‘When exactly I transferred my affections – how incorrigibly fond I 
am of these old-fashioned formulations! – from mother to daughter I cannot recollect’ 
(TS, 140), and his discourse is peppered with puns and word play: ‘canine’s canines’ 
(49), ‘transparent parents’ (35), ‘unsuitable suitor’ (67). 
Despite such playfulness and humour, however, Morden’s relationship to 
language, like Vander’s and that of the protagonist of Eclipse, Alexander Cleave, is 
fundamentally awkward and disoriented: he spends his day in seclusion pretending to 
write a monograph on Bonnard, ‘about whom’, he says, ‘I long ago came to realize, I 
have nothing of any originality to say’, and regularly punctuates his musings with 
comments, apropos of nothing specified, such as ‘Plimsoll. Now there is a word one 
does not hear anymore, or rarely, very rarely’ and ‘Stangury. Nice word’ (TS, 11 & 23). 
The equivalent of this in Coetzee’s work, focused to a much greater extent on the 
interpersonal than the intrapersonal as it is, is the attention language demands when its 
functions in communication – or, more commonly, miscommunication – bring it into 
unusual prominence and proximity. Importantly, it is precisely such proximity to 
language, as in the examples in Banville’s writing cited above, that is the very cause of 
the obscurity, or obtuseness, which prevents it from passing as second nature. In 
Disgrace (1999), for example, professor of modern languages and, following the 
rationalization of the academy, ‘communication’ David Lurie thinks, in response to 
another character’s use of the word ‘benefactor’: ‘A distasteful word, it seems to him, 
double-edged, souring the moment. Yet can Petrus be blamed? The language he draws 
on with such aplomb is, if he only knew it, tired, friable, eaten from the inside as if by 
termites. Only the monosyllables can still be relied on, and not even all of them’ (D, 
129). In a similar manner, the magistrate, protagonist of Waiting for the Barbarians, 
recounts an exchange that proceeds, ‘“I ask”, I continue, “only because if you get lost it 
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becomes our task to find you and bring you back to civilization.” We pause, savouring 
from our different positions the ironies of the word’ (WB, 12). 
In both of these examples, language, or a specific language, is represented as 
impeding the possibility of communication and communion. This is symptomatic of an 
ontological fact, an inevitable consequence of what and who we are, and points to the 
aporia of relating to others through conceptual categories. (As Lurie’s daughter tells him, 
‘You keep misreading me. Guilt and salvation are abstractions. I don’t act in terms of 
abstractions. Until you make an effort to see that, I can’t help you’ (D, 112).) 
Nevertheless, the central position language occupies in the constitution of which these 
are consequences means that it can be, and often is, treated as interchangeable with, or at 
least among the primary causes of, the estrangement it serves to indicate. 
A similar process is carried out in Paul Auster’s work on a slightly more 
conceptual, cognitive level. Here, habits of thought and perception are subjected to a 
scrutiny that renders the procedures whereby obscurity is ordinarily relieved themselves 
the source of ineluctable obscurity. The author’s use of the detective novel is itself a 
subversion of the faith in the efficacy of reason espoused by the genre, and his 
protagonists’ attempts to interpret the world or others flounder in a rapidly proliferating 
multiplicity of possible plausible meanings. Daniel Quinn, protagonist of City of Glass, 
for example, having been employed to tail a character, reviews his work after a period of 
time and becomes ‘deeply disillusioned’: 
He had always imagined that the key to good detective work was a close 
observation of details. The more accurate the scrutiny, the more successful the 
results. The implication was that human behaviour could be understood, that 
beneath the infinite façade of gestures, tics, and silences, there was finally a 
coherence, an order, a source of motivation. But after struggling to take in all 
these surface effects, Quinn felt no closer to Stillman than when he first started 
following him. He had lived Stillman’s life, walked at his pace, seen what he had 
seen, and the only thing he felt now was the man’s impenetrability. Instead of 
narrowing the distance that lay between him and Stillman, he had seen the old 
man slip away from him, even as he remained before his eyes. (CG, 67) 
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The parallels with Moran’s pursuit of Molloy, as discussed in chapter one, are clear: in 
both cases the attempt to recuperate a meaning leads inexorably to the loss of certainty 
and self-possession on the part of the individual who sets off in pursuit of this meaning. 
Importantly, the novel presents this failure to establish a sense of order and coherence as 
connected to, if not actually caused by, a developing sense of the unnaturalness of 
language, a sense that is, as in the examples listed above, instantiated by an increasing 
proximity to it. 
 Quinn, who ordinarily earns his living writing unchallenging mystery novels 
(CG, 2), buys a red notebook in which to record his observations when he first takes on 
the case. His note-taking begins relatively straightforwardly, but over the course of the 
novel more and more of his energy and time goes toward the writing. The act of writing 
itself also becomes increasingly perplexing, gradually taking over all of his attention, 
and the capacity of language to decode and explain the world – as is the case in the 
detective novels he previously made his living by writing – is increasingly undermined. 
A good characterization of what appears to be happening in these various 
disruptions of the relation to language is Stanley Cavell’s notion of ‘hidden literalism’, 
coined in his discussion of Endgame.154 Hidden literalism, in Cavell’s reading, works 
through a juxtaposition of the figurative conventions and assumptions of literary reading 
with a starkly literal attitude to language and meaning. Cavell writes that hidden 
literalism works to ‘unfix clichés and idioms’ by ‘turning its formulas into declarative 
utterances, ones of pure denotation’, and thus both undermines an excessively 
conventionalized relation to language and imparts a charge of strangeness to it (ibid., 
20). This is a procedure connected to Beckett’s eschewal of literary ornament and paring 
down of expressive valence, and relates to Barry’s understanding of the peculiar use of 
cliché in the work. 
It is also a striking feature of Coetzee’s style. As Attridge points out, the 
similarity of the comedy in the work of Beckett and Coetzee, and specifically in their 
treatment of sex, relies on an unusual and unexpected literal treatment of a subject that 
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has, in literary convention, been hyperbolically figured. 155  (Obviously, it is the 
transgression of expectations, rather than the literality itself, that is the source of humour, 
which would not exist without the pre-existing register.) The effect of this is analogous 
to that of the humour often occasioned by category errors, with a term being discussed 
in a vocabulary and idiom which connotes concepts not conventionally applicable to it. 
Nevertheless, the confusion of categories serves to elucidate the rhetorical strategies 
through which the initial differentiation is achieved, and aspects that are thereby glossed 
over and excluded. 
A particularly significant aspect of this strategy is spelt out by Patrick Hayes. 
Hayes, discussing the relationship Coetzee’s novels establish with political and 
historical discourse, invokes Joyce’s term, used by Coetzee to characterize Erasmus’ 
The Praise of Folly, ‘jocoserious’. Hayes writes that jocoseriousness instigates ‘a series 
of textual processes that create a particularly unstable irony – one which playfully 
troubles prevalent rules and boundaries around what counts as the serious.’156 Thus, 
rather than seeking to establish a position from which to rival ‘serious’ registers on the 
basis of the terms according to which they arrogate such a position unto themselves, the 
‘text offers itself jocoseriously as a disorienting and anti-foundational type of play’ and 
thereby ‘makes its own quite singular negotiation of the demands made upon the genre 
of the novel’ (ibid., 134). 
Such a strategy relates closely to Bakhtin’s thesis of the novel as originating in 
parody of official forms. As Hayes points out, with certain forms of the novel having 
achieved quasi-official status themselves (through, for example, the realist tradition’s 
relation to historiography), they have thus elicited novelistic responses, in Bakhtin’s 
sense. Don Quixote is among the first and most exemplary of these, with the novel 
largely comprised of an extended parody of romances and picaresque novels. Beckett’s 
novels occupy a similar position and perspective in relation to the briefer modern 
European novelistic tradition that recapitulates Bakhtin’s more expansive genealogy, a 
factor that accounts for much of Coetzee’s affinity for the works. I have discussed 
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Bakhtin’s thought in greater detail previously in relation to my understanding of 
influence in general and insofar as it relates to the writers under discussion; for the 
present it suffices briefly to outline why I consider his thinking relevant to this 
discussion and, perhaps more importantly, how it relates to my conception of the 
function of style in these texts. 
In Bakhtin’s thinking, the novel originates as a popular parody of official forms, 
related to, or even the literary equivalent of, carnival and other such officially 
sanctioned periods in which the rule of law is – to one extent or another – suspended. 
Once the novel is established as a genre in its own right, however, other genres are 
‘novelized’, infected with the destabilizing, comic energies of this deeply self-reflexive 
form. As Bakhtin puts it, ‘The novel parodies other genres (precisely in their role as 
genres); it expose the conventionality of their forms and their language.’157 What is the 
effect of this process on other genres? 
They become more free and flexible, their language renews itself by 
incorporating extraliterary heteroglossia and the novelistic layers of literary 
language, they become dialogized, permeated with laughter, irony, humor, 
elements of self-parody and finally – this is the most important thing – the novel 
inserts into these other genres an indeterminacy, a certain semantic 
openendedness, a living contact with unfinished, still-evolving contemporary 
reality. (Ibid., 6–7) 
In terms of this characteristic, the thoroughgoing parody of almost every form of textual, 
literary and aesthetic authority carried out in course of Beckett’s oeuvre represents 
something of a high-tide mark. 
 Bakhtin and Friedrich Schlegel express very similar attitudes about the novel as 
literary form in this respect. Similar to Bakhtin’s understanding of the dialogism of 
Dostoevsky’s work, Schlegel considers the novel as allowing the articulation of 
divergent, mutually incompatible points of view without subsuming these beneath an 
overarching authorial vision, and the best form for instantiating the ironic distance from 
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and reservation toward narrative enunciation on the part of the narrator so characteristic 
of Romantic poetics.158 A crucial element of this is a certain degree of indeterminacy 
and uncertainty with regard to point of view and narration: the Romantic novel prizes 
varying perspectives, disjunctive understandings, and the narrator’s awareness of her 
own partiality, contingency and unreliability. This entails a degree of self-parody on the 
part of the narrator and/or author: the conventional basis of registers and tropes are 
shown up for what they are, rather than attempting to be passed off as natural, and the 
situated, immanent position of the narrator is foregrounded for the sake of deflating 
pretensions toward a transcendent, omniscient narrative pose. 
The intensification of this principle of narrative self-parody is a significant 
aspect of the quasi-metaphysical gravity of Beckett’s writing. By the end of the final 
book of the trilogy the unreliability of the narrative voice has become so acute that 
almost no statement can be made without incurring an immediate contradiction or being 
qualified with ‘I don’t know’: ‘it won’t be I, I’ll stay here, or there, more likely there, it 
will never be I, that’s all I know, it’s all been done already … it was never I, I’ve never 
stirred, I’ve listened, I must have spoken, why deny it, why not admit it, after all, I deny 
nothing, I admit nothing, I say what I hear, I hear what I say, I don’t know, one or the 
other, or both’ (U, 132). In the world thus presented, there is no horizon of intelligibility 
from which to curtail the infinite slippage of a universal irony. It is this aspect of the 
work that accounts for its unique blend and balancing of the tragic and the comic: the 
hilarity induced by a given instance of absurdity shades into horror at the dawning 
realization of the sheer extent of it, which veers again toward the comic when the 
inappropriateness of such a response – of any possible response – becomes apparent, 
which itself then becomes a further source of anxiety, and so on, ad infinitum. Here, 
irony cannot be circumscribed by any hermeneutic horizon, and the play of parody is a 
volatile, incessant placing in question of every assertion by each that comes after. 
My contention is that this is achieved through the remarkable development of 
style and form that is to my mind most clearly exemplified by the trilogy and its 
constant intensification and sharpening of the self-undoing aspects of the prose. In 
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Beckett’s trilogy, the instigating impulse and guiding formal strategy is a search for 
narrative first principles, with the means and techniques to which the narrator has access 
steadily deconstructed and rejected in the progression toward the kernel of narration, the 
elusive ‘I’ behind the frenzy of figuration. The trilogy thus revolves around 
fundamentally epistemological concerns, and the ‘final’ word on these is an infinitely 
unstable irony, a method of doubt that, once set in motion, undermines every possible 
certainty and position of enunciation. In the course of the trilogy, the efficacy and 
transparency of character, plot, metaphor, and all other ‘resorts of fable’ (U, 19) are 
undermined and eroded, leaving the narrator unable to give voice to anything other than 
his own impotence and confusion. 
There is more than a little reminiscent of Descartes here, and one could quite 
easily read the description of the narrator of The Unnamable as a gruesomely literal 
depiction of what a ‘thinking thing’ might look like. In my construal, the trilogy can be 
read as a parody of Cartesian epistemological method, with Adorno’s important proviso 
– made with reference to Endgame, but applicable to the trilogy also – borne in mind: 
In its emphatic sense, parody means the use of forms in the era of their 
impossibility. It demonstrates this impossibility and by doing so alters the 
forms. … [W]hat is the raison d’être of forms when the tension between them and 
something that is not homogeneous to them has been abolished, without that 
slowing down progress in the artistic mastery of materials? Endgame handles that 
matter by making that question its own, by making it thematic. … Exposition, 
complication, plot, peripeteia and catastrophe return in decomposed form as 
participants in an examination of the dramaturgical corpse.159 
In light of this, the formal and thematic development of the trilogy can be read as 
enacting a reductio ad absurdum of modern epistemology, undermining the capacity of 
the narrating subject to achieve any certainty or clarity and instead opening onto ever 
broader vistas of incomprehension and ignorance. 
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 It is almost impossible for such a project not to entail reflexive implications for 
the attempt to make sense of it. Literary interpretation involves, among other things, the 
application of the epistemological apparatus for the sake of eliciting meanings. While in 
the case of the literary this is not possible in exactly the same way as it is in 
philosophical or scientific enquiry, as evidenced by the impossibility of perfect 
paraphrase, the appreciation and discussion of literature depends to a large part on the 
formulation of abstract accounts of what a work signifies. This is done through the 
hermeneutic vacillation between particular and general, between consideration of the 
elements of the text and construction of theories and schemata to account for the role of 
these in the general organization of the work. As I have indicated, and as it is important 
to stress, this is not a finite process or achievable goal: no general paraphrase or abstract 
account of the meaning of the work is able to avoid a certain amount of injustice to its 
specificity; no metalanguage can account for the work without doing a certain amount of 
violence to its singularity. Any interpretation always, thus, necessarily fails.160 
 Beckett’s work, through its foregrounding of the failure of the interpretive 
faculty through its depiction of the narrators’ inability to make sense of themselves or 
their world, raises this problem in especially stark, forceful ways. From the very earliest 
philosophical readings of Beckett’s writing,161 those of Adorno and Cavell, and with 
continuing regularity, in those such as Critchley’s and Rabaté’s, the difficulties and 
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contradictions involved in the paradoxical effort to make sense of a body of work that 
appears in many ways to contest the very possibility of making sense at all have been 
identified as of central significance. As Adorno puts it, ‘Understanding it can mean only 
understanding its unintelligibility, concretely reconstructing the meaning of the fact that 
it has no meaning.’162 
Such a depiction takes on a cosmic, metaphysical gravity because of its 
implications for what we can possibly know. Where in Descartes, for example, 
epistemological and metaphysical certainty are mutually reinforcing, the means whereby 
the subject bootstraps herself out of solipsism, Beckett’s vision of our epistemological 
apparatus precludes even the possibility of fruitful metaphysical speculation. When 
Molloy, for example, unsure of his identity, location, origin or destination and able to 
move only by crawling, claims that certain considerations are ‘ludicrously idle questions 
for a man in my position, though of undeniable interest on the plane of pure knowledge’ 
(M, 92), the very notion of ‘the plane of pure knowledge’ is rendered ironic by the 
implicit contrast with the confused condition of Molloy’s mind and the complete 
inapplicability of the fruits of abstract speculation to his condition. A similar incongruity 
is effected by Moran’s list of theological questions (M, 174–5), which serve more to 
indicate the confusion of the mind able to entertain such ideas than to gesture toward 
any amelioration of this. 
 This sort of invocation of philosophical, theological, or logical methods and 
procedures is also, however, a crucial aspect of the comedy of the writing. Molloy, for 
example, who describes himself as ‘a man with a passion for truth’ (M, 32), has a clear-
eyed curiosity and dead-pan earnestness that, when applied to the bizarre events that 
befall him and the situations in which he finds himself, produces an incongruity that is 
very often hilarious. His description of his mode of locomotion provides a good example 
of this: 
Let us try and get this dilemma clear. Follow me carefully. The stiff leg hurt me, 
admittedly, I mean the old stiff leg, and it was the other which I normally used as 
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a pivot, or prop. But now this latter, as a result of its stiffening I suppose, and the 
ensuing commotion among nerves and sinews, was beginning to hurt me even 
more than the other. What a story, God send I don’t make a balls of it. For the old 
pain, do you follow me, I had got used to it, in a way, yes, in a kind of way. 
Whereas to the new pain, though of the same family exactly, I had not yet had 
time to adjust myself. (M, 77–8) 
The effect of the contrast of the concern for accuracy and the measured modulation of 
description with the abjection of the situation described is not only to cast Molloy as a 
comical figure. In line with my general construal of the philosophical parody carried out 
by the trilogy, the sort of qualities and capacities involved in our attempt to understand, 
explain and account for our existence and our world are here similarly tinged with the 
ridiculous. Throughout the trilogy, adherence to the imperatives of reason is presented 
as being, as Molloy puts it, ‘like one dying of cancer obliged to consult his dentist’ (M, 
28). 
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Chapter III: Paul Auster 
 
‘standing watch in this interval of silence’: Beckett and Auster 
 
Paul Auster’s The New York Trilogy pays explicit homage to Beckett’s trilogy in a 
number of ways. As in Beckett’s trilogy, a central focus of The New York Trilogy is the 
question of subjectivity and identity, explored through an analysis of the reflexive 
relation of the self to the self as mediated through language. The New York Trilogy also 
devotes close scrutiny to the problems of authorship and authority raised by such 
matters, and the fact that in Auster’s work these are enacted through the use of 
techniques and strategies very similar to those adopted by Beckett makes the parallels 
rather easy to draw. 
 Certain aspects of work from all stages of Auster’s career bespeak a Beckettian 
influence. The frequent use of writers or storytellers as focalizers makes possible a 
particularly acute exploration of questions of identity and subjectivity in and through 
language, as is the case in Beckett’s work. Similarly, as with Beckett’s tendency away 
from communal, political or economic schemata in favour of a concentrated focus on the 
individual, a recurring plot device in Auster’s work is an event that leaves the 
protagonist independent of or cut off from family, friends, and broader society. This 
often takes the form of bereavement, which, with the attendant emphasis on grief and 
mourning, leads to a sharp delineation of the individual’s experience precisely as an 
individual. Another means whereby this is achieved, sometimes in combination with the 
former, is the receipt of a windfall in the form of inheritance, which serves to extricate 
the character from socio-economic arrangements. Among the most recent of the author’s 
productions, Travels in the Scriptorium (2007) achieves an effect in many ways 
reminiscent of Malone Dies and The Unnamable, with a narrator utterly isolated from a 
functioning world and unified identity and stranded in a welter of stories and discourse 
over which he is able to wield only a modicum of agency. 
This should not be taken to imply that I consider such themes and techniques to 
inform all of Auster’s work consistently and equally. While Auster’s later works do 
continue to explore problems and questions I have identified as typically Beckettian – 
85 
 
language, identity, fiction and metafiction, the subject’s epistemological negotiation of 
the world – the tone of these is on the whole rather different, with the emphasis shifting 
to a more experiential, existential presentation of such matters than is the case in The 
New York Trilogy. In this sense, where the development of Beckett’s work (at least that 
considered in this study) is toward greater and greater disembodiment and abstraction, 
Auster’s appears to proceed in the opposite direction. Man in the Dark (2008), for 
example, in which an elderly narrator spends much of his time in bed telling himself 
stories, has in this sense much in common with Malone Dies; the clear difference arises 
from the former’s unequivocal and explicit situation in post-911 American historical and 
political conditions.163 
The New York Trilogy therefore strikes me as the most apposite example of a 
work informed by both Beckettian theme and Beckettian form in Auster’s oeuvre, and 
thus the most appropriate for consideration here: the three novels’ consistent concern 
with the nature of identity as mediated by language, and perhaps more especially writing, 
and the infinite disruption and disorientation that subjectivity is depicted as opening 
onto when this nexus of language and identity is pushed against, have strong similarities 
with what I have described as prominent aspects of Beckett’s trilogy. Similarly, the 
methods adopted in the exploration of these subjects bear striking resemblances to the 
ironic techniques I have identified in Beckett’s work, and the readerly responses elicited 
by the respective projects are in many ways analogous. 
In light of this, it could perhaps be argued that The New York Trilogy is overly 
indebted to Beckett, an immature work that does not successfully sublimate its 
influences into its own voice. There is a cerebral, studiedly experimental aspect to all 
three of the novels, and the metafictional forays they make may be considered not yet 
completely incorporated in the texture of the writing. Auster’s comment that he was 
almost ‘crushed’ by Beckett would offer support for such a view, but one compelling 
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reason for not subscribing to it is the strong sense of situation in place and milieu The 
New York Trilogy evokes. These novels are, perhaps first of all, about people living in 
New York, and the city is a constant presence and point of reference. The Beckettian 
mode proves in this instance to be an especially apt one, but it nevertheless still serves to 
convey a powerfully locally rooted and originated fictional universe. 
As for the similarity, or overlap, in the matter of theme, and Auster’s clear 
homage to Beckett’s work, one would surely respond that Beckett’s work by no means 
exhausts the possible treatments of those I above described as common to the two 
writers. On the contrary, in its single-mindedness and the implacable logic of its 
development, Beckett’s work focuses more and more closely on one aspect of these 
themes. Much of the response of later writers, as I here try to show, and as other 
scholars have shown,164 consists to a greater or lesser extent in the attempt to extrapolate 
the insights obtained from this zero point of absolute interiority to more exterior, 
communal, and historically imbricated situations. Man in the Dark, mentioned above, is 
a good example of this, as is also, as I shall argue in this section, The New York Trilogy. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the following section, I 
discuss previous scholarship on the parallels and points of contact between the two 
writers’ work, and touch on some clear and salient similarities and differences between 
these, in terms of tone, register, and rhythm. I then move on to discuss the function of 
authorial self-parody in The New York Trilogy, one of the dimensions of Romantic irony 
identified by Lloyd Bishop, and spell out some of the implications of this for 
interpretation of the text. Following that, I discuss the depictions of writing and 
language presented in The New York Trilogy and ‘White Spaces’, and elucidate the 
implications of this for the way in which the works under consideration portray 
subjectivity, drawing out the connections of this to the topic as treated in Beckett’s work. 
 By far the most salient of the modalities of Romantic irony specified in Bishop’s 
discussion in The New York Trilogy is that of authorial self-parody. Details of Auster’s 
autobiography are incorporated throughout the text. The significance of these insertions 
is complex and multiple, but one of the clearest effects of the strategy is to draw 
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attention to the question of identity and subjectivity and its relation to the process of 
writing. This strikes me as the fundamental parallel between Beckett’s irony, the 
implications of which for subjectivity were discussed at the end of chapter one, and 
Auster’s. In this chapter I shall accordingly begin by describing the way in which 
authorial self-parody functions in The New York Trilogy, then draw out the implications 
of this for the work’s depiction of subjectivity, and finally discuss the ways in which this 
entails an ontological irony – as Bishop puts it, ‘an intangible ironic spirit hovering over 
the entire work and aimed not only at God and man but at the work itself and its 
author’165 – that Auster’s work has in common with Beckett’s. 
The perception of a similarity between Beckett’s and Auster’s trilogies is by no 
means a new one. Arthur Salzman comments on the common use of the detective genre 
in the respective projects, as well as the implication of this for the figuring of the author 
in the text (‘Quinn and Moran are versions of Auster and Beckett’).166 Steven Connor 
considers the parallel sufficiently self-evident not to require evidencing,167 while Aliki 
Vorvogli does precisely this with great detail and acuity in her The World That Is the 
Book.168 There are also chapters devoted to Auster’s work in two recent collections 
dealing with Beckett’s influence, by Catherine Morley in Beckett’s Literary Legacies 
and Julie Campbell in Beckett at 100,169 and numerous journal articles dealing directly 
with or touching on the topic. 
 Varvogli and Morley both remark the absence of allusions to Beckett’s work in 
The New York Trilogy. Given the many strong similarities of Auster’s trilogy to 
Beckett’s, and the densely intertextual nature of the former – Milton, Hawthorne, 
Melville, Whitman, and Poe are just some of the authors to whom allusion, or direct 
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reference, is made – the apparent lack of a clear nod to the latter seems significant. 
Varvogli considers this absence a response to an anxiety of influence, and argues that it 
is a strategy whereby ‘Auster, who at first could not see his way beyond Beckett … 
found a way out: Beckett has been written into the text, but he has been placed in a 
larger framework. Haunting The New York Trilogy with its conspicuous absence, 
Beckett’s Trilogy is made to produce signification, even it cannot produce answers.’170 
Morley, similarly detecting a clear resemblance between Auster’s and Beckett’s 
trilogies, draws on Genette’s notion of ‘architextuality’ to characterize the relation 
between the two projects: 
Defined as ‘a general sense of transcendent categories, for example modes of 
enunciation, literary genres, types of discourse, from which emerges a singular 
text’, architextuality involves a relationship that is completely silent, articulated 
at most by a paratextual mention (such as the title or epigraph). Yet when such an 
architextual relationship is not articulated by the author, it may signify a refusal 
to underscore that which is obvious, or indeed, an attempt to reject or elude 
classification. In the case of Auster’s relationship with Beckett, the latter is the 
most likely explanation for a writer self-consciously concerned with the 
necessary lack of meaning and textual exegesis in his writing.171 
This seems to me a particularly good articulation of the resemblance between the two 
projects, and one that corresponds rather closely with my own sense of the textual 
relations at play between these subsequent writers’ work and Beckett’s, as spelt out in 
the earlier chapters of this study. 
The mention of genre is especially intriguing. One certainly gets the sense when 
reading Auster’s trilogy that it belongs to the same genre as Beckett’s (‘philosophical 
detective metafiction’, perhaps), due to the similarity of theme, style and content. The 
works seem to be of a type in an explicit and ostensible way. Varvogli’s and Morley’s 
expositions of the parallels and similarities of the two trilogies substantiate this, spelling 
out commonalities of theme, structure and technique. This is a large part of the reason 
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why, despite (or perhaps, as Varvogli implies, precisely because of) the strength of 
Auster’s avowals of influence by Beckett, I claim that his is the most superficial of the 
three writers’ engagements with the older writer’s work: the largest part of Auster’s 
adoption or adaptation of Beckett’s achievement consists in his implementation of 
techniques and strategies, of narrative development, characterization, and metafictional 
gambits, common to the latter. Auster’s engagement with Beckett can hence be seen to 
be not so much a reformulation, development or misprision as a simple deflection, 
adopting the accidental and, to a certain extent, evading the essential. 
The superficiality of this engagement is well evidenced by a comparison of the 
respective relationships between the narration of events and the events narrated in 
Molloy and City of Glass. Both novels represent a breakdown on the part of the 
protagonists such that certain social, linguistic and subjective boundaries are erased or 
transgressed, leading to an accession to a mode of existence fundamentally different to a 
prior propriety that is posited as obtaining. In Beckett’s trilogy this breakdown is 
narrated by the character undergoing it, and a central aspect of the style arises from the 
tensions and complexities inherent in the attempt to portray, in language, experiences 
and events that disrupt and disfigure these narrators’ relationship to language. 
In City of Glass, as also in The Locked Room, in contrast, such events are 
narrated not by the character experiencing them but by one with some privileged point 
of vantage on the events. In City of Glass, the narrative device whereby this is achieved 
is the unnamed narrator relating what he is able to surmise from the red notebook in 
which the protagonist, Daniel Quinn, recorded his observations while on the case, from 
other people’s testimony, and from conjecture. As an example of this, at the very 
conclusion of the narrative, this narrator claims, ‘As for Quinn, it is impossible for me to 
say where he is now. I have followed the red notebook as closely as I could, and any 
inaccuracies in the story should be blamed on me. There were moments when the text 
was difficult to decipher, but I have done my best with it and have refrained from 
interpretations’ (CG, 132). 
One effect of the use of a narrator at one remove from the action is to insert an 
additional narratological layer between the reader and the uncanny events narrated, in 
the form of the mediation on the part of the narrator, and thus diminish the acuteness of 
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the irony it puts in play. It also means that the style of the writing is less subject to the 
tensions above indicated as playing so a crucial role in Beckett’s work, and that the 
irony it engenders is not so much enacted as described, and described in a relatively 
limpid manner throughout. The following passage, describing the very climax of 
Quinn’s dissolution, serves as a good example of such a contrast between turbid matter 
and limpid medium: ‘Quinn no longer had any interest in himself. He wrote about the 
stars, the earth, his hopes for mankind. He felt that his words had been severed from him, 
that now they were part of the world at large, as real and specific as a stone, or a lake, or 
a flower’ (CG, 130). Such a severing of language from the subject, however, does not 
occasion a correlative tension in the language of the text itself, and comparison of a 
passage such as this with the one from Molloy provided below illustrates the difference 
between Beckett’s treatment of such a theme and Auster’s. 
And once again I am I will not say alone, no, that’s not like me, but, how shall I 
say, I don’t know, restored to myself, no, I never left myself, free, yes, I don’t 
know what that means but it’s the word I mean to use, free to do what, to do 
nothing, to know, but what, the laws of the mind perhaps, of my mind, that for 
example water rises in proportion as it drowns you and that you would do better, 
at least no worse, to obliterate texts than to blacken margins, to fill in the holes of 
words till all is blank and flat and the whole ghastly business looks like what it is, 
senseless, speechless, issueless misery. (M, 9–10) 
 Despite such differences, there are nevertheless marked similarities in the irony 
the two writers achieve, as a result of similar depictions of the structure of subjectivity 
and the role and function of language in it. Perhaps the clearest example of such a 
commonality is the two trilogies’ shared foregrounding of writing and narration, the 
imbrication of these with memory, and the emphasis on the significance of such activity 
in the constitution, and destitution, of the subject. As I argued in the previous chapter is 
the case in Beckett’s work, Auster’s depicts subjectivity as essentially ironic, subject to 
a constant slippage and repositioning. While the writers’ respective trilogies proceed in 
opposite directions from this insight, the implications of the depiction remain 
fundamentally analogous. 
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‘between things and the names of things’: Auster’s irony 
 
The action of The New York Trilogy begins with a phone call to a wrong number from 
someone asking for ‘Paul Auster. Of the Auster Detective Agency’ (CG, 7). Out of 
curiosity Daniel Quinn, the protagonist of the novel, pretends to be Auster and takes on 
the case. When later in the course of City of Glass events overtake him, he seeks out the 
‘real’ Paul Auster in the hope of securing some help or advice. The Auster character 
(hereafter ‘Auster’) – who, like the author, is also a writer – knows nothing about the 
detective agency; instead, the two discuss writing, with ‘Auster’ telling Quinn about an 
essay concerning Don Quixote on which he is working. 
The essay itself is described as an ironic exercise – ‘I suppose you could call it 
speculative, since I’m not really out to prove anything. In fact, it’s all done tongue-in-
cheek’ (CG, 97) – on the topic of ‘the authorship of … the book inside the book 
Cervantes wrote, the one he imagined he was writing’: 
Cervantes, if you remember, goes to great lengths to convince the reader that he 
is not the author. The book, he says, was written in Arabic by Cid Hamete 
Benengeli. Cervantes describes how he discovered the manuscript by chance one 
day in the market at Toledo. He hires someone to translate it for him into Spanish, 
and thereafter he presents himself as no more than the editor of the translation. 
(CG, 97) 
The theory ‘Auster’ proposes, inter alia, is that Don Quixote orchestrates the entire 
process by pretending to be mad in order ‘to test the gullibility of his fellow men. … In 
other words, to what extent would people tolerate blasphemies if they gave them 
amusement?’ (CG, 101). He considers the answer to this question ‘obvious’: ‘the proof 
is that we still read the book. It remains highly amusing to us. And that’s finally all 
anyone wants out of a book – to be amused’ (CG, 100). 
 Immediately after having proposed this theory, ‘Auster leaned back on the sofa, 
smiled with a certain ironic pleasure, and lit a cigarette. The man was obviously 
enjoying himself, but the precise nature of that pleasure eluded Quinn. It seemed to be a 
kind of soundless laughter, a joke that stopped short of its punchline, a generalized mirth 
that had no object’ (CG, 100). This attitude remains enigmatic, because Quinn and 
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‘Auster’ are interrupted at this point by the arrival of the latter’s wife. Ulla Musarra-
Schrøder in her essay ‘Cervantes in Paul Auster’s New York Trilogy’ raises the 
possibility that the pleasure ‘Auster’ is here described as taking in the situation is due to 
his being responsible for orchestrating the series of accidents that lead to Quinn taking 
on the Stillman case.172 While a tantalizing possibility, this seems unlikely. ‘Auster’ is 
described as having become involved in Quinn’s case ‘accidentally’ (CG, 131), and, 
while the unnamed narrator does, at the very conclusion of the novel, claim that, ‘I am 
convinced he [Auster] has behaved badly throughout’ (CG, 132), this is clarified by the 
earlier, ‘I began to feel angry that he had treated Quinn with such indifference. I scolded 
him for not having taken a greater part in events, for not having done something to help 
a man who was so obviously in trouble’ (CG, 131). Hence, if we assume the unnamed 
narrator to be in possession of the relevant facts of the matter, ‘Auster’s’ actual 
involvement consists in what the novel makes explicit, and his fault is that of doing too 
little, rather than too much. 
Musarra-Schrøder is nevertheless correct to claim that there ‘is a queer and 
somewhat distorted correspondence’ between the respective insertions of the author in 
City of Glass and Don Quixote.173 As she points out, in both novels the strategy troubles 
and distorts the boundaries between truth and fiction, which is also a central thematic 
concern of both. The disruptions in Don Quixote and The New York Trilogy, however, 
and hence the delirium of their respective protagonists, proceed in opposite directions; 
where Don Quixote mistakes the world for the text, Daniel Quinn mistakes the text for 
the world.174 
 In an interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory, Auster claims that the 
strategy ‘stemmed from a desire to implicate myself in the machinery of the book. … I 
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mean my author self, that mysterious other who lives inside me …. I wanted to open up 
the process, to break down walls, to expose the plumbing.’175 This description indicates 
a desire to disrupt demarcations and renegotiate the boundaries of the fictional space, 
and falls very much in line with what I have previously described as irony’s 
transgressive valence. The destabilizing and undoing of accepted or authoritative forms 
and conventions is a central aspect of the technique, and Auster’s desire ‘to break down 
walls’ signals a close sympathy with broadly Romantic aspirations, and those specific 
energies attributed to irony by Schlegel and de Man. 
 The comment and the use of the device also bears significance for Auster’s own 
writing. Writing on Charles Reznikoff, in terms the applicability of which to Beckett’s 
work Aliki Varvogli has pointed out,176 Auster claims that the ‘act of writing … is a 
process by which one places oneself between things and the names of things, a way of 
standing watch in this interval of silence.’177 In this vision, in a rather un-Beckettian 
gesture, the interstitial is valued for its capacity to make possible a re-evaluation of 
those categories between which it marks the boundary and hence a reorganization of the 
boundary itself: this process is one of ‘allowing things to be seen – as if for the first time 
– and henceforth to be given their names’ (ibid.). Such a sense of the capacity of 
language to adequate to the world, of the commensurability of thought and things, is 
also evidenced in the development of Quinn’s relationship to language over the course 
of the novel, as will be discussed later in this section. 
This fundamentally confident attitude seems to me to mark another sharp 
difference between the work of Auster and Beckett. In comparison, for example, with 
the attitude of the various narrators of Beckett’s trilogy to their verbiage – a stain on the 
silence, an unavoidable excrescence – one has Quinn’s euphoric, 
At a certain point, he realized that the more he wrote the sooner the time would 
come when he could no longer write anything. He began to weigh his words with 
great care, struggling to express himself as economically and clearly as 
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possible. … He wanted to go on writing about it, and it pained him to know that 
this would not be possible. Nevertheless, he tried to face the end of the red 
notebook with courage. He wondered if he had it in him to write without a pen, if 
he could learn to speak instead, filling the darkness with his voice, speaking the 
words into the air, into the walls, into the city, even if the light never came back. 
(CG, 131) 
Indeed, Moran and Quinn in their respective adventures proceed in many ways in 
diametrically opposite directions, the former from a sense of confidence in the capacities 
of language and cognition and security in the world to a position of isolation, confusion 
and uncertainty, the latter the exact reverse. Such a difference in fundamental 
philosophical orientation seems to me also to account for the clear difference in the tone 
of the works, Beckett’s characterized by an anarchic comic dimension and Auster’s by 
detachment and calm. 
A fundamental source of the difference in the comic modalities of the respective 
works is the treatment of the body. In Beckett’s writing, the comedy arises to a 
significant extent from the deflation of transcendence by immanence, 178  from the 
inescapably – one could almost say radically – situated, embodied condition of the 
narrators and the way in which their embodiment erupts into conceptual categories, so to 
speak, and renders them inapplicable. Molloy’s descriptions of his modes of locomotion, 
Malone’s schedule, and the Unnamable’s abstract musings when contrasted with his 
hellish physical condition all bring about, in addition to a comic incongruity, a vivid 
sense of the incompatibility of body and mind, often to comic effect. As Coetzee points 
out, Beckett is unable to avoid subscribing to a version of Cartesian dualism, while 
simultaneously unable to consider the implications of this account of the nature of the 
self anything other than ‘ludicrous’.179 
Further, such examples also indicate the tenuousness of the hold of reason in a 
world so configured. The various attempts made by such narrators to theorize aspects of 
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their existence, when contrasted with the chaos of their physical and mental condition, 
inevitably appear ironic. When Molloy, for example, discusses the ‘[d]ivine analysis that 
conduces thus to knowledge of yourself, and of your fellow-men, if you happen to have 
any’, he is in fact referring to a series of contradictions he has been unable to resolve (M, 
32). Similarly, the Unnamable’s musings on his situation and condition serve merely to 
underscore the sheer absurdity of his existence and any attempt to make sense of it. 
The world of Auster’s work, in contrast, is perspicuous, amenable to reason, 
explicable. The texture of the writing in no ways bears evidence of ruptures wrought in 
the medium by the subject matter – so prominent a facet of Beckett’s style, in contrast –, 
and the tone is controlled, even and sedate. A good indication of this difference is the 
rhythm of the writing: that of Beckett’s work is characterized by contradictions, 
interjections, tangents, what J.M. Coetzee has aptly termed a ‘rhythm of doubt’ (DP, 40) 
and ‘a flow continually checked by doubts and scruples’ (Y, 155); that of Auster’s is 
assured, fluent, steady. Where Beckett, in his own way, seems to have tried to achieve 
something of the formal quality he attributed to Joyce (‘His writing is not about 
something; it is that something itself’),180 Auster’s work is fundamentally diegetic. 
Despite such contrasts of tone and rhythm, however, the structures of the 
respective trilogies evidence certain striking parallels. Among the most noteworthy 
elements of this is the imbrication of the novels through the assertion of the, somewhat 
obscure, identity of their narrators. As discussed previously, there are indications in 
Molloy and The Unnamable that the same voice narrates all three novels of Beckett’s 
trilogy. Similarly, toward the conclusion of the final novel of The New York Trilogy, The 
Locked Room, the narrator claims 
The entire story comes down to what happened at the end, and without that end 
inside me now, I could not have started this book. The same holds for the two 
books that come before it, City of Glass and Ghosts. These three stories are 
finally the same story, but each one represents a different stage in my awareness 
of what it is about. (LR, 295) 
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The nature of this revelation, while in one way indicating a parallel in the structures of 
these respective trilogies, serves also to mark rather clearly the differences I have 
described above. Beckett’s narrators forget the stories they are engaged in even before 
they’ve reached a conclusion, and their own identity seems more often than not wrapped 
in impenetrable obscurity. It is sufficiently difficult for them to remember their own 
names; a feat of recall and self-awareness such as achieved by the narrator of The 
Locked Room at the conclusion of his story would seem unthinkable. Similarly, the 
shaping and authorial agency that is here exerted over the material, marshalling 
disparate stories into a unified development and effectively providing the key to the 
interpretation of the whole, is a potentiality from another universe. 
Such identity needs to be indicated or hinted at in some way – in Beckett through 
spectral traces and vague parallels, in Auster through unequivocal statement – because it 
pertains despite the absence of the markers that would ordinarily be taken to indicate it: 
names, continuity of memory, allusion to previous events, locality. The very obscurity 
of this identity, however, even, or especially, to the narrators themselves, is of central 
importance in the respective trilogies’ depictions of subjectivity, as is well demonstrated 
by the ways in which The Locked Room extends and complicates the authorial self-
parody initiated in City of Glass. The unnamed narrator and protagonist of The Locked 
Room is contacted by Sophie, the wife of his childhood friend Fanshawe, when the latter 
has been missing for more than six months. Fanshawe had been a writer, and, urged by 
his wife to attempt to get his work published but reluctant to do so, he struck a deal with 
her ‘three or four months before he disappeared’: if he had failed to do anything with the 
work in a year’s time, Sophie ‘was to take all his manuscripts to me and put them in my 
[the narrator’s] hands. I was the guardian of his work, he said, and it was up to me to 
decide what should happen to it’ (LR, 206). Fanshawe further specified that ‘if anything 
should happen to him’ Sophie was to give the writing to the narrator immediately. Thus 
it transpires that the narrator becomes Fanshawe’s literary executor. 
 An interesting avenue into a discussion of the authorial self-parody carried out in 
The Locked Room is a story the narrator describes as being recorded in one of 
Fanshawe’s notebooks, about ‘the famous Arctic explorer’ Peter Freuchen (LR, 254). 
Freuchen, trapped in a blizzard, ‘decided to build an igloo and wait out the storm’. The 
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elements and the wolves prowling outside present a threat. The igloo itself, however, 
presents a problem much graver: 
Freuchen began to notice that the walls of his little shelter were gradually closing 
in on him. Because of the particular weather conditions outside, his breath was 
literally freezing to the walls, and with each breath the walls became that much 
thicker, the igloo became that much smaller, until eventually there was almost no 
room left for his body. It is surely a frightening thing, to imagine breathing 
yourself into a coffin of ice …. [I]n this case it is the man himself who is the 
agent of his own destruction, and further, the instrument of that destruction is the 
very thing he needs to keep himself alive. (LR, 254–5) 
This passage bears many important implications for an understanding of the model of 
subjectivity presented in the novel. The significance of the title The Locked Room seems 
gestured toward in the situation here described – subjectivity as a confined, 
impenetrable space – along with the implication of, as Beckett puts it, the dual 
impossibility of being and not being oneself. The importance of the story is indicated by 
the narrator’s comment that ‘one begins to suspect that Fanshawe felt that [stories such 
as this] could somehow help him to understand himself’ (LR, 254), which is lent further 
gravity by the novel’s earlier emphasis on what the narrator describes as Fanshawe’s 
essential inaccessibility (a topic to which I shall later return). Most significant in a 
discussion of authorial self-parody, though, is the fact that the story is a verbatim 
transcription of an earlier piece of Auster’s writing, ‘White Spaces’. 
This is, however, just one of a number of autobiographical facts from the 
author’s own life that are credited to Fanshawe. In an interview with Michael Wood, 
Auster claims, 
In The Locked Room … several incidents come directly from my own life. Ivan 
Wyshnegradsky, the old Russian composer who befriends Fanshawe in Paris, was 
a real person. I met him when he was eighty and saw quite a lot of him when I 
lived in Paris in the early seventies. The business about giving Ivan the 
refrigerator actually happened to me – in the same way it happens to Fanshawe. 
The same holds for the slapstick scene in which he delivers the captain breakfast 
on the oil tanker – inching along the bridge in a seventy-mile-an-hour gale and 
98 
 
struggling to hold onto the tray. It was the one time in my life I truly felt I was in 
a Buster Keaton movie. And then there’s the crazy story the narrator tells about 
working for the US Census Bureau in Harlem in 1970. Word for word, that 
episode is an exact account of my own experience.181 
Andreas Hau takes this to imply that ‘Fanshawe represents Auster’s past, or that part of 
Auster that stood in the way of a successful career as a novelist.’182 This contention is 
part of a broader reading of The Locked Room, and the whole of The New York Trilogy, 
as an allegory of Auster’s development from poet to novelist, for which Hau provides 
much compelling and closely observed evidence. While there is perhaps a danger of 
being overly reductive in claiming that ‘the whole of The New York Trilogy can be read 
as an elaborate, albeit well-disguised, allegory on the author’s struggle to free himself 
from his past as a poet and make a fresh start as a novelist’ (ibid.), it certainly seems to 
be the case that elements of the work are best accounted for by way of this schema. 
One interesting implication of this reading is, as Hau puts it, that The Locked 
Room thus becomes about Auster’s need ‘to put the poet in himself to rest’ (ibid.): the 
narrator is intended to represent Auster the novelist, Fanshawe Auster the poet, and the 
relations between the two the interactions of two aspects of identity in some way 
delineated by, inter alia, the resolution, recognition or realization of the ideas espoused 
in ‘White Spaces’. Apropos of this, and considering the depiction of Fanshawe provided 
in the novel, Auster’s comment in an interview is revealing: ‘I remain very attached to 
the poetry I wrote, I still stand by it. In the final analysis, it could even be the best work 
I’ve ever done.’183 
Such doubling of identity is a feature of all the novels of The New York Trilogy, 
if to a lesser extent than is the case in The Locked Room. We are informed that, ‘as a 
young man’, like Auster, Daniel Quinn ‘had published several books of poetry, had 
written plays, critical essays, and had worked on a number of long translations. But 
quite abruptly, he had given up all that. A part of him had died, he told his friends, and 
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he did not want it coming back to haunt him’ (CG, 4); Auster has also claimed that City 
of Glass developed out of his imagining an alternative course of his life, one in which he 
had not met his wife.184 The action of Ghosts, meanwhile, is specified as beginning on 
the day of Auster’s birth, 3 February 1947. 
The significance of such doublings of identity and authorial self-inscription, and 
the connection of these to Beckettian irony, is tied to the depiction of the act and process 
of writing these novels. Writing is prominently thematized throughout The New York 
Trilogy, a central feature of every plot and the foremost preoccupation of almost every 
character, and is portrayed as exerting effects that cut right to the core of identity – 
specifically, of opening up gaps in the unity of identity and leading to a divestment of 
selfhood and agency in the face of the depersonalizing dimension of language. As 
indicated earlier, it is this aspect of the work that strikes me as most closely analogous to 
the most far-reaching and disruptive effects of irony in Beckett’s work. In the following 
section I therefore turn to a discussion of the depiction of writing in The New York 
Trilogy and the implications of this for an understanding of the portrayal of subjectivity 
in it. In doing so, I shall begin by devoting more extensive consideration to the earlier 
piece written into The Locked Room, ‘White Spaces’, which charts in fascinating ways 
the theoretical development that preceded and led to The New York Trilogy. 
 
‘wordless things and thingless words’: language, selfhood and the il y a 
 
A meditation on the connection between narration and experience, ‘White Spaces’ 
articulates many of the quandaries and aporia Beckett’s trilogy deals with, and 
demonstrates Auster achieving his own perspective on matters that would come to play 
a central role in his later fiction. Concerned with the challenges posed to articulation by 
the inevitable, and necessary, incommensurability of language and experience, the piece 
marks an overcoming of a severe philosophical and literary impasse that had led to 
several years of writer’s block and a sense of creative failure.185 It also marks a crucial 
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point of transition from the author’s youthful poetry to his more mature prose works; as 
Auster puts it, ‘It was a liberation for me, a tremendous letting go, and I look back on it 
now as the bridge between writing poetry and writing prose. That was the piece that 
convinced me I still had it in me to be a writer’ (ibid., 302). 
The piece was inspired by and initially written to be a spoken accompaniment for 
a single dancer, then printed, along with the similarly formally indeterminate ‘Northern 
Lights’ and ‘The Death of Sir Walter Raleigh’, in White Spaces in April 1980. As Hau 
points out, Auster’s ‘first book of prose under his real name’ thus appeared in the same 
month ‘as his last collection of poems’.186 The piece has subsequently been reprinted in 
Disappearances: Selected Poems (1988), Selected Poems (1998), and Collected Poems 
(2004). This publication history has meant that – in some senses, at least – what was 
initially intended to accompany dance has been turned first into something 
approximating a discursive essay and then into a prose poem. 
Lending credence to Auster’s claim that the piece was for him a ‘bridge between 
writing poetry and writing prose’, the subject matter of ‘White Spaces’ bears many 
similarities to the meditations on language presented in City of Glass. Indeed, linguistic 
matters such as those speculated upon by Stillman Sr. and Quinn are in ‘White Spaces’ 
spelt out in a discursive and philosophically perspicuous style that provides invaluable 
insight into the conceptual terrain Auster was negotiating on his way to The New York 
Trilogy, and it is therefore worthwhile to discuss the argument presented there in some 
detail. 
The central opposition on which the speaker concentrates, and seeks to reconcile, 
is that between the abstracting nature of language and the existence of the desiring body 
in space and time. The necessary disjunction between these two is crucially connected to 
the matter of the ‘motion’ of experience, which is characterized as ‘the realm of the 
naked eye’ (WS, 85) passing continuously before the subject. While this motion ‘seems 
to be random’, as the speaker indicates, ‘randomness does not, in itself, preclude a 
meaning. Or if meaning is not quite the word for it, then say the drift, or a consistent 
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sense of what is happening, even as it changes, moment by moment’ (WS, 82). However, 
while it is ‘probably not impossible’ to ‘describe it in all its details’, 
so many words would be needed, so many streams of syllables, sentences, and 
subordinate clauses, that the words would always lag behind what was happening, 
and long after all motion had stopped and each of its witnesses had dispersed, the 
voice describing that motion would still be speaking, alone, heard by no one, 
deep into the silence and darkness of these four walls. (WS, 82) 
This consideration is supplemented by a reflection reminiscent of a paradox of Zeno: ‘In 
the realm of the naked eye nothing happens that does not have its beginning and its end. 
And yet nowhere can we find the place or the moment at which we can say, beyond a 
shadow of a doubt, that this is where it begins, or this is where it ends’ (WS, 83). Faced 
with the seamless flux of experience, the process of atomization whereby language 
creates discrete entities, with beginnings and ends, is an Achilles chasing an ever-
moving tortoise. Therefore, ‘whoever tries to find refuge in any one place, in any one 
moment, will never be where he thinks he is. … It is never too late. It is always too late’ 
(WS, 83). 
The speaker’s response to this situation is to claim that ‘it is sometimes 
necessary not to name the thing we are talking about’, invoking the rarefied example of 
the ninety-nine names of God in Judaic mysticism, each of which is ‘in fact nothing 
more than a way of acknowledging that-which-cannot-be-spoken … that-which-cannot-
be-understood’ (WS, 83). ‘But even on a less exalted plane,’ he continues, language 
revolves centrally around such lacunae. The speaker exemplifies this by describing the 
way the neuter third-person singular pronoun ‘it’ functions in statements such as ‘It is 
raining’ or ‘How is it going?’ 
We feel we know what we are saying, and what we mean to say is that it, the 
word ‘it’, stands for something that need not be said, or something that cannot be 
said. But if the thing we say is something that eludes us, something we do not 
understand, how can we persist in saying that we understand what we are saying? 
And yet it goes without saying that we do. The ‘it’, for example, in the preceding 
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sentence, ‘it goes without saying’, is in fact nothing less than whatever it is that 
propels us into the act of speech itself. (WS, 84) 
 This formulation and description might put one in mind of Blanchot’s treatment 
of Levinas’ notion of the il y a. As is evident in his reading of The Unnamable, in 
Blanchot’s thought the il y a, conceived of as ‘the neutral region where the self 
surrenders in order to speak’,187 is similarly that which ‘propels us into the act of speech 
itself’ through the exigencies of maintaining the identity thus undermined by it (ibid.). 
Similarly, Blanchot’s characterization of The Unnamable as essaying an approach to 
‘the point of perpetual unworkableness with which the work must maintain an 
increasingly initial relation or risk becoming nothing at all’ seems to echo the agenda 
expressed in ‘White Spaces’ as the goal ‘to go on … as if each word were the beginning 
of another silence, another word more silent than the last’ (WS, 88). However, Auster 
draws very different implications from the observation than does Blanchot. 
 Instead of seeing evidence in such an understanding of the task of literature – or 
at least one kind of literature – for the contingency of language, and hence of any 
construction of self founded thereon, as is the case in Beckett’s work, the argument 
develops in a rather numinous direction. Observing that ‘never do we ask what “it” 
happens to be’, the speaker claims that this is because, ‘We know, even if we cannot put 
it into words. And the feeling that remains within us, the discretion of a knowledge so 
fully in tune with the world, has no need of whatever it is that might fall from our 
mouths’ (WS, 84). This leads the speaker to conclude that ‘it says itself, and our mouths 
are merely the instruments of the saying of it’ (WS, 84). 
 This conceptual development leads to a sense of emotional equilibrium (‘Our 
hearts know what is in them, even if our mouths remain silent. And the world will know 
what it is, even when nothing remains in our hearts’), which, in conjunction with the 
abrupt change of direction that occurs at this point, as well as the topic of the argument, 
encourages an interpretation of the foregoing chain of reasoning as representing the 
resolution of the writer’s block and the achievement of the ability to write fiction to 
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which the author has subsequently referred. In light of this, a later portion of the piece is 
highly revealing: 
In the beginning, I wanted to speak of arms and legs, of jumping up and down, of 
bodies tumbling and spinning, of enormous journeys through space, of cities, of 
deserts, of mountain ranges stretching farther than the eye can see. Little by little, 
however, as these words began to impose themselves on me, the things I wanted 
to do seemed finally to be of no importance. Reluctantly, I abandoned all my 
witty stories, all my adventures of far-away places, and began, slowly and 
painfully, to empty my mind. Now emptiness is all that remains: a space, no 
matter how small, in which whatever is happening can be allowed to happen. (WS, 
86) 
The passage is reminiscent of those in which Malone describes his literary Bildung (and, 
indeed, of Beckett’s descriptions of his own). In addition, the dedication of ‘these words 
to the impossibility of finding a word equal to the silence inside me’ further emphasizes 
the Beckettian motifs of failure and silence, of great significance in a discussion of the 
presence of Beckettian irony in Auster’s work. 
Similarly, language and the subject’s relation to it are prominently foregrounded 
in all the novels of The New York Trilogy. Quinn, much like Moran, is drawn into an 
endeavour that steadily brings about the loss of any and all certainty, self-possession and 
clear sense. Like Moran, what begins as a clear project of pursuit – of detective work, 
the pitting of the epistemological apparatus against obscurity for the sake of 
recuperating meaning – flounders in murky considerations of the possibility of 
significance at all, and results in the protagonist losing his bearings and falling prey to 
an absolute abjection. In both Molloy and City of Glass, the activity of writing plays a 
significant role in this process. With respect to the earlier mentioned significance of 
irony to the late-twentieth century Western Weltanschauung, Derrida’s emphasis, in the 
more general deconstruction of Western metaphysical assumptions, of the error of 
insisting on the primacy of the univocity of the spoken word over the plurivocal 
significance of the written, is especially relevant in this context. For Moran, the process 
of dismemberment and the loss of proprieties he undergoes is depicted as intimately 
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connected to his becoming a writer, and, specifically, a writer of counterfactuals, of 
fictions. 
Writing plays a similarly freighted role in The City of Glass. Quinn buys a 
notebook at the very beginning of the case: ‘It would be helpful to have a separate place 
to record his thoughts, his observations, and his questions. In that way, perhaps, things 
might not get out of control’ (CG, 38). His relationship to it, and, metonymically, the 
writing he intends to carry out within it, is from this early stage particularly charged. 
Quinn is ‘[a]lmost embarrassed by the intensity of his feelings’ on purchasing the 
notebook (CG, 39), and immediately on returning home with it he 
drew the shades in the room, took off all his clothes, and sat down at the desk. He 
had never done this before, but it somehow seemed appropriate to be naked at this 
moment. … Then he opened the notebook. He picked up his pen and wrote his 
initials, DQ (for Daniel Quinn), on the first page. It was the first time in more 
than five years that he had put his own name in one of his notebooks. He stopped 
to consider this fact for a moment but then dismissed it as irrelevant. … For 
several moments he studied his blankness, wondering if he was not a bloody fool. 
(CG, 39) 
Thus from the very beginning the role the red notebook – and writing – will come to 
play in the stripping of Quinn’s faculties and identity is prefigured in his urge to undress 
when first confronted with it. The disruptive role it plays in relation to his identity is 
similarly indicated by his reversion to the initials of his real name in the course of 
conducting business in the guise of Paul Auster. The final sentence, with Quinn 
‘wondering if he was not a bloody fool’, also very aptly characterizes the depiction of 
the effect of the activity of writing on the subject in this novel, a depiction with strong 
parallels in all of those under consideration. 
 Simply put, writing, or even simply the attempt to engage in language for the 
sake of narration, is presented as inevitably troubling the unity and coherence of the 
subject, embroiling him or her in contradictions and aporia that cannot be resolved into 
thetic clarity. Writing thus entails foolishness. The writer becomes the subject of 
language, the dupe of meaning that always exceeds or undershoots intention and words 
that steadily erode rather than contribute to comprehension. This last verb renders the 
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issue in question especially clearly: the writer’s grip on herself, language and the world 
slips, and things are pulled apart into fragmentary incoherence rather than unified into 
systematic clarity. The relation to language exemplified by Quinn and Moran, and every 
bit as much the magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians, which I shall discuss later in 
this study, is thus one that troubles identity and unity and sets in play a process over 
which the agent exercises little or no control. Furthermore, the intimate and ineluctable 
connection of language to the foundation and structure of subjectivity, and hence what 
the individual is able to know, feel, or be, is demonstrated in the extreme example, in 
many ways the centre of City of Glass, of Peter Stillman Jr. 
Stillman Jr. is confined to a locked room by his father from early infancy for 
nine years in an attempt to leave him free of influence and thus able to begin speaking 
the ‘natural’ language of humankind. Such experiments, as Quinn notes, are also 
reported to have been carried out by the Egyptian Pharaoh Psmatik and the Holy Roman 
Emperor Frederick II, and stories about individuals such as Kasper Hauser and the wild 
boy of Aveyron are also mentioned in connection with the case of Stillman Jr. (CG, 33–
5). The house burns down and Stillman Jr. is freed, but the damage already done is 
irreversible: when Quinn meets him, thirteen years later, he speaks in a disjointed, 
barely coherent idiom all his own, which, anticipating the collapse of schemata of 
evaluation his involvement in the case will bring about, leaves Quinn disorientated and 
unsure of how to act. Stillman Jr.’s very presence, it is noted, is like ‘a command to be 
silent’ (CG, 15). 
Peter Stillman Sr., the orchestrator of the experiment and the man Quinn is hired 
to follow, on his release from prison continues to espouse ideas about language equally 
eccentric to those that had inspired his earlier activities. He believes the renewal of 
society and the founding of the New Jerusalem will be achieved through a purification 
of language. His role in this, as he at one point tells Quinn, is ‘inventing a new 
language’: 
A language that will at last say what we have to say. For our words no longer 
correspond to the world. When things were whole, we felt confident that our 
words could express them. But little by little these things have broken apart, 
shattered, collapsed into chaos. And yet our words have remained the same. They 
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have not adapted themselves to the new reality. Hence, every time we try to speak 
of what we see, we speak falsely, distorting the very thing we are trying to 
represent. It’s made a mess of everything. (CG, 77) 
These ideas are connected to Stillman Sr.’s vision of history, which is crucially inflected 
by his understanding of the significance of the Fall and the destruction of the Tower of 
Babel. 
 Following Milton, Stillman argues that, in the Garden, Adam’s ‘tongue had gone 
straight to the quick of the world. His words had not been merely appended to the things 
he saw, they had revealed their essences, literally brought them to life’; after the Fall, 
‘Names became detached from things; words devolved into a collection of arbitrary 
signs; language had been severed from God’ (CG, 43). The destruction of the Tower of 
Babel is simply ‘a recapitulation’ of this, ‘only expanded, made general in its 
significance for mankind’ (CG, 43). 
 The terminology and phrasing of this passage are significant. At the very end of 
the process of dissolution the case brings about on Quinn, as indicated earlier, he is 
described as having come to feel as if the words he uses are ‘part of the world at large, 
as real and specific as a stone, or a lake, or a flower’ (CG, 130), which would seem to 
indicate that he has, in some ways, reversed the effects of the fall of language, at least in 
the sense proposed by Stillman Sr. A further indication that such is the case is Quinn’s 
increasingly paranoid attitude to the significance of Stillman Sr.’s activity. 
 When, after some weeks on the case, observation of Stillman Sr. renders nothing 
intelligible, Quinn begins to feel ‘deeply disillusioned’ (CG, 67) about his attempts to 
retrieve some sense from the activity, he resorts to increasingly oblique approaches. In 
response to his sense of the ‘impenetrability’ and incoherence of the object of scrutiny, 
Quinn adopts an increasingly tenuous and frenetic approach, drawing maps of the routes 
Stillman walks during the day. Doing so, he begins to see letters formed from the shapes 
thus constituted, which day by day spell out a phrase he comes to believe Stillman is 
intentionally tracing out – ‘Tower of Babel’ (CG, 67). 
The referential delusion involved in this is made clear by the fact that these are 
all ‘complicated by numerous irregularities, approximations, and ornate embellishments’, 
which nevertheless do not prevent Quinn from continuing to interpret them as 
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significant (CG, 70). This moment seems to me to mark the critical juncture in his 
breakdown, as, ‘clinging to a semblance of objectivity’, he swings between the inability 
to believe and the inability not to believe the validity of what he thinks he has found: 
Perhaps he was looking for pictures in the clouds, as he had done as a small boy. 
And yet, the coincidence was too striking. If one map resembled a letter, perhaps 
even two, he might have dismissed it as a quirk of chance. But four in a row was 
stretching it too far. … But the letters continued to horrify Quinn. The whole 
thing was so oblique, so fiendish in its circumlocutions, that he did not want to 
accept it. … It was all an accident, a hoax he had perpetrated on himself. (CG, 
70–1) 
He then falls asleep, arriving ‘in a neverland of fragments, a place of wordless things 
and thingless words.’ 
The similarity of this formulation to Beckett’s ‘even then, when already all was 
fading … there could be no things but nameless things, no names but thingless names’ 
seems to beg remarking on (M, 29). Indeed, given the respective contexts of the phrases, 
one might on the basis of this close similarity go so far as to question Morley’s 
contention regarding Beckett’s complete absence from the text. The meditation on the 
possibility of understanding and clarity in which it occurs in City of Glass is appositely 
matched by the following passage, the lexicon and phrasing of which is of profound 
significance in Beckett’s trilogy: 
I felt sure that it began with a B or a P, but in spite of this clue, or perhaps 
because of its falsity, the other letters continued to escape me. … It’s too difficult 
to say, for me. And even my sense of identity was wrapped in a namelessness 
often hard to penetrate, as we have just seen I think. … I say that now, but after 
all what do I know now about then, now when the icy words hail down upon me, 
the icy meanings, and the world dies too, foully named. All I know is what the 
words know, and the dead things, and that makes a handsome little sum, with a 
beginning, a middle and an end as in the well-built phrase and the long sonata of 
the dead. (M, 29) 
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It seems hard, in light of this, not to read Auster’s evocation of nameless things and 
thingless names as a direct intertextual nod in Beckett’s direction. The closing 
description of Quinn’s dream, ‘which he later forgot’, could perhaps also be read as 
furnishing a further Beckettian touch: ‘he found himself in the town dump of his 
childhood, sifting through a mountain of rubbish’ (CG, 72). One could well imagine a 
play by Beckett based on the premise. 
The image provides a clue as to the nature of the activity Quinn is performing in 
sifting through the data he has haphazardly gathered. In imbuing the resulting patterns 
with an overarching significance, Quinn’s interpretation becomes psychotic, in the sense 
articulated by Lacan: he mistakes the imaginary for the symbolic, and thus comes to 
believe in the possibility of unmediated access to the real.188 This is also exactly the 
structure of the ideas of language Stillman Sr. spells out in his tract on the New 
Jerusalem. In seeking to undo the problem of language having ‘devolved into a 
collection of arbitrary signs’ (CG, 42), Stillman hopes to remove precisely its symbolic 
aspect and thus allow it to cut ‘straight to the quick of the world.’ 
It is this dimension of the novel that leads me to claim that Auster’s and 
Beckett’s works proceed in opposite directions. Confronting the breach in the manifold 
of signification, characters such as Stillman and Quinn resort to paranoiac proliferations 
of meaning, their relations to language and the world assuming a superabundance of 
significance, which results, nevertheless, in a cancelling out of meaning. The 
development of Beckett’s trilogy, in contrast, enacts a steady intensification of 
implications of the void that falls between sign and signified, with the narrators 
progressively able to know, and say, less and less, in an apophaticism with no final 
transcendent referent. As Molloy puts it, ‘What I liked in anthropology was its 
inexhaustible faculty of negation, its relentless definition of man, as though he were no 
better than God, in terms of what he is not’ (M, 38). 
Nevertheless, the reasoning spelt out in ‘White Spaces’ and the development 
depicted in City of Glass both point to an understanding of language in many ways 
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analogous to that which I earlier argued informs Beckett’s work, and the implications of 
this for the figuring of subjectivity similarly correspond at significant points. ‘White 
Spaces’ makes clear that a fundamental valence of this vision of language is an irony 
that entails that assertion and articulation inevitably lag behind, and thus misalign with, 
that to which they are meant to refer. While formulated in a rather more cerebral form 
and register than characterizes Beckett’s writing, this remains fundamentally analogous 
to – indeed, simply a broader, less specific articulation of – the earlier writer’s framing 
of the problem, spelt out in the previous chapter, of the impossibility of the coincidence 
of the self and any reference to the self. In both of these projects, therefore, subjectivity 
is depicted as being inherently ironic, a locus of instability linguistic constructions circle 
endlessly around but are never able finally to secure. 
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Chapter IV: J.M. Coetzee 
 
‘a crumbling, a frenzied collapsing’: Beckett and Coetzee 
 
Of the responses to Beckett of the three writers under discussion, Coetzee’s most clearly 
demonstrates the enabling aspects of the influence. While the two writers’ bodies of 
work are markedly different in a number of ways, I shall argue in this chapter that the 
ironic register Beckett achieves is adopted as a central thematic and formal resource by 
Coetzee. A particularly Beckettian irony characterizes Coetzee’s fictional responses to 
political, literary and historical questions. This can, I think without exaggeration, be 
identified as occupying the primary place in Coetzee’s understanding of literature: the 
disruptive aspects of this type of irony are precisely those that are referred to in 
‘Erasmus’ Praise of Folly: Madness and Rivalry’, in which the author works out a 
poetics and an ethics of non-positionality.189 Most important for my argument here is the 
fact that this form of irony represents an enabling of possibilities for literary – and, in 
this case, also ethical – activity: Beckett’s work, for Coetzee, does not represent an 
obstacle to be surmounted or a conflict to be resolved; rather, it seems primarily to be an 
innovation to be adopted, adapted and explored; although, as discussed later in this 
chapter, it is also deflected toward slightly different concerns and orientations. 
 As indicated in a prior chapter, Coetzee has said that his initial response to 
Beckett took the form of an intentional attempt to ‘get closer to a secret’ of the Irish 
writer’s style (DP, 25), and it is interesting to note that Coetzee only finds his voice after 
prolonged and systematic study of Beckett’s writing, in the form of his doctoral 
dissertation and other academic studies. The description in Youth (2002) of ‘John’s’ 
response to his first reading of Watt is revealing in this respect. Contrasting Beckett with 
Ford Maddox Ford, on whom Coetzee had written his master’s dissertation, the narrator 
and protagonist John wonders how he ‘could … have imagined he wanted to write in the 
manner of Ford when Beckett was around the whole time? In Ford there has always 
been an element of the stuffed shirt that he has disliked but has been hesitant to 
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acknowledge … whereas Beckett is classless, or outside class, as he himself would like 
to be’ (Y, 155). 
 The passage indicates, in addition to an aspect of Beckett’s own eluding of 
positionality that appealed to the young Coetzee, the relatively uncomplicated nature of 
his influences, which in this case is described as taking the form of a desire to write like 
someone else. The essay ‘Homage’ paints a similar picture. While it would be simplistic, 
and contrary to Coetzee’s own statements about the writer’s relation to the work, to take 
this purely at face value, such does seem to be the case with many of the more obvious 
influences on his writing: Coetzee’s appropriations of and responses to prior writers 
often take the form of conscious, explicit engagements, as is the case with Defoe in Foe, 
Kafka’s In the Penal Colony in Waiting for the Barbarians, and Beckett in In the Heart 
of the Country. In this sense, then, the Bakhtinian, intertextual model seems the best 
with which to account for Beckett’s influence on Coetzee. 
 Coetzee explicitly cites Bakhtin’s thinking on a number of occasions. In an 
interview with David Attwell, for example, he has said, ‘There is a true sense in which 
writing is dialogic: a matter of awakening the countervoices in oneself and embarking 
upon speech with them’ (DP, 65). As Carrol Clarkson, whose study of Coetzee is 
organized around this notion of responding to countervoices, puts it in discussing this 
comment, ‘Coetzee’s critical engagement with the writing of others – already an explicit 
dialogue – proceeds to raise countervoices within himself, so that each word that he 
writes becomes dialogic in Bakhtin’s specific sense of the term.’ 190  Significantly, 
however, she indicates that, as a result of this, ‘what may have started out as a 
discussion of some aspect of language in Bakhtin, now takes on a deeply charged ethical 
resonance’ (ibid., 73–4). Coetzee himself has said that what he feels to be ‘missing in 
Bakhtin’ is ‘a clear statement that dialogism … is a matter not of ideological position, 
still less of novelistic technique, but of the most radical intellectual and even spiritual 
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courage’, a point that indicates the extent to which Coetzee’s literary, intellectual and 
ethical concerns intertwine.191 
The ethical turn dialogism takes in Coetzee’s work is a result of an 
understanding of subjectivity that differs in important respects from that on which 
Bakhtin’s thinking is based, and that means that the notion is significantly qualified in 
Coetzee’s adaptation of it. Where Bakhtin sees the possibility of speaking for others as a 
relatively uncomplicated one, as evidenced by his discussion of Dostoevsky’s work, this 
becomes in Coetzee’s work a central problem. Most obviously, the ethical problems 
inhering in the issue of speaking for another are strikingly foregrounded in many of 
Coetzee’s novels, and the non-reciprocity of discursive authority is a matter meditated 
on in great depth by the author and the protagonists of his novels. 
Perhaps the best example of this difference is provided by Lucy’s admonition of 
her father in Disgrace. Bakhtin, discussing Dostoevsky’s depiction of characters, writes, 
‘just as the central object for other novelists might be adventure, anecdote, 
psychological type, a scene from everyday life or history, for him the central object was 
the idea.’192 Lucy, in response to David’s attempts to draw her into dialogue and thus 
understand her reasoning, says, ‘You keep misreading me. Guilt and salvation are 
abstractions. I don’t act in terms of abstractions. Until you make an effort to see that, I 
can’t help you’ (D, 112). Given that Lucy’s experience and interiority remain enigmatic 
to her father throughout the novel, with all his attempts to understand her proceeding via 
recourse to his own assumptions and values, her statement here would appear to be an 
argument against the possibility of the establishment of real engagement with another on 
the basis of abstract ideas, and hence against the possibility of an ethical dialogism 
based on such. Like the magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians and the medical officer 
in Life & Times of Michael K (1983), it is precisely dialogue that David fails to achieve. 
Similarly, in the figure of Friday in Foe (1986) Coetzee inscribes the inscrutability of 
the other to authorial intention. Thus, in contrast to Bakhtin’s perception of a dialogism 
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based on the idea, Coetzee’s work appears to place in question the possibility of such, 
proposing instead an alternative based on a recognition of the radical alterity of the other 
and an attitude mindful and respectful of this. 
Such radical alterity implies that the dialogical relation is asymmetrical, and it is 
this asymmetry that instantiates the irresolvable irony in Coetzee’s novels. Because of it, 
the other becomes a vanishing hermeneutic horizon, from which certainty can only be 
recuperated by means of violence, discursive or otherwise. This in turn means that the 
subject of discourse is continuously displaced, the significance of any utterance and the 
validity of any position disrupted by its imbrications with that which finally undermines 
it. There are clear Levinasian echoes in the structural metaphors I have chosen to 
describe this question, and a number of prominent commentators have had recourse to 
the philosopher’s ethical thinking in discussion of the author.193 This chapter is informed 
by the discussion of Blanchot’s response to Levinas in ‘Notre compagne clandestine’, 
discussed in the introduction, and specifically his tantalizing claim there that 
‘philosophy is precisely not allegory’: this is the point of departure for my discussion of 
Waiting for the Barbarians, much critical response to which has centred on the question 
of whether or not the novel is to be read allegorically. I shall argue that it is not, and that 
one can only do so by ignoring certain of the most salient aspects of the work, and 
others of Coetzee’s, regarding the economies of human relations and the role of the 
understanding. Following Johan Geertsema, I shall argue that irony is the most 
appropriate way of conceiving of the narrative economy of the novel and ethical 
schemata depicted within it, and that this irony is in certain ways analogous to that 
instantiated in Beckett’s trilogy. 
Irony in Coetzee’s work, I argue, fulfils a function similar to that in Beckett’s, 
blurring, and undermining, the boundaries between the comic and tragic, proper and 
improper, significant and insignificant. Among the most noteworthy consequences of 
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this blurring is that the reader is forced to interrogate the modalities of her habitual 
literary responses, and the various assumptions underlying, and the implications of, 
certain generic, stylistic, and rhetorical conventions. Perhaps the most pronounced, or 
simply least subtle, example of this in Coetzee’s oeuvre is his reading, when invited to 
give a lecture, a story about someone being invited to give a lecture. The strategy makes 
it impossible to give attention to the nominal content without a very pressing awareness 
of form, and, specifically, the contraventions of formal expectations, whereby it is 
presented. 
My understanding of the role of irony in Coetzee’s work is closely related to 
such troubling and interrogation of literary and aesthetic conventions and the 
assumptions on which they are founded. The tenor of the irony in Coetzee’s writing 
nevertheless undergoes significant modulations over the course of the author’s career. 
The caustic tone of Dusklands (1974) and In the Heart of the Country, for example, is 
rather different to the more introspective, tortured register of Waiting for the Barbarians, 
which again differs dramatically from the significantly less anguished Slow Man (2005). 
I would argue, however, that running throughout the oeuvre as a central preoccupation is 
the question of the impossibility of relation to the other arising from the subject’s 
situation in language. This need not be considered a characteristic drawn directly from 
Beckett; Hofmannsthal, Borges, or Wallace Stevens might all equally accurately be 
identified as precursors in this regard, and it is among the most recurrent of 
preoccupations of mid- to late-twentieth century philosophy and literature, Anglophone 
and continental. Nevertheless, almost no writer is as obsessively and rigorously 
preoccupied with this question as is Beckett, and in almost no other writers’ work is the 
ironic structure of subjectivity as pervasive as it is in his. 
This is not to deny the significant differences between the two writers. The 
intense preoccupation with questions of ethical community in Coetzee’s work is very 
different to the solipsistic self-engagement that characterizes so much of Beckett’s. 
Similarly, Coetzee’s concerns with historical and political situatedness are very 
prominent, whereas these appear in Beckett’s work in oblique and obscured ways. 
Further, Coetzee’s statements on the importance of Beckett’s work for his own have 
become steadily more qualified as his career has progressed, to the point at which, in 
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2011, he replied to an interviewer’s question on the significance of Beckett for his own 
writing, ‘Let us not overestimate my involvement with Beckett. There are writers who 
have meant more to me than he has.’194 
Despite these differences, though, there is a strong sense in which Coetzee can 
be said to be working in a Beckettian tradition. Patrick Hayes describes the nature of this 
very well. Hayes argues that, while the unnameable other to which Beckett’s work 
attempts to give voice – or, more accurately, enacts the impossibility of the attempt to 
give voice to – is an internal other, an aspect of the self occluded by discursive 
consciousness, and Coetzee’s is an external other occluded by social and historical 
structures, both bodies of work are fundamentally informed by the question of speaking 
for the speechless. 195  In a similar vein, Gilbert Yeoh claims that ‘Coetzee 
simultaneously transplants Beckett’s metaphysical and epistemological paradigms into 
South African political reality, and reconfigures them into moral and political paradigms 
more relevant to the South African context.’196 In Bakhtinian terms, this can be read as 
the attempt to overcome monologism in favour of a substantial and meaningful 
plurivocal dialogue. Importantly, though, as I indicated earlier, where Bakhtin sees this 
as a real possibility, in the work of both Beckett and Coetzee this attempt is presented as 
a problem, if not an outright impossibility, rather than a project effectively completed, 
but one we are nevertheless unable not to take up. 
Among the principle ways in which I see this disruption of interpretive limits 
being instantiated in both Beckett’s and Coetzee’s work is a radically unstable irony that 
serves to dislocate the frames of reference and disrupt the points of view of any 
statement, and thus producing a narrative, and interpretive, equivalent of the 
impossibility of naming the unnameable. (As Patrick Hayes construes it, the failure to 
engage with the external other that occurs in Coetzee’s work is analogous to the failure 
to achieve self-coincidence that occurs in Beckett’s; in both writers, the linguistic and 
conceptual resources available to the subject fail to make possible an adequation to 
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either the self or the other.)197 In Coetzee’s work, the destabilizing aspects of irony come 
to the fore largely in response to ethical concerns, as a response to, or way of engaging 
with, ideological monologism and the authoritarianism it informs. The pronouncements 
and perspectives of narrators are rendered ironic through their inextricable situatedness 
in given historical, social and epistemic horizons, not in a way that admits of 
circumscription and understanding of these, as for example in Bakhtin’s conception of 
Dostoevsky’s poetics, but one that actually enacts such hermeneutic indeterminacy. In 
Beckett’s work, a similar effect is achieved through the vertiginous undermining of the 
speaker and position of enunciation, such that any statement is immediately called into 
question by that which follows, and rather than any coherent picture of reality being 
presented, we receive an enactment of the failure of this to be achieved. 
In discussing such forms of irony and the techniques whereby they are achieved, 
in this chapter I shall first discuss In the Heart of the Country, paying attention to the 
ways in which it bears the imprint of Beckett’s influence in a far more overt way than is 
the case with later novels. This permits me to establish a point of reference from which 
to evaluate which aspects of Beckett’s writing exert a lasting, integral influence, and 
which are dropped as Coetzee establishes the style most recognizably his own. Central 
among those aspects that are dropped, I shall argue, is a certain strain of comedy, and 
the discussion will focus on the nature of this comedy and the implication of its absence 
from later novels. I shall then move on to discuss Waiting for the Barbarians, a novel I 
take to be exemplary of the style and concerns of what might be called Coetzee’s middle 
period (extending from Waiting for the Barbarians to Disgrace), in order to demonstrate 
that, while certain stylistic and tonal aspects reminiscent of Beckett’s work present in 
early novels such as In the Heart of the Country and Dusklands are muted in later work, 
the irony I have identified as typically Beckettian continues to inform the work in 
fundamental ways. 
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Critical consensus – with some exceptions198 – is quite largely agreed on the very 
un-comic tone of almost all of Coetzee’s writing. James Wood, for example, claims that, 
in Coetzee’s novels, ‘in place of comedy there is only bitter irony (this is Coetzee’s 
large difference from Beckett, whom he so clearly admires)’.199 There is little point in 
contesting the first portion of this claim; whatever the general tenor of novels such as 
Age of Iron (1990), Disgrace or Life & Times of Michael K happens to be, it would be 
perverse to argue for them being predominantly, or even in part, comic. (It is interesting 
that in the clearest exceptions to this trend, Youth and Summertime (2009), the comedy 
is at the writer’s own expense.) Nevertheless, the second part of Wood’s claim is not an 
obvious consequence of the first. As is clear from the argument regarding the nature and 
role of irony in Beckett’s work offered above, the absence of comedy in no way implies 
the necessary absence of irony. 
 
‘so obscure as to be a prodigy’: language and the other 
 
One rather obvious difference between, on the one hand, the early novels Dusklands and 
In the Heart of the Country and, on the other, Waiting for the Barbarians, which 
exhibits far more clearly the style, tone and register of Coetzee’s middle period, is the 
almost complete absence from the latter of a certain anarchic comedy that is present in 
the former. Later protagonists do not depart quite as sharply – or, like Michael K, do so 
in a markedly different manner – from the psychological middle ground as do Magda, 
Eugene Dawn or Jacobus Coetzee, who are all in certain respects insane. The 
perverseness of Jacobus Coetzee’s view of himself and the world provides the basis for 
a rather Beckettian comedy of the grotesque. In a similar manner, Magda, the 
protagonist and deeply unreliable narrator of In the Heart of the Country, exhibits 
regular instances of the withering self-scrutiny that is used to such potent comic effect in 
Molloy or Malone Dies: 
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a child I bore, assuming that such a calamity could ever befall me, would be thin 
and sallow, would weep without cease from aches in his vitals, would totter from 
room to room on his rickety pins clutching at his mother's apron-strings and 
hiding his face from strangers. But who would give me a baby, who would not 
turn to ice at the spectacle of my bony frame on the wedding-couch, the coat of 
fur up to my navel, the acrid cavities of my armpits, the line of black 
moustache …? (HC, 10) 
While the caustic edge to such passages seems also to be a central principle of the semi-
autobiographical works Youth and Summertime, the fact of their dealing with the author 
renders the effect slightly different to that achieved here. 
  Gilbert Yeoh considers In the Heart of the Country to be an immature work. He 
reads it as having failed fully to work through Beckett’s influence, characterizing it as ‘a 
fledgling writer’s crude attempt to imitate Beckett's early prose.’200 While ‘crude’ seems 
an overly harsh evaluation of the novel, Coetzee’s own recent comments about his 
relation to Beckett’s comedy bear out the general import of Yeoh’s assessment. In an 
interview in 2011, Coetzee discussed how his doctoral dissertation on Watt was in large 
part intended as an exploration of the comedy of that novel.201 ‘What I failed to notice’, 
Coetzee claims, ‘was the Irishness of the whole project: not just the Irish garrulousness 
of its learned comedy but the Irishness of its humor too’: 
The comedy was Irish and to that extent unavailable to me as a writer. I might be 
able to learn how to make up Beckettian syntactic structures, and those structures 
might indeed be induced to carry their own formal meaning; but what I would 
have at my disposal with which to fill them would never be the equal of what 
Beckett had, because the language and the sensibility he worked with, the 
language-sensibility, was both personal and communal, Beckettian and Irish. 
(Ibid.) 
In the Heart of the Country certainly seems to precede such a perception. The 
title of Paul Cantor’s article on Beckett and Coetzee, ‘Happy Days in the Veld’, sums up 
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the general tenor of the work very well,202 and Beckett’s play in fact appears to be 
directly alluded to in the novel: ‘If I had been set down by fate in the middle of the veld 
in the middle of nowhere, buried to my waist and commanded to live a life, I could not 
have done it…. I need more than merely pebbles to permute’ (HC, 119). Various other 
thematic and formal aspects of In the Heart of the Country also align it with Beckett’s 
work. The activity of writing occupies a prominent place in the narrative, with the 
framing fiction being that the text of the novel is comprised of Magda’s journal.203 This 
leads to various authorial interjections, amendments and intrusions, with the plot itself 
being interrupted and revised at various points. Indeed, Magda at one point exclaims 
‘What tedium!’ (HC, 54), echoing Malone verbatim, and phrases such as, ‘But to tell the 
truth, I am wary of all these suppositions’ (HC, 80) ring with a disenchantment with the 
business of fabulation very similar to that expressed by many of Beckett’s narrators. 
Through her writing, Magda hopes to escape her imprisonment in language (‘This 
monologue of the self is a maze of words’ (HC, 16)) and achieve some form of 
meaningful communion with her fellow beings, but such proves impossible, and, as in 
Beckett’s work, the writing leads rather into further estrangement: like Molloy, Magda 
largely loses her grasp on her identity and her understanding of the world, and the 
course of the writing steadily opens up greater and greater reaches of confusion and 
uncertainty. 
 However, in line with Patrick Hayes’s argument that Coetzee’s work situates 
Beckett’s ironic valence in specific historical and political schemes204 – takes the inward 
and turns it out on the world, so to speak – such estrangement is importantly figured as a 
consequence of power relations rather than, as in Beckett’s trilogy, resulting from 
aspects of subjectivity. The novel dwells at length on the impossibility of human relation 
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untouched by patriarchal or colonial domination, and Magda’s longing to escape such 
determination is what for the most part drives the action. Nevertheless, such a 
systematic distortion of relations is depicted as resulting extensively from the subject’s 
relation to language, which implies clear parallels with my construal of Beckettian irony: 
‘Words are coin. Words alienate. Language is no medium for desire. Desire is rapture, 
not exchange. It is only by alienating the desired that language masters it’ (HC, 26). 
 Such an alienation in and by language is among the central subjects of the novel. 
The impossibility of relations with others, one’s history and the natural world is 
consistently dwelt on, and the desire to find a way beyond the strictures of the forms of 
being and thinking imposed by the language and the history bequeathed her is Magda’s 
primary animating impulse. In this respect, she is in certain ways exemplary among 
Coetzee’s protagonists. In an interview with David Attwell, Coetzee claims, 
Magda is passionate … and her passion is, I suppose, of the same species as the 
love I talked about in the Jerusalem address – the love for South Africa (not just 
South Africa the rocks and bushes and mountains and plains but the country and 
its people), of which there has not been enough on the part of the European 
colonists and their descendants – not enough in intensity, not enough in all-
embracingness. Magda at least has that love, or its cousin. (DP, 61) 
To this extent, Magda represents a polar opposite to a character such as Jacobus Coetzee, 
in whom the possibility of love is entirely thwarted by his immersion in cognitive 
schemata that figure the world as an object to be dominated. 
 David Attwell makes interesting use of Coetzee’s essay ‘Achterberg’s “Ballade 
van de gasfitter”: The Mystery of I and You’,205 published at more or less the same time 
as In the Heart of the Country, in his reading of the latter.206 Attwell notes that in the 
Achterberg essay, Coetzee, in describing the intersubjective relation, draws a parallel 
between Martin Buber’s notion of the mythical primacy of the I-Thou relation and 
Wallace Stevens’s Nanzia Nunzio, ‘the woman stripped more nakedly / Than nakedness, 
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standing before an inflexible / Order, saying I am the contemplated spouse.’207 Both of 
these, Coetzee argues, ‘point to a transcendence of subjectivity through union with or 
reconstitution of the Word.’ Such a possibility is contrasted, however, with a ‘darker’ 
Sartrean view in which subjectivity is ‘a hole through which nothingness pours into the 
world’ and a Kierkegaardian understanding in which the approach to the other is ‘the via 
dolorosa of an absurdist Christian knight, the consummation of whose search for the 
true Thou … is a moment in the “presence” (a presence that is an absence) of both his 
own nothingness and an unapproachable, infinitely remote God’ (DP, 74).208 
The conclusion Coetzee draws from this is that, ‘All versions of the I are fictions 
of the I’ (DP, 74), a deeply Beckettian position. The development of Coetzee’s fiction 
from this position, however (as indicated above), consists in his exploration of the 
consequences of such a view of subjectivity for the subject’s engagement with others, 
the world, and history. As In the Heart of the Country amply demonstrates, ‘Neither of 
the Words I and You can exist pure in the medium of language’ (DP, 74), and the 
subject must negotiate the relation to the other through perpetual ironic misdirection, an 
awareness of the fictiveness of all forms of address available to her along with a 
recognition of the impossibility of any other. 
I here follow Johan Geertsema’s characterization of irony as enabling an ethical 
response to alterity given such reifying dimensions of language. Geertsema argues that 
irony allows for a form of representation that draws attention to its limitations as 
representation, in order not to be mistaken for anything other than such and hence to do 
justice to the alterity of the other. 209  The common ground between the classical, 
rhetorical conception of irony and the Romantic understanding of it, claims Geertsema, 
lies in the invocation on the part of both of otherness: in irony, something intervenes 
between the stated and the implied, the said and the unsaid, to produce something new. 
This ‘between’ is that which allows language to extend beyond itself, to figure a 
semantic excess in the schema of a linguistic economy. 
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Despite – or perhaps precisely because of – her passion for the other, Magda 
seems aware of the tendency of language to do violence to that which it seeks to 
represent, and is adept at disrupting it to establish some possibility of relation beyond its 
strictures. Magda’s revisions and amendments to her story and her meditations on 
language serve to disrupt the illusion of a perspicuous discourse, and hence draw 
attention to its failure to accommodate various aspects of the world in which she finds 
herself. Derek Attridge discusses how In the Heart of the Country fits into a modernist 
and postmodernist tradition that attempts to ‘fissure’ language in order to admit that 
which is excluded by discourse, and Michael Marais similarly argues that Magda 
attempts ‘not so much to “burst through the screen of names into the goatseye view 
of … the stone desert” as to make language like the stone desert it excludes’.210 
Almost all of Coetzee’s characters are depicted as coming under the sway of 
otherness. Magda, the magistrate, Mrs Curren, and Dostoevsky are all drawn through a 
material and emotional degradation by their obedience to an obscure imperative to 
access some other who appears in their world. This summons by the other functions, as 
Geertsema’s treatment of the topic adeptly demonstrates, in a manner analogous to 
irony: ‘each [irony and otherness] is potentially infinite. And each, while linguistic, 
escapes language. The other, even though it appears in language, can never be 
apprehended in that language, while irony, similarly, even though it operates in 
language, exhausts language or the attempt to close it off so it can mean fully.’211 In the 
instance of both irony and otherness, hence, a closed economy is opened onto the 
infinity of a task it can neither discharge nor put off, and both bring about an analogous 
‘infinite vertige’ of attempts to accommodate the excessive. 
As in Beckett’s and Auster’s work, Coetzee consistently depicts writing as 
operating close to the crux of this intersection between self and other, and as an activity 
with a peculiar facility to bring about an interruption of closed subjectivity by alterity. 
Foe, Age of Iron, The Master of Petersburg, and Slow Man all thematize writing as an 
attempt to reach the other, as do, in slightly different ways, In the Heart of the Country 
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and the section of Life & Times of Michael K comprising the medical officer’s journal. 
David Lurie’s composition of his opera in Disgrace is perhaps the most extensive and 
explicit exploration of this dimension of creativity, but it is tinged with a euphoria of 
revelation that seems entirely absent from similar considerations of writing. In the Heart 
of the Country offers no conclusions or summation, merely, like Molloy, a steadily 
intensifying derangement. Mrs Curren’s letter to her daughter is written to an absence, 
and in The Master of Petersburg Dostoevsky describes writing as ‘treachery without 
limit’ (MP, 222). What all have in common, however, is a responsiveness to an 
imperative that issues from beyond the horizon of intelligibility and that leads to a self-
undoing exploration of the bases of the individual’s most central meaning and values. 
In Magda’s case, this responsiveness is figured in her ‘passion’ to achieve true 
communion with the other. As already touched on, her perception of the role of 
language in establishing such an inapproachable alterity is made clear throughout the 
text. This perception extends, in a strongly Beckettian vein, to her sense of her own self 
as alienated in language: 
If I am an emblem then I am an emblem. I am incomplete, I am a being with a 
hole inside me. I signify something, I do not know what. … There is no act I 
know of that will liberate me into the world. There is no act I know of that will 
bring the world into me. I am a torrent of sound streaming into the universe, 
thousands upon thousands of corpuscles weeping, groaning, gnashing their teeth. 
(HC, 9) 
This is a vision exactly analogous to the Sartrean view of subjectivity as ‘a hole through 
which nothingness pours into the world’ discussed in the Achterberg essay, and it 
implies that any positing of a self – even in an attempt to relate to another – will be 
ultimately simply an arbitrary assertion of will. Like the narrators of Beckett’s trilogy, 
Magda circles the irreducible contingency at the centre of her being, unable to identify 
an axiomatic foundation on which to ground her fictions. 
 In light of this, one might interpret her various narrative revisions as an attempt 
to exhaust the permutations of the constellation of terms in which she finds herself, and 
perhaps in this way to move beyond them. Like Molloy with his sucking stones (M, 69), 
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Magda moves her father, Hendrik, Anna and herself from one term of relation to the 
next, steadily working through all possible combinations. Having done so, however, she 
is nevertheless left with ‘the voices’ that speak to her from the ‘machines that fly in the 
sky’ (in quotations from Rousseau, Blake, and Hegel) (HC, 126), to which she continues 
to attempt to respond. One implication of this, and specifically the fact that Magda hears 
quotations taken from significant figures in the history of Western thought and literature, 
is that she is engaged in – trapped in – a dialogue with the history of her own culture, 
and that her attempt to fissure the subjectivity in which she feels herself to be bound 
must proceed through an opening of this history to what it excludes. 
 The irony of Magda’s situation consists in the irresolvable relation of freedom 
and determination: she experiences her own essential self as an abyssal freedom, an 
infinite negativity, but she is able to frame this experience, and hence finally actually to 
experience it, only in the terms made available to her by her history. The irony that 
arises from this is analogous to the mathematical sublime, deriving as it does from the 
impossible relation of the particular with the infinite. Hence, in conjunction with the 
infinite demand of the other discussed by Marais and Geertsema, there is a correlative 
irony at work in the constitution of the self. As in the spiralling recursions of the 
narrative of The Unnamable, for example, Magda’s trajectory toward the heart of the 
real is forever condemned to traverse her construction of that real, and then her 
construction of that construction, and so on ad infinitum, in an impossible surfeit of 
fictions. Both the interior alterity of the self and the exterior alterity of the other are 
excluded by language, but Magda has nothing but language with which to access them, 
and so she goes on narrating. 
 Such a concern with the constraints and implications of the forms of 
communication available to one, and the ways in which they impede or disrupt human 
relation, remain a prevalent concern in almost all of Coetzee’s work. In Waiting for the 
Barbarians, this is done largely in the character of the magistrate and his encounter with 
the barbarian girl. Further, though, and more interestingly for my purposes here, this 
novel depicts certain modes of interpretation as constituting precisely such a constraint. 
It also instantiates an irony that, in disrupting such interpretative procedures, enacts the 
disruption of habits of thought it depicts occurring within the magistrate as a profoundly 
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ethical event or state of being. In the following I characterize the mode of interpretation 
thus challenged as one analogous to allegory (for reasons described below), contrasting 
this with the irony I see as being a central aspect of the text and demonstrating how the 
latter undermines the possibility of the former. 
 
‘of no interest in itself, like all that has a moral’: allegory, irony, alterity 
 
There are a number of reasons for the use of the term ‘allegory’ to characterize the 
interpretive approach I am here addressing: its use in Coetzee’s texts themselves, as 
discussed in greater detail below, correlates exactly to the attitude or stance I seek to 
specify, and the prior critical literature, as also discussed below, makes abundant use of 
the concept. It also seems to me best to describe, in the context of literary interpretation, 
the abstracting, rationalizing mode of engagement that is depicted as both the essential 
form of one specific Western epistemological stance that is a recurrent preoccupation in 
the novels and the basis of a correlative posture of domination. I considered the view of 
this relation of interpretation to domination and the ways in which allegory and irony 
connect to this in chapter two, in the discussion of Blanchot’s response to Levinas’s 
thought, and Levinas’s thinking on ethics is of great significance in this context: as I 
argue in this section, I read the anti-allegorical nature of Waiting for the Barbarians, 
which I follow previous critics in viewing as describing the contours of the ethical 
encounter as posited by Levinas, as instantiating an irony analogous to that achieved in 
Beckett’s work, but oriented differently. I hence see Beckettian irony as continuing to 
play a significant role in the central ethical and narrative concerns of Coetzee’s work 
after the more apparent stylistic and tonal similarities of the earlier work have been 
muted, and as a valid and helpful category in making sense of this fiction. 
A good place to begin an analysis of the place of such allegory in Waiting for the 
Barbarians is the lengthy critical discussion that centres on it. A significant portion of 
the work on this novel concerns the extent to which it is to be read as an allegory of 
Apartheid South Africa, colonial domination and postcolonial resistance, or some other 
applicable historico-political fact. This is to some extent a result of the initial reception 
of Coetzee’s work in his home country. In South African literary circles in the later 
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stages of the National Party regime there was much support for a Marxist mode of 
critical realism as the most appropriate response to the political situation then prevailing, 
as articulated, and practised, by Lewis Nkosi, for example. By this standard, the 
metafictional and experimental aspects of Coetzee’s work smacked of art pour l’art, and 
meant that it was judged to fall short of the requisite commitment considered 
appropriate. Nadine Gordimer’s 1994 review of Life & Times of Michael K., which 
characterizes Coetzee’s writing as evidencing a ‘desire to hold himself clear of events 
and their daily, grubby, tragic consequences’, is perhaps the most concise statement of 
this view.212 (Such criticisms have persisted beyond the demise of official Apartheid and 
Coetzee’s emigration to Australia: in 2012 Imraan Coovadia, comparing Coetzee 
unfavourably with Gordimer and Athol Fugard on the subject of such engagement, 
claimed ‘the advanced forms of postcolonial and poststructuralist argument that Coetzee 
found so congenial have as distant a connection to equality as Gradgrind to real 
horses’.)213 Given this climate, one of the ways in which commentators sought to clear 
Coetzee’s work of such a taint was to read it as an oblique allegorical engagement with 
then-present political actualities. In this interpretation, as expounded by Bernard Levin 
and Irving Howe, for example, Coetzee’s work transmuted the all too pressing political 
issues facing the country into broader moral questions.214 
 An important factor in such allegorical readings is the need to preserve some 
autonomy for the artist and the work of art. As Clive Barnett points out, much of the 
discourse about South African literature at this time was concerned with the 
overwhelming weight and imaginative inescapability of the political situation.215 While 
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this latter perspective appears to provide scope for some form of aesthetic sublimation 
of hard reality, it frequently does so merely by eliding any of the historical or political 
context of the production of the works for the sake of recuperating a humanistic moral 
core. Hence, as Barnett puts it, such allegorical readings 
re-anchor the novels to a familiar model of South Africa as an enclosed terrain, 
but at the same time, and conversely, once so located they can be read as having a 
universal moral significance, rather than a specific political one either with 
reference to alternative understandings of South Africa or to the politics of 
writing. (Ibid.) 
The dangers of Western humanistic readings’ tendency to gloss historical particularities 
for the sake of recuperating a flattering – or less damning – significance from a text are 
certainly relevant in such a context. Much like the medical officer with Michael K., 
there appears to be a certain anxiety animating such rehabilitations of these disturbing 
allegories to sound moral structures. 
 Nevertheless, postcolonial readings of Coetzee’s novels, which came after such 
initial reviews and were informed by more sophisticated theoretical and historical 
perspectives, also frequently found reason to have recourse to notions of allegory. A.R. 
JanMohamed and Gayatri Spivak are perhaps the most relevant in this sense,216 but there 
are numerous other examples.217 As Derek Attridge has demonstrated, however, such 
readings tend to have to ignore a great deal of the specificities of the texts themselves in 
order to make a case for the alignment of them with such pre-existing schemes.218 Most 
importantly, such readings need to elide the ways in which the novels so masterfully 
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enact ethical and existential ambiguity and uncertainty, the ways in which they conjure 
an event rather than simply making a statement – elide, that is, precisely what can be 
considered the literariness of the writing (ibid., 44–48). This tendency is clearly 
demonstrated by Bill Ashcroft’s reading.219 
 Aschcroft argues that Waiting for the Barbarians enacts the magistrate’s move 
from an initial postmodern ironic position to a subsequent committed postcolonial 
stance, and that this movement is an allegory of resistance to imperial domination. One 
point he cites in support of this is the magistrate’s claim, on his return from the journey 
to the barbarians, ‘I am aware of the source of my elation: my alliance with the 
guardians of the Empire is over, I have set myself in opposition, the bond is broken, I 
am a free man’ (WB, 78). The passage that follows immediately after this, however, of 
which Ashcroft makes no mention, is this: 
But what a dangerous joy! It should not be so easy to attain salvation. And is 
there any principle behind my opposition? Have I not simply been provoked into 
a reaction by the sight of one of the new barbarians usurping my desk and pawing 
my papers? As for this liberty which I am in the process of throwing away, what 
value does it have to me? Have I truly enjoyed the unbounded freedom of this 
past year in which more than ever before my life has been mine to make up as I 
go along? For example: my freedom to make of the girl whatever I felt like, wife 
or concubine or daughter or slave or all at once or none, at whim, because I had 
no duty to her save what it occurred to me to feel from moment to moment: from 
the oppression of such freedom who would not welcome the liberation of 
confinement? In my opposition there is nothing heroic – let me not for an instant 
forget that. (WB, 78) 
I do not mean here to simplify Ashcroft’s argument: he presents a detailed and in many 
ways compelling case for his claims, and, as his aim is primarily to establish the non-
ironic nature of Coetzee’s work, or at least of his second and third novels, I shall have 
reason to return to his points later in this chapter. The purpose of this criticism of a 
rather decontextualized claim is to demonstrate how, in order for such allegorical 
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readings to be advanced, the vacillation and reflexive foldings of the narrative – as so 
clearly evidenced in the above quoted passage – need to be supressed. 
 As Attridge points out, the thematization of allegory within Coetzee’s novels has 
important implications for an appreciation of the ways in which they rest on allegorical 
principles of composition and make themselves available to allegorical interpretation.220 
The frogs Elizabeth Costello describes to her panel of inquisitors are an exemplary 
instance of this. In the Kafkaesque parable that constitutes the penultimate chapter of 
Elizabeth Costello (2003), the eponymous alter-ego of the author is called before a 
committee to give a statement of her beliefs in order to be allowed through ‘the gate’. 
She prepares two versions of her creed, both of which centre on her vocation as a writer 
and the necessities this imposes, and the piece can be read as an exploration of a certain 
conception of literature that appears to have much in common with that which Coetzee’s 
novels enact and explore. Her first submission – in which she claims that belief has no 
place in writing, that her vocation is not about belief but rather about listening, 
responding – being rejected, in the second she tells a story about a species of Australian 
frog that hibernates beneath baked desert mud for months at a time, emerging with the 
infrequent rains. One of her interlocutors describes her story as an ‘allegorical’ assertion 
of her belief in the spirit of life (much as Molloy describes a given event as ‘an incident 
of no interest in itself, like all that has a moral’ (M, 86)), but she maintains: ‘the life 
cycle of the frog may sound allegorical, but to the frogs themselves it is no allegory, it is 
the thing itself, the only thing’ (EC, 217). Read in connection with the book’s consistent 
concern with domination and how it is justified, the passage would suggest that an 
allegorization of the life cycle of the frog is only possible through a failure to engage 
with its specificity, through a sublation that, ultimately, does violence to the frog itself. 
As Costello puts it, ‘it is because of their indifference to me that I believe in them’ (EC, 
217): the relation described is not one of an abstracting incorporation of the other into a 
known scheme, but a leaving open of any such schema to accommodate that which is 
other to it. 
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 Another notable instance of such a thematization of allegory occurs in Life & 
Times of Michael K: the medical officer, disturbed and fascinated by K, resorts to 
increasingly desperate interpretations of him while seeking to elicit some sort of 
response from him. At one point in this process, the medical officer states, ‘Your stay in 
the camp was merely an allegory … of how scandalously, how outrageously a meaning 
can take up residence in a system without becoming a term in it’ (MK, 228). As I shall 
argue is the case of almost every instance of allegory in Coetzee’s work, this is a 
description of allegory of that which defies allegorization – of an allegory ironic about 
its own very possibility – and hence a thematization of allegory for the sake of 
illustrating its totalizing proclivities. It is also rendered ironic by the fact that it is spoken 
by the medical officer, whose utter failure to understand K culminates in the bathetic 
scene in which, running behind the vanishing figure of the escaping K, he despairingly 
cries, ‘“Have I understood you? If I am right, hold up your right hand; if I am wrong, 
hold up your left”’ (MK, 229). As with almost all such pairings of westerner and other 
(or human and other) in Coetzee’s work, the novel demonstrates how the medical 
officer’s attempts to read K, to translate him into a schema with which he is familiar, 
arises from the discomfort such otherness arouses. 
To the extent that the texts make use of such aspects of allegory, they more often 
than not do so to explore and reflect on such aspects of the technique, and to hold it in 
an ironic openness to that which destabilizes and disrupts it. Mrs Curren wonders at one 
point whether Vercueil might be the angel of death, but his importance to her, and in the 
novel, is precisely that he cannot be ascribed such pat ready-made labels. In The Master 
of Petersburg, Dostoevsky, musing on the mode of responsibility required to carry out 
the work of mourning for his son, recognizes, ‘As long as he expects what he does not 
expect, what he does not expect will not come. Therefore – paradox within paradox, 
darkness swaddled in darkness – he must answer to what he does not expect’ (MP, 80). 
Exactly contrary to allegorical engagement, which apprehends what is expected and 
expects what is known, Coetzee’s fiction repeatedly emphasizes the need to explode the 
known to incorporate that which exceeds it, to maintain a permanent ethical vigilance. 
These points, as I indicate above, have been made before by Derek Attridge. 
Like him, I do not want to deny that Coetzee’s novels can cast any light on the time and 
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place of their composition or domination and totalitarianism considered in the abstract, 
for example; they have frequently been read as doing so. The point I am making, rather, 
is that such interpretations fail to take account of the central concern of these novels 
with the ways in which the economy of allegorical interpretation maps onto and 
correlates with various attitudes underlying and procedures of domination and control, 
insofar as both are construed as arising from an assertion of familiarity over an 
irreducible alterity.221 From the explicit links between Western epistemological practice 
and domination of other peoples and nature that are made in Jacobus Coetzee’s 
meditations on technology and the wild to the intricate deconstructions of Western 
discursive norms and practices accomplished through the Elizabeth Costello and Nobel 
Prize lectures, there is a persistent exploration of the ways in which epistemological and 
interpretive assumptions legislate specific forms of othering, and thereby of 
domination.222 
 As discussed toward the beginning of this chapter, there are a number of 
responses to Coetzee’s work that read it as performing and exploring a highly 
Levinasian engagement with the other. Central to the textual strategies whereby this is 
achieved is an ironic undermining of allegory exactly analogous to the infinite dialectic 
between skepticism and responsibility discussed in chapter two. A certain form of 
allegory is elicited precisely for its habitual mode of conclusion to be interrupted, a 
particular motion of interpretation initiated in order to be perverted, and the sense of 
failed comprehension engendered thus enacts the slippage Levinas describes as the basis 
of the ethical attitude.223 
Waiting for the Barbarians exemplifies this aspect of Coetzee’s work especially 
well. The novel revolves around and interrogates the nature of the relationship between 
empire and its others, between civilization and barbarism, through the attempts of the 
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novel’s protagonist and focalizer, the magistrate of a small town on the borders of an 
unnamed empire, to negotiate his position in relation to the categories imposed on him 
by history. Stated simply, the magistrate undergoes an ordeal, in part of torture and 
physical degradation but perhaps more significantly comprised of the disruption of his 
own concupiscent accommodations to history, that forces him to reformulate his 
attitudes to the world in which he lives and the others who inhabit it. Significantly, this 
reorientation of his ethical and epistemological compass is depicted as an open-ended, 
inconclusive process: having undergone drastic transformations in the course of the 
events of the novel, he ends it recognizing, ‘I have lived through an eventful year, yet 
understand no more of it than a babe in arms. … I leave it feeling stupid, like a man who 
lost his way long ago but presses on along a road that may lead nowhere’ (WB, 169–
70). 224  It is this sensation of stupidity and lostness, of not knowing and not 
understanding, that the novel opposes to a sublation of the material into the sensible, of 
the accidental into the essential, thus achieving an irony that cannot be domesticated by 
allegorical interpretation. Thus thwarting understanding, this irony hence presents itself 
to the reader as a challenge to recognize and remain in her own stupidity, to abide in 
irresolvable contradiction rather than to extrapolate a significance from it. The novel 
thus performs this irony in a manner analogous to Beckett’s texts, calling on the reader 
to undergo a certain failure of her interpretive capacities. 
The irony instantiated in Waiting for the Barbarians appears to be of a different 
kind to that sort that seems an almost inescapable part of the modern novel. In earlier 
instances, such as the fiction of Jane Austen, the disjunction between the moment of 
narration and the events narrated (implicit in a narration in the past tense) implies an 
ironic framing of those events and the characters embroiled in them, a dramatic irony 
heightened by the use of an omniscient third-person narrator (Pride and Prejudice, 
Sense and Sensibility). In a more recent form, such as used frequently by Kazuo 
Ishiguro, the disjunction brought about by historical events (The Remains of the Day, An 
Artist of the Floating World) frames the first-person narrator’s memories and 
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perspective in such a way as to render a slightly different type of dramatic irony. In both 
cases, distance and disjunction produce the irony, and in both a vantage from which the 
‘truth’ of the narration can be discerned is established: in Austen via the implied social 
consensual view, in Ishiguro via our historical moment. 
Waiting for the Barbarians prevents such a stabilizing vantage in a number of 
ways. The present tense narration implies that the narrator himself is not recollecting the 
events narrated in tranquillity, with the benefit of hindsight and the lessons learnt from 
them, but as they occur, while living through the ethical and existential conundrums 
they present. The reader is thus denied the implicit complicity with the older, wiser 
narrator that so frequently structures the extent of the irony of a novel, summing up 
ambiguities and disparities from a point of conclusion, but must instead engage with the 
inconclusive and often indeterminate material without the benefit of such a structuring 
device. The indeterminate historical and geographical setting similarly serves to remove 
the possibility of the sort of frame within which novels such as The Remains of the Day 
must be placed if they are to be understood at all, further estranging the experience of 
the text from schemata that structure interpretation of it. This is not to claim that the 
torture and colonial paranoia presented in the novel do not have historical precedent, or 
that they are not intended or expected to elicit comparison with the novel’s moment of 
composition and publication.225 My point is that the technique serves to diminish the 
authority of such references as the key to some sort of fundamental significance of the 
text, thus instantiating the Barthesian ‘play of writing’ that appears to have exerted such 
an important influence on Coetzee’s thought at about this stage of his career (and 
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later),226 and carrying out in fiction the sort of insurrection with respect to the authority 
of history that he proposed in ‘The Novel Today’.227 
For the protagonists of many of Coetzee’s novels, like the magistrate in Waiting 
for the Barbarians, interpretation is figured in the attempt to forge a relationship with, to 
understand and be understood by, a member of the subservient class. For the magistrate, 
the barbarian girl is an enigma, a living trace of that which is occluded by the discourse 
into which he is born, and to which he is subjected every bit as much as those it 
ostensibly oppresses. His relationship with her thus represents an attempt to move 
beyond the position in which they are inscribed by history. The troubling ambiguity of 
his desire to ‘read’ her is signalled by his fascination with the marks of her torture; as he 
himself acknowledges, there is an unsettling parallel between his fixation on these 
marks as a key to an understanding of the barbarian girl’s identity and Colonel Joll, the 
secret policeman and torturer’s belief that physical pain guarantees the veracity of 
confessions. 
In Bill Ashcroft’s reading of the novel, the awareness of complicity the marks of 
torture engender in the magistrate is understood to be that which initiates his movement 
from an ironic (postmodern, a-political) stance to an engaged (postcolonial) one: ‘the 
point at which irony solidifies into opposition is found in the reality of the girl’s pain. 
The urgent material effects of colonial discourse disturb the equanimity of the ironic. … 
Though the magistrate’s position in relation to the girl may be ironic, her pain represents 
an unequivocal “reality” from which he cannot distance himself.’228 This reading of the 
role of the body seems correct: the barbarian girl’s body, and specifically the traces of 
torture it bears, exercises a power over the magistrate that he cannot understand or 
define but which acts as a something of a summons to action. 
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Similarly, the magistrate repeatedly characterizes the torture and physical 
degradation to which he is subjected as ripping him out of discourse. The following 
passage exemplifies this particularly well: 
In my suffering there is nothing ennobling. … [M]y torturers were not interested 
in degrees of pain. They were interested only in demonstrating to me what it 
meant to live in a body, as a body, a body which can entertain notions of justice 
only as long as it is whole and well, which very soon forgets them when its head 
is gripped and a pipe is pushed down its gullet and pints of salt water are poured 
into it till it coughs and retches and flails and voids itself. They did not come to 
force the story out of me of what I had said to the barbarians and what the 
barbarians had said to me. So I had no chance to throw the high-sounding words I 
had ready in their faces. They came to my cell to show me the meaning of 
humanity, and in the space of an hour they showed me a great deal. (WB, 115) 
Nevertheless, Ashcroft’s belief that the effect of the body and its pain is to resolve the 
ambiguities of discursive indeterminacy by offering a non-linguistic real from which 
perspective can be obtained seems problematic. Rather, the non-speaking body itself is 
the cause of the ironic indeterminacy. Laura Wright, discussing the role of animals in 
the fiction, puts the point particularly well: ‘Coetzee’s fables cannot … be allegorical; in 
Coetzee’s fiction, the animal body does not find one-to-one correlation with some 
unrepresentable abstraction. Instead, the animal body is a body, voiceless and suffering, 
engaged within in a social and historical milieu … characterized by its status as 
similarly inarticulate.’229 The ‘role’ of the body, of the other, in the fiction is thus not 
that of a term in a totalizing system of signification, but rather a limit to, a blind spot in, 
any such system, which hence disrupts and necessitates its perpetual revision. 
 Discussing the question of the attempt to ‘recover a history of … [f]orgetting’,230 
of engaging with, making amends for, and undoing past political denial of specific 
groups the status of full humanity, Sam Durrant indicates the paradoxical task of 
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postcolonial literature: ‘Postcolonial narrative’, he writes, is ‘confronted with the 
impossible task of finding a mode of writing that would not immediately transform the 
formlessness into form, a mode of writing that can bear witness to its own incapability 
to recover a history’ (ibid.). This seems to me to articulate something of the nature of 
Coetzee’s relationship to history and politics very well. In Coetzee’s case, such a mode 
of writing, which does not transform the formless into form and thus avoids simply 
reiterating the colonizing strategies it hopes to undo, is achieved through sustained 
interrogation of the ethics of address. 
The silent other in Coetzee’s novels – the barbarian girl, Friday, animals – is 
precisely that which both compels and disables dialogue: the compulsion arises from a 
Levinasian responsibility, a summons from the other’s very otherness; the fact of 
otherness, however, disables the possibility of actual dialogue, as discourse invariably 
abstracts the heteronymous out to a greater or lesser degree. Here, ought implies cannot. 
The responsibility that can neither be avoided nor discharged this entails is the source of 
the inescapably ironic nature of language and subjectivity: one is summoned to do 
precisely that which one cannot do.231 Importantly, however, for Coetzee, this is exactly 
the basis of literature’s relation to the ethical. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
 
231 This is idea is discussed in detail, at times in relation to Beckett’s writing, in Simon Critchley, Very 
Little. 
137 
 
Chapter V: John Banville 
 
‘I am like everything but myself’: ironic rapture 
 
As discussed in chapter two, John Banville’s relationship to the Beckettian legacy is to 
my mind by far the most anxious and ambivalent of the three writers considered in this 
study. In a manner that rather neatly rounds out the development sketched in the 
introduction from early Romanticism through modernism and into the present, 
Banville’s work seems to vacillate between a stark sense of the Beckettian irony I have 
discussed in the earlier portions of this study and a contrasting intuition of the capacity 
of the imagination, and hence of literature and the imaginative arts, that bears certain 
resemblances to the Kantian or Romantic understanding of the synthesizing, ordering 
capacities of this faculty. Banville’s narrators simultaneously intuit schemata of order 
and beauty in the world while also remaining painfully aware of, in addition to the 
disorder of their own selves and the chaos on which their subjectivity appears to be 
founded, the fundamental alterity of such beauty to human being.232 These two aspects 
are often juxtaposed in Banville’s work, to poignant or comic effect, and their mutual 
presence accounts for a significant portion of the tone – mordant, cynical, and 
disenchanted, yet acutely attuned to the beauty, and pain, of the intensity and 
inexplicability of the fluctuating play of affect and sensation in consciousness. 
This ambivalence is in some ways similar to Beckett’s tragicomic mode 
discussed in chapter two, specifically with respect to the comic possibilities it provides, 
and which both writers exploit. In Banville’s case this is often focused on the 
slipperiness of language, and the narrators’ tendency revealingly to say more than they 
intend. Max Morden, narrator of The Sea, for example, often stumbles in such a way 
when discussing the cancer that leads to his wife’s death: ‘Before Anna’s illness I had 
held my physical self in no more than a fond disgust, as most people do – hold their 
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selves, I mean, not mine – tolerant, necessarily, of the products of any sadly inescapable 
humanity’ (TS, 70). In this passage, as so often in Beckett’s work, any possibility of the 
gravity of the subject being afforded what might be considered a suitably solemn 
treatment is undercut by the riotous intrusions of the body and the comic floundering of 
language trying simply to obtain a grip on what it wants to mean. 
In a related manner, Banville’s narrators similarly tend to undermine their own 
authority, by drawing attention to either their own limited or biased perspective, their 
flawed memory, and their general unreliability, or the ontological impossibility of an 
accurate description of the world or the self. Freddie Montgomery, the narrator of The 
Book of Evidence (1989) (and, it can be deduced, the other two novels of the Frames 
trilogy), who has much in common with Beckett’s Malone in this respect, presents the 
clearest example of this tendency in Banville’s fiction. In connection with the former of 
the two types of failing described above, his narration of The Book of Evidence is 
frequently punctuated by asides such as, ‘Mrs Reck was tall and thin. No, she was short 
and fat. I do not remember her clearly. I do not wish to remember her clearly. For God’s 
sake, how many of these grotesques am I expected to invent?’ (BE, 79) or ‘Do not be 
fooled: none of this means anything either’ (BE, 93). Apropos of the latter type, 
connected to some sort of fundamental ontological indistinctiveness of things, he claims, 
in the course of the attempt to give an account of his motivations and the actions that 
have followed from them (most salient among which is the murder of a young woman), 
‘Perhaps that was the moment in my life at which – but what am I saying? there are no 
moments, I’ve said that already. There is just the slow, demented drift of things’ (BE, 
115). 
Certain other prominent aspects of Banville’s style seem to depart rather sharply 
from Beckett’s, however. In a manner connected to the thematization of intuitions of 
order and beauty, and the attendant possibility of a subjective alignment with the world 
and others, Banville’s prose frequently displays a sharp perceptiveness and descriptive 
clarity that puts one in mind of Wallace Stevens’s dictum that ‘Description is 
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revelation.’233 All forms of sensory apprehension, as well as the motions of affective and 
psychological states, are presented with a precision that offers glimpses of a luminosity 
and transparency strenuously denied in the writings of Beckett, Coetzee and perhaps to a 
lesser extent Auster. Alex Cleave, for example, provides the following poignant 
recollection: 
The weather was wintry still. There had been a brief fall of soft wet snow, and 
now the sun had come infirmly out, and the sky was made of pale glass, and the 
gore was a yellow flame against the whiteness, and all about us water was 
dripping and tinkling and covertly running under the lush, flattened grass. … 
[W]hen we were coming down a stony track between two walls of blue-black 
pines she tripped and fell over and cut her lip. The drops of her blood against the 
patchwork snow were a definition of redness. I snatched her up and held her to 
me, a bulky warm ball of woe, and one of her quicksilver tears ran into my mouth. 
I think of the two of us there, among the shivering trees, the birdsong, the gossipy 
swift whisperings of trickling water, and something sags in me, sags, and 
rebounds with a weary effort. What is happiness but a refined form of pain? (E, 
76) 
Such vividness of description correlates with, and frequently enacts, the possibility of 
establishing of some prehension on the world by means of imagination and art that 
constitutes so important an element of Banville’s work. 
Stylistically, such lucidness and detail are almost certainly connected to an 
aspect of the fiction that is gestured toward in the author’s claims to want to write prose 
that is like poetry.234 One can assume that by this he is referring, in one respect, to a 
certain compression, intensity, and precision of the writing, and to a gloss and polish of 
expression and style, to ‘the kind of denseness and thickness poetry has.’235 While this 
would perhaps seem an ambition diametrically opposed to Beckett’s desire to write 
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without style, other of Banville’s own discussions of the point link it in interesting ways 
precisely with Beckett’s work. For example, discussing Molloy in an interview, Banville 
claims that 
it was a great revelation to me – the idea that a writer could speak in such a 
completely self-absorbed way, not dealing with characters or human interests – 
the usual stock-in-trade of the novelist. It was great to discover that linguistic 
beauty could be pursued as an end in itself. Beauty is … crucial to me. It’s what 
I’m after constantly. Beauty is an almost nonhuman pursuit.236 
This statement aptly characterizes the stylistic quality of the writing, and the reflections 
on beauty as an ‘inhuman’ quality would mark an interesting starting point for a 
discussion of the ways in which Banville’s writing departs from Romantic and 
modernist aesthetic and epistemological frames. Indeed, I shall argue later in this 
chapter that Banville’s depiction of the human relation to beauty inverts the Kantian 
notion of its consisting in the apprehension of order and intelligibility in the world; 
rather, beauty is consistently depicted as arising in an apprehension of the otherness, the 
non-humanness, of the world, and hence as representing an interruption, rather than an 
affirmation, of subjectivity. 
In expanding on the implications of this notion of the significance of such poetic 
elements in his prose, this chapter is organized as follows: I begin with a brief 
discussion of Banville’s attitude to the work of Rainer Maria Rilke and Wallace Stevens, 
poets he seems to consider in some ways exemplary, and to whom he has made telling 
reference at important junctures. In doing so I hope to elucidate his understanding of the 
imagination, to clarify the continuities of this with Romantic notions of it, and to spell 
out the relation of art and literature to it. This will proceed primarily via a discussion of 
Doctor Copernicus, a pivotal work in the author’s development. My discussion of this 
novel serves a function analogous to that of ‘White Spaces’ in the context of Auster’s 
work: an early novel, Doctor Copernicus serves to clarify many of the important aspects 
of Banville’s understanding of the role of the imagination in mental representation, and 
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also enacts the impasse into which this leads and from which a more fundamentally 
Beckettian mode arises in the author’s writing. That is, I shall argue that Rilke’s answer 
to certain problems that arise from a Romantic conception of art – the answer of praising 
the world to the Angel, on which Banville has throughout his career set much store – in 
fact simply begs the primary question, and that Banville’s recognition of this leads him, 
in his later novels, to inflect this ‘solution’ with an ineradicable and irresolvable irony. 
Contrary to Coetzee and Auster, therefore, I see Banville’s work as becoming more 
ironic, and more Beckettian, over the course of its development. As my intention in such 
a reading of Doctor Copernicus is primarily to sketch out the conceptual impasse that 
the later fiction engages with more closely, my discussion is somewhat selective, and 
focused to a far greater extent on the ideas I see embodied in the principal characters 
than a close reading of the rhetorical and figural devices of the text. Where I discuss 
these latter, I do so with reference to the author’s entire body of work in order to 
delineate characteristic tropes and techniques and the implications of these for my 
understanding of the subjects of imagination, ethics, and art. 
I shall then consider later work, focusing primarily on Eclipse and, to a lesser 
extent, The Sea, in light of this foregoing discussion in order to demonstrate the ways in 
which Beckettian irony comes to inform them fundamentally. This discussion will 
similarly focus on the nexus and perceived connection between the imagination, ethics, 
and art, demonstrating how Banville incorporates a Beckettian mode in framing these 
and depicting the possibilities open to the artist – to the subject – given the implications 
he draws from them. In this movement in his more recent work, I see Banville as 
gravitating toward the position he credits to Wallace Stevens, and away from that of 
Rilke. Stevens’s view, I argue, has important links with the problematic of the 
inaccessibility of the ordinary, as dealt with in Heidegger and post-Heideggerian 
phenomenological work, as well as in the work of thinkers such as Wittgenstein and 
Cavell, and I spell out the ways in which such a line of inquiry sheds light on the 
concerns with subjectivity, memory and intersubjectivity in Banville’s work. As with all 
the authors discussed in this study, in these later novels an emphasis on subjectivity, the 
structures on which it is based and the limitations it inevitably implies, is depicted as 
necessarily giving rise to a misalignment between the mind and the world and other 
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people, and hence to an irresolvable ontological irony such as is instantiated in Beckett’s 
trilogy. I conclude the argument by linking the inversion of the Kantian view of beauty 
to such subjective misalignment and to the problem of the ordinary that is raised earlier 
in the chapter, showing how Banville’s view of beauty poses it as an interruptive, 
uncanny force that facilitates some form of accession to an ordinary that is otherwise 
precluded from human apprehension. 
In terms of the relevant scholarship, in the relatively young field of Banville 
studies, there has consistently been interest in and attention devoted to the significance 
of Beckett’s work for the later author’s. Various factors make this nigh inevitable: 
Banville’s own assertions of the importance of Beckett’s work for his; the similarities of 
the two writers’ relationship to their homeland; and the texture of their respective 
writings, both so deeply inflected with a Hiberno-English mellifluousness, and both so 
thoroughly shot through with an anguished and anarchic comedy. The second of these 
factors provided much fodder for the debate that defined the first generation of Banville 
studies, that concerning the extent to which he is or should be considered an ‘Irish’ 
author. Rüdiger Imhof, for example, advanced the view that Banville is to be considered 
a cosmopolitan, pan-European postmodernist with little or no affiliation to or interest in 
Irish affairs,237 while various other scholars have devoted attention to how Banville’s 
predominant concerns relate to those of his homeland. Declan Kiberd describes him as a 
‘post-nationalist’ writer who moves beyond the antinomies of nationalist and anti-
nationalist Irish writings by exploring ‘all those forces that have made the very phrases 
“Irish tradition” or “German culture” problematic’.238 Richard Kearney similarly argues 
that Banville occupies an important place in ‘the critical counter-tradition of Irish 
writing’ initiated by Joyce and Beckett that ‘sets out … to challenge the clichés of 
traditional [Irish] narrative’.239 Peter Boxall and Derek Hand both identify a type of 
voluntary self-marginalization from any putative tradition as being an attitude 
commonly struck by Irish writers (Maria Edgeworth, Elizabeth Bowen, Flann O’Brien), 
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and see Beckett and Banville as also having this in common (a commonality that 
ultimately consists in the denial of commonality).240 
On the question of thematic and stylistic parallels between Banville and Beckett, 
Imhof, Joseph McMinn, Derek Hand, and Elke D’Hoker all discuss the similarities 
between the two writers’ treatments of the way the self relates to the self in the 
processes of memory, narration, self-perception and interrogation of identity, and all 
consider Banville’s work very Beckettian in respect of such matters.241 Mark O’Connell 
points out the two authors’ shared concern with the breaking down or dissolution of 
identity, while Ingo Berensmeyer touches on the emphasis on authorial impotence 
common to the two.242 Possible similarities between the comedy of the two writers’ 
work have not to my knowledge hitherto received any attention, which certainly offers a 
compelling topic for exploration. 243 In addition to these works, three others of relevance 
to my discussion of the uncanny in this chapter are Hedwig Schwall’s ‘“Mirror on 
mirror mirrored is all the show”: Aspects of the Uncanny in Banville's Work with a 
Focus on Eclipse’, Romain Nguyen Van’s ‘“According to all the authorities”: The 
Uncanny in John Banville’s The Sea’, and Hugh Haughton’s ‘The Ruinous House of 
Identity’.244 
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‘the definition of redness’: the limits of simile 
 
In a lecture delivered to the International Writing Programme at the University of Iowa 
City in 1980, Banville describes his vision of the role of art as following from the 
interaction of two aspects of awareness, for articulations of which he cites passages from 
Rilke and Stevens.245 On the one hand, as Stevens observes, ‘the poem springs’ from the 
fact ‘that we live in a place / That is not our own, and, much more, not ourselves’:246 
works of art and literature are an attempt to relate to, and to some extent to domesticate, 
the otherness of the world; as Heidegger, after Hölderlin, puts it, ‘poetically man 
dwells’.247 On the other, Banville claims that ‘the real purpose’ of literature is as Rilke 
states it in the ninth Duino Elegy, to ‘[p]raise the world to the Angel’: 
Tell him of Things. He will stand astonished …. 
Show him how happy a Thing can be, how innocent and ours, 
how even lamenting grief purely decides to take form, 
serves as a Thing, or dies into a thing …. 
 
Earth, isn’t this what you want: to arise within us, 
invisible? Isn’t your dream 
to be wholly invisible someday? O Earth: invisible! 
What, if not transformation, is your urgent command?248 
Banville’s sense of the validity and importance of this second sentiment is repeated in a 
review of a recent translation of Letters to a Young Poet, which concludes by quoting, 
approvingly, Rilke’s, ‘because truly being here is so much; because everything here / 
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apparently needs us, this fleeting world, which in some strange way / keeps calling to us. 
Us, the most fleeting of all.’249 
The conjunction of these two observations on the nature and purpose of art 
serves to illustrate Banville’s simultaneous sense of both the fundamental foreignness of 
the world to human being and the obscure imperative to sublate it through art, both our 
alienation from the world – a characteristically Beckettian point of view – and the 
capacity of the imagination to make something meaningful of this very alienation – an 
attitude strikingly reminiscent of Romantic attitudes. In articulating his perception of the 
implications of the interplay of these two observations regarding the task and function of 
art, Banville states, 
Together the Stevens and the Rilke quotations create a synthesis which is the very 
core of art. It is out of the tension between the desire to take things into ourselves 
by saying them, by praising them to the Angel, and the impossibility finally of 
making the world our own, that poetry springs …. Hence the note of solitude, of 
stoic despair, which great art always sounds. As Beckett says: I can't go on, I’ll 
go on.250 
The final word here seems to be accorded to the impenetrability, the strangeness of the 
world, ‘the impossibility finally of making the world our own’. But the tone of 
Banville’s work is on the whole less relentlessly despairing, and less stoic, than 
Beckett’s. This is in large part because of his perception of the validity of the sort of 
‘supreme fiction’ Stevens envisages, resolved to its own artifice yet finding resources 
therein nevertheless: ‘an art which is honest enough to despair and yet go on … without 
delusions, aware of its own possibilities and its own limits; an art which knows that 
truth is arbitrary, that reality is multifarious, that language is not a clear lens’ (ibid.). 
This idea of a supreme fiction – by which Banville takes Stevens to mean ‘an all-
embracing and sustaining, and yet admittedly synthetic, touchstone created by men for 
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man’251 – is of great importance in Banville’s work. The passage from Stevens quoted in 
the Iowa City talk is taken from Notes toward a Supreme Fiction, as is the epigraph to, 
and a number of direct quotations incorporated into, Doctor Copernicus, the first of the 
novels of the tetralogy that explores the accessibility of the world to human intellection 
in the form of scientific enquiry. It is perhaps somewhat surprising that in the Iowa talk 
Banville does not make more extensive reference to the poem itself, as it is centrally 
concerned with the implications of precisely the sort of observations he there makes for 
an understanding of the attempt to forge such supreme fictions. Like Copernicus, who in 
Banville’s depiction sets out to identify ‘the deepest thing: the kernel, the essence, the 
true’ and discovers that in the end all his efforts amount to ‘merely an exalted naming’ 
(DC, 207),252 Stevens claims that ‘Adam / In Eden was the father of Descartes’ (ibid., 
207), another of those architects of the Enlightenment, and one who similarly 
endeavoured to ascertain the very essence of being, the absolutely true. 
This disillusionment with the possibility of knowledge, and attendant 
meditations on the nature of human intellection and figuration, are the central subject of 
Doctor Copernicus. The attempt to access – and hence, necessarily, the faith in – 
ultimate truth instigates the astronomer’s attempt to replace the Ptolemaic system, which 
offers self-consciously expedient explanations of the motion of the planets in line with 
inherited orthodoxies regarding the divine mathematical harmony of the cosmos in order 
to ‘save the phenomena’. Brudzewski, a defender of the system Copernicus seeks to 
replace, observes that astronomy ‘does not discern your principle thing, for that is not to 
be discerned’ (DC, 35). As Elke D’Hoker notes, in ascribing to Brudzewski the view 
that ‘[w]e are here and the universe, so to speak, is there, and between the two there is 
no sensible connection’, Banville ‘clearly tries to give these scholastic beliefs a 
Postmodern flavour by emphasising the limits of knowledge they try to observe’.253 
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Throughout the novel two attitudes to thought and its implications for human 
being are consistently contrasted, the one represented by Copernicus, the other to some 
extent by the Scholastics, but more properly by Copernicus’s older brother Andreas. In 
this opposition, Copernicus’s longed-for transcendental knowledge, unsullied by 
materiality and free of its means of expression, is counterpointed by an acceptance of 
embodiment and a recognition of the inescapable implications of this for any possible 
form of knowledge. These contrasting attitudes are perhaps most clearly illustrated by 
their proponents’ attitudes to names. For Copernicus, the arbitrariness and messiness of 
designation is a source of dissatisfaction and anxiety: 
It was the Vistula, the same that washed in vain the ineradicable mire of Torun – 
that is, the name was the same, but the name meant nothing. Here the river was 
young, as it were, a bright swift stream, while there it was old and weary. Yet it 
was at once here and there, young and old at once, and its youth and age were 
separated not by years but leagues. He murmured aloud the river’s name and 
heard in that word suddenly the concepts of space and time fractured. (DC, 20) 
His goal is hence to access a mode of knowing that transcends the linguistic and the ad 
hoc. In an argument with a fellow astronomer he states, ‘I believe not in names, but in 
things’ (DC, 36). Among the Scholastics with whom he disagrees, his teacher Canon 
Wodka expresses the opposing view most succinctly: ‘I believe that the world is here … 
that it exists, and that it is inexplicable. … [A]ll theories are but names, but the world 
itself is a thing’ (DC, 23; italics original). Ultimately, Copernicus comes to see himself 
as having failed in his attempt to transcend the signifier, as having merely formulated 
further names. However, Banville’s approving citation of Rilke’s Duino Elegies would 
indicate that the author’s attitude to the nature of names is rather more complex, as is 
evidenced by the treatment of embodiment and sensation and the implications of these 
for subjectivity in Doctor Copernicus and other novels. 
Indeed, the significance of the question of embodiment in this respect is 
signalled in the section immediately following Canon Wodka’s assertion that ‘the world 
itself is a thing’: ‘On Saturdays in the fields outside the walls of the town Caspar Sturm 
instructed the school in the princely art of falconry. The hawks, terrible and lovely, 
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filled the air with the clamour of tiny deaths. Nicolas looked on in a mixture of horror 
and elation. … Compared with their vivid presence all else was insubstantial. They were 
absolutes’ (DC, 23). The physical force of the image is compounded by the implication 
of Nicolas’s erotic attraction to Caspar Sturm: ‘Nicolas watched him watching his 
creatures and was stirred, obscurely, shamefully’, and he later ejaculates on waking 
from a dream in which ‘[m]onstrous hawklike creatures were flying on invisible struts 
and wires across a livid sky, and there was a great tumult far off, screams and roars, and 
howls of agony or of laughter’ (DC, 24). 
A connection is implied between eroticism and mortality throughout this passage, 
first hinted at in the polyglot pun of the hawks’ filling the air with ‘tiny deaths’ and 
stated more explicitly in the description of Nicolas’s ejaculation as ‘a kind of exquisite 
dying’ (DC, 24). This link clarifies the contrast between the two attitudes described 
above. The longing for the transcendent is a desire precisely for the unchanging, the 
deathless, whereas mortality is the inescapable condition of embodied being, and this 
point underpins Nicolas’s motives in adopting the course of action he eventually does, 
as described in the following passage: 
it was all a deeply earnest play-acting, a form of ritual by which the world and his 
self and the relation between the two were simplified and made manageable. 
Scholarship transformed into docile order the hideous clamour and chaos of the 
world outside himself, endistanced it and at the same time brought it palpably 
near, so that, as he grappled with the terrors of the world he was terrified and yet 
also miraculously tranquil. Sometimes, though, that tranquil terror was not 
enough; sometimes the hideousness demanded more, howled for more, for risk, 
for blood, for sacrifice. Then, like an actor who has forgotten his lines, he stood 
paralysed, staring aghast into a black hole in the air. (DC, 28) 
It is of more than passing interest to note that the situation described in the final 
sentence here is the instigating premise of the action – if one could call it such – of 
Eclipse. 
The contrary to Nicolas’s striving for disembodied, transcendental 
changelessness is provided by his older brother Andreas, who most clearly figures 
embodied human being in the novel. Dissolute, sensual, and impatient of theorizing, 
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Andreas inhabits the physical world with no longing for an absolute elsewhere, and 
figures to some extent as Nicolas’s inverted double, as his animus. Indeed, when on his 
deathbed, disillusioned with his life’s work and despairing of his earlier ambitions, 
Nicolas conjures Andreas in an hallucination, this is made explicit: ‘you have said that 
you are dreaming me …. That is why I am here, because at last you are prepared to 
be … honest’ (DC, 238). In this hallucination, the vision of Andreas points out to 
Nicolas, ‘I was that which you must contend with. … I was the one necessary thing, for 
I was there always to remind you of what you must transcend. I was the bent bow from 
which you propelled yourself beyond the filthy world’ (DC, 240). Providing an 
assessment of Nicolas’s life and work, he continues: 
There had to be a little regard, yes, the regard which the arrow bears for the bow, 
but never the other, the thing itself, the vivid thing, which is not to be found in 
any book, nor in the firmament, nor in the absolute forms. You know what I mean, 
brother. It is that thing, passionate and yet ordinary, that thing which is all that 
matters, which is the great miracle. You glimpsed it briefly in our father, in sister 
Barbara, in Fracastro, in Anna Schillings, in all the others, and even, yes, in me, 
glimpsed it, and turned away, appalled and … embarrassed. (DC, 241) 
The characterization of the prized object of the epistemological effort as ‘ordinary’ is an 
indication of how certain of Banville’s preoccupations intersect with those of 
Wittgenstein and Cavell, for example (among many other post-Kantian thinkers), 
concerning the inaccessibility of the ordinary, which I shall touch on later in this chapter. 
The conception of the relation of embarrassment to this ordinary, however, seems to me 
a strikingly original insight. 
Embarrassment is accorded very close scrutiny on many occasions in Banville’s 
oeuvre, and imbued with especial force and intensity. Andreas has earlier said to Nicolas, 
‘It was always your stormiest emotion, that fastidious, that panic-stricken 
embarrassment in the face of the disorder and vulgarity of the commonplace, which you 
despised’ (DC, 238). And in The Sea, Max Morden remarks on his and his wife’s 
discomfort on her being diagnosed with cancer, 
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I realized what the feeling was that had been besetting me since I had stepped that 
morning into the glassy glare of Mr Todd’s consulting rooms. It was 
embarrassment. Anna felt it as well, I was sure of it. Embarrassment, yes, a panic-
stricken sense of not knowing what to say, where to look, how to behave …. It 
was as if a secret had been imparted to us so dirty, so nasty, that we could hardly 
bear to remain in one another’s company yet were unable to break free, each 
knowing the foul thing that the other knew and bound together by that very 
knowledge. From this day forward all would be dissembling. There would be no 
other way to live with death. (TS, 22) 
This depiction emphasizes those aspects of the emotion that, rather than relating 
exclusively to a relatively thin veneer of social observance, stem from some deeper, 
more primary of our modes of engagement with the world. Such would certainly be 
consistent with the references to it in Doctor Copernicus and The Sea. In both of these 
novels, the connection between embarrassment, on the one hand, and death and the body 
on the other that implies the former implies a visceral response to the abject. 
Significantly – given my characterization of Andreas as representing a form of 
embodied being from which Nicolas attempts to flee – in the hallucination scene in 
which the reference to embarrassment appears, Nicolas says to Andreas, ‘You are death’, 
to which Andreas characteristically replies, ‘O that too, brother, that too, but that’s of 
secondary importance’ (DC, 237). This is only consistent: mortality and finitude are the 
necessary and inevitable correlatives of embodied being, its horizon and organizing 
principle; Nicolas’s aspiration after the transcendent and absolute is also a desire for 
changelessness. 
There is however an indication that Nicolas undergoes some transformation on 
his deathbed. At the very end of the book, in the formulation, ‘This was dying, yes, this 
was unmistakably the distinguished thing’ (DC, 237), the parallelism in the verbal 
formulation with the object of his lifelong preoccupation – ‘the vivid thing’, ‘the 
principal thing’ – is clear.254 And indeed, this dimension of death is gestured at within 
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the very first pages of the novel: when Nicolas’s mother dies in his early childhood, she 
is described, in the free indirect, as being ‘utterly, uniquely still, and seemed in this 
unique utter stillness to have arrived at last at a true and total definition of what she was, 
her vivid self itself’ (DC, 5). The motif is reiterated in the scene of Nicolas’s petite 
morte following his dream about the hawks, in which ‘his self shrank together into a tiny 
throbbing point’ as he is ‘poised on the edge of darkness and a kind of exquisite dying’ 
(DC, 24). Taken together, these descriptions imply the irony of Nicolas’s project: self-
coincidence consists in absolute self-dispersal, and the closest he can hope to get to the 
absolute knowledge he desires is in ceasing to be a subject of knowledge, in the 
becoming of an object. 
There is in this depiction a further connection to Rilke’s work, and one that is 
intimately tied up with the notion, so frequently quoted by Banville, of the human duty 
to bring the world to life within us through an aesthetic engagement with it. In The 
Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, a central focalization of the young poet’s anxiety 
and loathing of Paris are his meditations on the nature of death in the modern city. In 
counterpoint to his grandfather’s death, which is intimate, familial, immediate, Malte 
considers death in the modern city, like life, to be commodified, inextricable from 
systems and technologies that render it alien and unapproachable. There is also however, 
in addition to such technological causes, a moral dimension to this alienation, exactly 
analogous to that implicit in the imperative mood of the Duino Elegies, and many other 
of Rilke’s poems (perhaps most emphatically ‘Archaic Torso of Apollo’: ‘You must 
change your life’): ‘Who cares about a well-made death these days? No one. Even the 
rich, who could afford to die in well-appointed style, are lowering their standards and 
growing indifferent; the wish for a death of one’s own is becoming ever more infrequent. 
Before long it will be just as uncommon as a life of one’s own.’255 
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The notion of such a being toward death and the comportment toward the world 
implied by the Duino Elegies are analogous: both register a sense of responsibility 
toward the fundamentally other, and both premise a project of subjectivity on this 
responsibility. A just, a morally answerable, mode of being is one in which 
embarrassment before the abject is transformed into acceptance, and this acceptance is 
seen as providing the basis for a transformation of the self. When Andreas claims, ‘We 
know the meaning of the singular thing only so long as we content ourselves with 
knowing it in the midst of other meanings: isolate it and all meaning drains away. It is 
not the thing that counts, you see, only the interaction of things’, Nicolas says, ‘You are 
preaching despair.’ Andreas replies: 
Call it, rather, redemptive despair, or, better still, call it acceptance. The world 
will not bear anything other than acceptance. Look at this chair: there is the wood, 
the splinters, then the fibres, then the particles into which the fibres may be 
broken, and then the smaller particles of these particles, and then, eventually, 
nothing, a confluence of aetherial stresses, a kind of vivid involuntary dreaming 
in a vacuum. You see? the world simply will not bear it, this impassioned 
scrutiny. (DC, 239) 
Such a stance – as espoused by Andreas here, as espoused by Rilke – seems to 
me to correspond to Stanley Cavell’s idea, exemplified for him especially well by 
Beckett’s work, of the ordinary as a goal, as something to be achieved: ‘Solitude, 
emptiness, nothingness, meaninglessness, silence – these are not the givens of Beckett’s 
characters but their goal, their new heroic undertaking.’256 Cavell’s attitude is in turn 
part of a by-now lengthy series of philosophical repudiations of metaphysics and 
metaphysical thinking, beginning with Nietzsche and Heidegger and perpetuated into 
the present on various fronts (poststructuralist, deconstructionist, ordinary language 
philosophy, pragmaticist) and various foundations (linguistics and the philosophy of 
language, physics, psychology, neuroscience), with which Banville’s outlook as 
construed in this chapter has a great deal in common. A central aspect of such an 
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undermining of metaphysical thinking is a rethinking of the mind-body problem, and 
Banville’s extrapolation of Rilke’s ideas, and his treatment of the question of beauty, are 
of great interest in this respect. 
As mentioned above, beauty and the perception of it are among the most 
prominent and striking aspects of Banville’s work, in both theme and form. The density 
and gloss of the writing and the acuity of perception is matched by the consistent 
preoccupation of the protagonists and narrators with order, harmony, and clarity. While 
the overt theme of the science tetralogy is epistemological, of the Frames trilogy ethical, 
and of later novels such as Eclipse, Shroud, The Sea and Ancient Light (2012) existential, 
the ultimate goals and achievements of these apparently disparate categories are all 
consistently depicted as being most properly conceived of as beauty. To qualify this no 
doubt seemingly sweeping and unhelpfully generalizing claim, I should emphasize that I 
take the understanding of beauty espoused by Banville’s work to be fundamentally 
rooted in a specific perception of the nature and implications of embodied being. Simply 
put, beauty is depicted as a certain sensory, perceptual relation to the world and other 
people, a certain comportment of embodiment. While the Frames trilogy explores the 
ethical dimensions of this conception of beauty, and the science tetralogy the 
epistemological, it is implied that the paradigm example of it, at least in a contemporary 
Western cultural configuration, is that of art and aesthetic discourse surrounding it. The 
significance of Rilke’s exhortation for Banville’s understanding of art stems precisely 
from this perception: the directive to allow things to come to life within us, to perceive 
things in such a way that they, and we, are redeemed in the perception, is an exact 
analogue of the corollaries of the idea of beauty put forward in Banville’s work.257 
A passage from Doctor Copernicus, in which a solution to a problem presents 
itself to Nicolas, demonstrates this especially well: 
Calmly then it came, the solution, like a magnificent great slow golden bird 
alighting in his head with a thrumming of vast wings. It was so simple, so ravis-
                                                          
 
257 Here also Stevens presents an opposition to Rilke: in Stevens’s play Bowl, Cat and Broomstick, Bowl 
says, ‘What an extraordinary effect one gets from seeing things as they are, that is to say: from looking at 
ordinary things intensely!’ To which Broomstick replies, ‘But to look at ordinary things intensely, is not 
to see things as they are’ (Palm at the End of the Mind, 30).  
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hingly simple, that at first he did not recognise it for what it was. … He turned the 
solution this way and that, admiring it, as it were turning in his fingers a flawless 
ravishing jewel. It was the thing itself, the vivid thing. (DC, 83–85) 
Given the earlier characterization of the hawks as ‘an absolute’ of embodiment, the fact 
that the solution is here figured as a bird is of great significance, as is Nicolas’s passivity 
in the process. His admiration is depicted as a tactile, sensory involvement, and his 
initial response is also described in terms applicable to the apprehension of an object of 
beauty: it is ‘ravishing’ and ‘ravishingly simple’, the repetition further emphasizing the 
extent of the subject’s passivity in the occurrence, and alluding to the notion of beauty 
discussed above. 
Such an understanding of beauty in one respect runs directly counter to a Kantian 
view. While it does indeed propose a disinterested interestedness, the emphasis on 
embodied perception inverts the prioritizing of the mental side of the mind-body 
dichotomy implied by the Kantian idea of the conceptual intimations of order 
underpinning the phenomenon. 258  In this respect Banville’s attitude is explicit: the 
novels consistently depict intellection, or at least certain aspects of it, as a disruptive, 
destructive faculty. The apparitions of beauty that suddenly illuminate the narrative 
occur despite, not because of, the protagonists’ mental life. It is this distrust of 
intellection, and of a humanity defined on the basis of it, that accounts quite largely for 
the tinge of misanthropy and self-loathing that mark out so many of his narrators. 
Freddie Montgomery, for example, while determinedly getting drunk, muses, 
It was not just the drink, though, that was making me happy, but the tenderness of 
things, the simple goodness of the world. This sunset, for instance, how lavishly 
it was laid on, the clouds, the light on the sea, that heartbreaking, blue-green 
distance, laid on, all of it, as if to console some lost suffering wayfarer. I have 
never really got used to being on this earth. Sometimes I think our presence here 
                                                          
 
258 I have in mind here Kant’s idea of beauty as consisting in the pleasure that arises from the experience 
of the harmonious interaction of the imagination and understanding, and the way this in turn hence 
prioritizes the cognitive aspects of the phenomenon. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner 
S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 20–32; M. Budd, 'Delight in the Natural World: Kant on the 
Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature: Part I: Natural Beauty', British Journal of Aesthetics, 38 (1998), 6. 
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is due to a cosmic blunder, that we were meant for another planet altogether, with 
other arrangements, and other laws, and other, grimmer skies. I try to imagine it, 
our true place, off on the far side of the galaxy, whirling and whirling. And the 
ones who were meant for here, are they out there, baffled and homesick, like us? 
No, they would have become extinct long ago. How could they survive, these 
gentle earthlings, in a world that was meant to contain us? (BE, 24) 
The painterly metaphor (‘how lavishly it was laid on’), and through it the positing of an 
organizing agency, by way of which the narrator here engages with the scene implies a 
(perhaps ironic) engagement with the natural world by analogy with the modes of 
engagement with a work of art. Such a relation of work of art and natural world serves 
further to substantiate the inversion of the Kantian schematization of beauty: where for 
Kant the aesthetic dimension is the natural world, subsequent aesthetic discourse adopts 
the terms applied there, primarily beauty and the sublime, to characterize the relation to 
the work of art. With an attitude such as Freddie Montgomery’s spelt out above, in 
which the natural world is posited as being as if a work of art in order to apply aesthetic 
categories to the original aesthetic object, the inversion is complete. M.’s statement in 
Ghosts (1993) sums the matter up rather succinctly: ‘Nature did not exist until we 
invented it one eighteenth-century morning radiant with Alpine light.’259 
The solicitude expressed for the ‘gentle earthlings’ bespeaks a tenderness and 
affection for the world of objects and the physical directly proportional to Freddie’s 
implicit disenchantment with ‘us’. Later in the novel Freddie puts the matter more 
bluntly: ‘Here is a question: if man is a sick animal, an insane animal, as I have reason 
to believe, then how account for these small, unbidden gestures of kindness and of care?’ 
                                                          
 
259 The allusion to Oscar Wilde here is also clear: ‘For what is Nature? Nature is no great mother who has 
borne us. She is our creation. It is in our brain that she quickens to life. Things are because we see them, 
and what we see, and how we see it, depends on the Arts that have influenced us. … They did not exist till 
Art had invented them.’ Oscar Wilde, ‘The Decay of Lying’, in The Complete Writings of Oscar Wilde 
(Vol. VII) (New York: The Nottingham Society, 1909), 42. While this is again beyond the scope of the 
present study, such allusions do provide support for the contention that Banville’s work is centrally 
concerned with a tradition of thinking about art and its relation to other aspects of human thought and 
activity.  
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(BE, 43).260 Andreas’s criticism of Nicolas’s desire to transcend the physical must be 
read with this schema in mind: his aversion to the physical constitutes an aesthetic-
moral failing, a rejection of the possibility of coming to terms with the world. In light of 
this reading, there is a profound irony in his consistently stated credo that ‘knowledge 
must become perception’ (his alternative to the prevailing orthodoxy of formulating 
theory to ‘save the phenomena’). The novel implies that exactly the reverse is the case, 
that perception must become knowledge, or rather, that perception itself is knowledge. 
 This vision of subjectivity and awareness is afforded further prominence by the 
striking and frequent use of simile throughout the oeuvre, as has been thoroughly 
demonstrated by Joseph McMinn.261 Connected to, and very often a central aspect of, 
the sharpness of the observation and presentation of sensory perception, simile and 
metaphor function to enact the form of understanding, the form of apprehension of the 
world, indicated (in the implied failings of Nicolas Copernicus’s life’s project, for 
example) as being the appropriate response to our nature and condition. As McMinn 
puts it, in the neo-Romantic sense in which he understands simile to function in 
Banville’s work, ‘analogy is not so much a figure of speech, but a way of seeing and 
experiencing the world’ (ibid.). Importantly, metaphor and simile serve to provide 
insight and understanding by way of a purely perceptual intuition of similitude and 
analogy, and the characters who use them are presented as obtaining some specific form 
of access to the world through the use of such figures.262 For example, when Nicolas’s 
father dies, his grief is described as being ‘the shape of a squat grey rodent lodged in the 
heart’ (DC, 12) and in this way – through the positing of the equivalence of a sensory 
with a non-sensory experience, and hence the obtaining of some purchase on the 
                                                          
 
260 While, as pointed out above, it is obviously important to take account of the various aspects of the 
unreliability of the narrators pronouncing such judgements, the tenor of the opinion expressed is 
sufficiently similar to those of most of Banville’s protagonists to warrant the claim that it exemplifies 
relatively broad concerns, rather than simply the psychopathy of a specific character.   
261 Joseph McMinn, ‘“Ah, this plethora of metaphors! I am like everything except myself”: The Art of 
Analogy in John Banville’s Fiction’, Irish University Review, 36.1 (Spring-summer 2006), 134–150.  
262 I do not intend here to rehearse the various positions on the relative situation of metaphor and simile in 
a possible taxonomy of figures. For my purposes, it is sufficient to indicate that simile works by 
transposition, precisely the ‘carrying over’ of specific attributes or qualities of one thing to another 
effected by metaphor, and that its facilitation of understanding by analogy is hence, in some ways at least, 
equivalent to that of metaphor.   
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inexplicable and inarticulable – some grasp is obtained on an otherwise inconceivable 
entity. Rather than being predicative, this procedure enacts the metaphorical carrying 
over of the sensory to the non-sensory, the known to the unknown; perhaps ironically, it 
is in this process that perception and knowledge are most closely conjoined. An apt 
example of the frequent density of simile in the writing, as well as its role in the 
subject’s apprehension of the world, is provided in the following passage from Eclipse: 
This is how I wake now, sliding warily out of sleep as though I had spent the 
night in hiding. … I have a deep dislike of mornings, their muffled, musty texture, 
like that of a bed too long slept in. … I have come to think of my life as 
altogether like a morning’s interminable passing; whatever the hour, it is always 
as if I have just risen and am trying to get a grip on things. (E, 28) 
The specific context of the comparison – waking in the morning – is expanded to serve 
as an analogy of the narrator’s life in general, in which his continuously ‘trying to get a 
grip on things’ proceeds by way of such an apprehension of likenesses. Precisely as 
McMinn claims, therefore, the function takes on a far more fundamental role in the 
character’s cognition of himself and his world than the merely figural. 
A related aspect, because similarly based on the perception and organization of 
qualia, is Banville’s idiosyncratic use of adjectives. Perhaps the most notable of these 
are the strings of numerous, often unpunctuated, adjectives, which produce a quite vivid 
sense of the process of a character’s gradual apprehension of a given thing or situation 
through an agglomeration of properties: ‘a magnificent great slow golden bird’ (DC, 83), 
‘cool and smooth and moist’, ‘cold and calm and distant’, ‘a fleeting, sidelong, faintly 
smiling look’ (E, 58, 58, 71). There is also his use of obscure, technical or specialist 
lexemes to denote a specific quality (‘velutinous’, ‘cinereal’, ‘oleaginous’), hence 
drawing attention to the sensory manifold and the character’s inhabitation of and 
response to it – as well as to the characters’ connoisseurship of language. This 
conjunction of perceptual acuity and ornate, baroque diction indicates the way in which 
the world is known, perhaps primarily, through language, and the extent to which the 
knowledge of a thing consists in the knowing of its name, as Peter Stillman Sr., and 
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Walter Benjamin, would attest.263 The following passage from The Sea serves well to 
demonstrate various of these aspects, as well as the characteristic density of adjectives 
and adverbs and the ways in which they are linked to perceptual clarity: 
It was one of the last days of that summer’s heat-wave, the air like scratched glass, 
crazed by glinting sunlight. Throughout the afternoon long gleaming motor cars 
kept pulling up outside and depositing yet more guests, heron-like ladies in big 
hats and girls in white lipstick and white leather knee-high boots, raffish 
pinstriped gents, delicate young men who pouted and smoked pot, and lesser, 
indeterminate types … sleek, watchful and unsmiling, in shiny suits and shirts 
with different-coloured collars and sharp-toed ankle boots with elasticated sides. 
Charlie bounced among them all, his blued pate agleam, pride pouring off him 
like sweat. Late in the day a huddle of warm-eyed, slow-moving, shy plump men 
in headdresses and spotless white djellabas arrived in our midst like a flock of 
doves. (TS, 105) 
Nevertheless, however rich this faculty may be or skilled and insightful such 
characters in the manipulation of it, it is ultimately presented as providing insubstantial, 
and perhaps even illusory, succour, precisely at those moments of greatest subjective 
strain and import. Such a failure of simile to provide meaning frequently occurs in 
connection with questions of identity and selfhood. Alex Cleave, who claims to be 
trying to achieve ‘the pure conjunction, the union of self with sundered self’ (E, 70), 
when trying to explain to his wife the reason for his retreat to the seaside house in which 
he grew up, reaches the following impasse: 
The incident with the animal in the wintry gloaming was definitive, though what 
it was that was being defined I could not tell. I saw where I was, and I thought of 
the house, and knew that I must live there again. … Such seeming absence of 
human agency was proper also; it was as if … 
 ‘As if what?’ my wife said. 
                                                          
 
263  Walter Benjamin, ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’, Reflections: Essays, 
Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writing, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1986).  
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 I turned from her with a shrug. 
 ‘I don’t know.’ (E, 12–3) 
More to the point, understanding based on simile or analogy is depicted as preventing 
any possibility of self-coincidence, of full inhabitation of one’s being, and thus of any 
full and authentic engagement with the world and other people such as that urged by 
Rilke’s admonitions. In Athena (1995), Morrow observes, ‘Ah, this plethora of 
metaphors! I am like everything except myself’, while Max Morden similarly notices 
‘everything for me is something else’ (TS, 138). 
Ultimately, hence, the capacity of similitudinous apperception to provide a basis 
for knowledge and action proves limited, and it is this limitation that leads to the 
prominent foregrounding of the matter of nouns and naming in Doctor Copernicus. As 
discussed above, Nicolas, considering his entire life’s work as having consisted in 
‘merely an exalted naming’, sees this as a failure, but this pessimistic view of 
designation can be contrasted with one that falls in line with Rilke’s idea of praising the 
world to the Angel, and perhaps also of that proposed by Peter Stillman Sr. in City of 
Glass. In this view, naming is an act of communion, an engagement with the quiddity of 
a thing. The valorization of this dimension is indicated by Andreas in the deathbed scene: 
What shall we call it? – science? the quest for truth? Transcendent knowledge? 
Vanity, all vanity, and something more, a kind of cowardice, the cowardice that 
comes from the refusal to accept that the names are all there is that matter, the 
cowardice that is true and irredeemable despair. With great courage and great 
effort you might have succeeded, in the only way it is possible to succeed, by 
disposing the commonplace, the names, in a beautiful and orderly pattern that 
would show, by its very beauty and order, the action in our poor world of the 
otherworldly truths. But you tried to discard the commonplace truths for the 
transcendent ideals, and so failed. … We say only those things that we have the 
words to express: it is enough. (DC, 240) 
As with the moral and redemptive valence implied in Rilke’s ninth Duino Elegy (‘to 
have been / this once, completely … / … seems beyond undoing. // Here is the time for 
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the sayable, here is its homeland’264), the depiction of this question emphasizes its moral 
aspects. Andreas’s description of Nicolas’s attitude as ‘a kind of cowardice’ outlines 
what such a moral dimension may consist in, but the point is made emphatically in the 
Frames trilogy. 
The Frames trilogy details Freddie Montgomery’s murder of a young woman and 
his subsequent attempt to atone for his act. He envisions this as an effort of imagination: 
understanding his murder as being predicated on a failure to fully register his victim’s 
being – ‘because … he does not see her properly’ (G, 266) – he views his proper 
atonement as consisting in an imaginative revivification. ‘Prison, punishment, paying 
his debt to society, all that was … merely how he would pass the time while he got on 
with the real business of atonement, which was nothing less than the restitution of a life’ 
(G, 267). This does not refer, as probably goes without saying, to a literal restoration of 
the girl’s life, nor do any of the three novels in which this process is presented operate in 
a magical realist mode in which some sort of equivalent might be conceivable. Rather, 
such resuscitation takes the form of a task of the imagination: seeing his lack of 
imaginative engagement as that which has made it possible for him to kill the young 
woman, he comes to understand the possibility of redemption as consisting in the 
achievement of a mode of engagement with the world and others sufficiently animated 
by imagination to preclude the possibility of such violence. 
The solipsistic nature of this ‘solution’ marks its limitations, and is perhaps an 
intentional irony, given that the penance itself remains profoundly narcissistic. 
Nevertheless, insofar as it can be said to be achieved, the following epiphany may be 
taken to be the moment at which this occurs: 
And as she talked I found myself looking at her and seeing her as if for the first 
time, not as a gathering of details, but all of a piece, solid and singular and 
amazing. No, not amazing. That is the point. She was simply there, an incarnation 
of herself, no longer a nexus of adjectives but a pure and present noun. … And 
somehow by being suddenly herself like this she made the things around her be 
there too. … I felt everyone and everything shiver and shift, falling into vividest 
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forms, detaching themselves from me and my conception of them and changing 
themselves instead into what they were, no longer figment, no longer mystery, no 
longer a part of my imagining. (G, 321) 
The displacement of the self that allows for the other to be apprehended not as an 
impediment to be removed nor as a tool to be annexed to the protagonist’s own purposes 
– Banville’s characters’ habitual attitudes – but as an independent and self-contained 
subjectivity can be read as equivalent to the requirement to fully imagine the other that 
is proposed at the outset of the effort. The irony, of course, is that this is made possible 
by her ceasing to be ‘a part of [his] imagining’, by his relinquishing of any attempt to 
shape or structure her being to his own ends or according to his own preconceptions, and 
simply perceiving her – a point that chimes with, and is subject to precisely the same 
irony as, Copernicus’s dictum that ‘perception must become knowledge’. 
Such a depiction of the possibility of true perception as consisting in a 
divestment of preconfigured cognitive schemata and imaginative constructions 
obviously has much in common with the thinking about the question of ‘the ordinary’ in 
post-Kantian philosophical endeavour. Robert Pippin sums this up well as involving 
the appeal to a more original, less distorted experience of the human things as 
such, as human, not as artificially constructed through the lens of some theory. In 
a word, that word that has circulated so much in twentieth-century thought; in 
Husserl on the life-world; in Heidegger on pre-predicative experience, being-in-
the-world, and the everyday; in the later Wittgenstein, Austin, Cavell (and 
through Cavell's insistence, found anew in Emerson and Thoreau); and recently in 
two books by Stanley Rosen: an appeal to ‘the ordinary’ as a way of bypassing, 
avoiding, not refuting the supposedly reductionist, skeptical, disenchanting, 
enervating trajectory of modern naturalism.265 
As M. puts it here, the precise point of the experience is that it was ‘not amazing’, but 
simply itself. Stanley Cavell’s position with respect to figuration and imagination spelt 
                                                          
 
265 Robert Pippin, ‘The Unavailability of the Ordinary: Strauss on the Philosophical Fate of Modernity’, 
Political Theory, 31.3 (Jun. 2003): 344. 
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out in his essay on Endgame has a great deal in common with that implied by M.’s 
epiphany and my understanding of the use and treatment of simile throughout the 
oeuvre. 266  Indeed, this concern is announced as early as the epigraph to Doctor 
Copernicus, taken from Stevens’s ‘Notes toward a Supreme Fiction’: ‘You must become 
an ignorant man again. / And see the sun again with an ignorant eye, / and see it clearly 
in the idea of it.’ 267  Like Cavell and Stevens, Banville is acutely aware of the 
contradictory, and hence impossible, nature of such an undertaking – a contradiction 
perfectly exemplified in the desire that ‘perception become knowledge’: it involves the 
desire to conceive of something without conception, to know without knowledge of. 
While such a view would conceive of true knowledge as being ostensive – if a certain 
specific form of ostention, a ‘thou’ rather than a ‘that’ –, even within the moment of 
ostention a supreme fiction intervenes. Significantly, the closing lines of the section 
from which the epigraph to Doctor Copernicus is taken read, ‘… Phoebus was / A name 
for something that never could be named. / … // There is a project for the sun. The sun / 
Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be / In the difficulty of what it is to be’ (ibid.). 
Among the most fundamental of such supreme fictions is that of the self. At the 
conclusion of the passage in which M. relates his epiphany, when he feels ‘everyone and 
everything detaching themselves from me and my conception of them and changing 
themselves instead into what they were’, he asks – mournfully, as the following 
discussion will demonstrate – ‘And I? Was I there amongst them, at last?’ (G, 321). 
Such meditation on the insubstantiality, absence or fraudulence of the self is a recurrent 
motif in the three novels, and indeed in almost all of the author’s subsequent ones. 
Freddie Montgomery, for example, anticipating his arrest and incarceration thinks 
wistfully: 
First there would be panic, and then pain. And when everything was gone, every 
shred of dignity and pretence, what freedom there would be, what lightness! No, 
what am I saying, not lightness but its opposite: weight, gravity, the sense at last 
of being firmly grounded. Then finally I would be me, no longer that poor 
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impersonation of myself I had been doing all my life. I would be real. I would be, 
of all things, human. (BE, 138) 
Importantly, being ‘human’, and by implication fully moral, is predicated on 
ceasing to impersonate something, or someone, and becoming one’s true self. To praise 
the world to the Angel, to achieve a ‘saying such as things hoped never so intensely to 
be’, one must first be able to say oneself, the first of the ‘pair of lovers’ involved in such 
communion, in such a way. But if one’s self is a fiction, the best any such saying can 
aspire to is an exalted naming, the ministrations of a supreme fictiveness. Rilke’s answer 
hence begs the question, and ‘the thing itself, the vivid thing’ remains elusive. It is this 
problem to which Banville’s later novels, from The Untouchable (1997) until, most 
recently, Ancient Light,268 devote especially close scrutiny, and from the simultaneous 
seductiveness and impossibility of the Rilkean solution arises an irony premised, much 
like that I argued to be characteristic of Beckett’s writing, on the structures of 
subjectivity. 
 
‘intricate evasions of as’: the inostensible self 
 
As with M. in Ghosts, who runs up against the limits of his ability to engage with the 
world directly and authentically, subjectivity is the snag on which phenomenological 
systems seem inevitably to hitch, and come undone. Sartre, for example, seems to have 
been able to define authenticity only negatively, in opposition to bad faith, for which 
one could furnish no end of examples. Husserl’s adverting to a transcendental ego to 
hold his system in place serves well to signify the requirement for an arbitrary line in the 
sand to put a stop to the potentially infinite reversions to which the search for ‘the ideal 
core of the onion’ can give rise. This seems to be the implication of the Frames trilogy, 
much like Beckett’s trilogy: there is no authentic ground, merely further fictions. 
In The Untouchable, Eclipse, Shroud and The Sea, the protagonist’s life is 
interrupted by a revenant from his past that undermines his identity and forces him to 
                                                          
 
268 I would exempt The Infinities from this general grouping, as the tone and subject of the novel are so 
markedly different from those of works such as Shroud or Eclipse. 
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revisit its foundations. In The Untouchable and Shroud this occurs through the 
intervention of another person, in The Sea through the death of the protagonist’s wife, 
but in Eclipse the dissolution occurs through an entirely interior process. Given the 
trajectory of the discussion in the preceding section, and my emphasis on structures of 
subjectivity and continuities between Beckett’s work and Banville’s, I shall focus 
primarily on Eclipse. 
Eclipse centres on, and is narrated by, Alex Cleave, a celebrated veteran thespian 
who has undergone a breakdown, the nadir of which takes the form of his corpsing mid-
performance. The line he describes himself as trying to deliver when he freezes – ‘Who, 
if not I, am Amphitryon?’ – is taken from the eponymous play by Kleist. The play is 
about Zeus’s assumption of Amphitryon’s identity in order to seduce Alcmene, his wife, 
and, like Eclipse, revolves centrally around questions of identity. Like Amphitryon, 
Cleave comes to feel as if his self has been in some way usurped. As he strikingly puts it: 
I still felt invaded, as I had that day out in the fields: invaded, occupied, big with 
whatever it was that has entered me. It is still here; I feel I am pregnant; it is a 
very peculiar sensation. Before, what I contained was the blastomere of myself, 
the coiled hot core of all I was and might be. Now, that essential self has been 
pushed to the side with savage insouciance, and I am as a house walked up and 
down in by an irresistibly proprietorial stranger. … I imagine it in there, filling 
me to the skin, anticipating and matching my every movement, diligently 
mimicking the tiniest details of what I am and do. (E, 15) 
The description of feeling oneself as being ‘a house walked up and down in’ marks a 
fascinating, and vivid, formulation of the phenomenon of unheimlichkeit, and the novel 
is extensively preoccupied with the uncanny. Cleave for a long while believes the 
seaside house to which he returns in order to recuperate to be inhabited by ghosts – who 
turn out to be merely squatters (but why ‘merely’? – the scrupulousness of Banville’s 
style is catching) – and the past, that which he has returned to recuperate, is itself 
depicted as exerting uncanny effects: Cleave claims, ‘Memories crowd in on me, 
irresistibly, threatening to overwhelm my thoughts entirely’ (E, 55), while protagonist 
and narrator of The Sea, a novel remarkably similar to Eclipse, Max Morden remarks, 
‘The past beats inside me like a second heart’ (TS, 9). 
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The most unsettling revenant for Cleave, though, is Cass, his daughter, who 
haunts this novel with her absence and whose death marks its conclusion. This haunting, 
this present absence, is made more poignant by Shroud, which Banville wrote 
immediately after Eclipse and which relates the events that occur in Cass’s life during 
the period of time roughly corresponding to that in which the events of Eclipse occur; 
her absence from the pages of the former novel hence comes to reverberate and ramify 
by way of the latter. 269  Cass, who suffers from Mandelbaum’s syndrome, a 
schizophrenic-type condition, is herself periodically inhabited by voices and alternate 
personalities, and Cleave describes how, ‘For her I think the world is always somewhere 
else, an unfamiliar place where yet she has always been. This is for me the hardest thing, 
to think of her out there, standing on some far bleak deserted shore … with an ocean of 
lostness all before her and the siren voices singing in her head’ (E, 73–4). 
The very topological movement of the novel – as is also the case with The Sea, 
of which the title underscores the point –, with the action consisting in a return to a 
seaside home, indicates such a concern with a rather Heideggerian conception of the 
uncanny.270 In various writings Heidegger links the experience of the uncanny closely to 
the dread felt in the face of geworfenheit, thrown being, and values it insofar as it 
represents an authentic manifestation of Dasein. In this understanding, the uncanny is a 
product of the disruption of an inauthentic disposition of the ordinary, and hence 
represents a recuperation of authentic being that is occluded in such conditions. The 
significance of the sea in such a reading is made clear by Cleave’s description of it as 
follows: 
Why do I find the thought of the sea so alarming? We speak of its power and 
violence as if it were a species of wild animal, ravening and unappeasable, but the 
sea does nothing, it is simply there, its own reality, like night, or the sky. Is it the 
heave and lurch and sudden suck that frightens? Or is it that it is so emphatically 
                                                          
 
269 This effect is further heightened by Ancient Light, in which Cleave is contracted to play the leading 
role in the film of the life of Axel Vander, the man with whom Cass spends her last days and with whose 
child she is pregnant when she commits suicide.  
270 I have discussed this link in greater detail in ‘“an earthly glow”: Heidegger and the Uncanny in 
Eclipse’, paper presented at Banville and His Precursors Conference, University of York, Nov. 2013.  
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not our medium? I think of that world beneath the ocean, the obverse of ours, the 
negative of ours, with its sandy plains and silent valleys and great sunken 
mountain ranges, and something fails me in myself, something that is mine draws 
away from me in horror. Water is uncanny in the way, single-minded and 
uncontrollable, it keeps seeking its own level, like nothing else in the world that 
we inhabit. (E, 67) 
The final formulation here – ‘the world that we inhabit’, rather than the more 
economical, and formulaic, ‘our world’ – is a crucial touch in the depiction of Cleave’s 
disrupted relation to things. The description of the sea implies that the return to it can be 
read as signifying an attempted confrontation with, or resolution of, some almost 
elemental uncanny dimension of existence the protagonist feels forced to carry out. 
There is much in the novel, not least the protagonist’s name, that suggests that this is 
connected to some fissure in the self and a resulting doubling or inauthenticity. 
Indeed, leaving the beach after this musing, Cleave notes an ‘[u]ncanny 
sensation, as of a chill presentiment’ (E, 71), and comes across a rudimentary shelter in 
the dunes that sets him thinking about the virtues of an ascetic existence: 
What would I require for survival except a cup, a dish, a blanket? Free then of all 
encumbrance, all distraction, I might be able at last to confront myself without 
shock or shrinking. For is this not what I am after, the pure conjunction, the union 
of self with sundered self? I am weary of division, of being always torn. I shut my 
eyes and in a sort of rapture see myself stepping backward slowly into the cloven 
shell, and the two halves of it, still moist with glair, closing around me …. (E, 70) 
Cleave’s breakdown is similarly described as centring on some such schism in his self 
(E, 88), which he connects to his acting, in the extra-professional sense – his continual 
putting on of masks and pretence. While in some respects his motivation in returning to 
the home of his youth seems to be to regain access to the identity he imagines preceded 
all the play-acting, his avowed rationale is slightly more subtle, and is connected to the 
notion of the uncanny that informs the entire novel, and indeed Banville’s attitude to all 
art. 
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The version of the uncanny promulgated in such depictions calls for qualification. 
That it differs in important respects from the Freudian understanding of the phenomenon 
is marked by Morden’s musing in The Sea, ‘How is it that in childhood everything new 
that caught my interest had an aura of the uncanny, since according to all the authorities 
the uncanny is not some new thing but a thing known returning in a different form’? (8). 
There is a passage in Eclipse in which Cleave describes to his wife a dream he has had 
(‘in which it was an Easter morning’) about a plastic chicken into which one can insert 
eggs that the chicken then ‘lays’: 
‘How do you get the egg back into the chicken’, she said, ‘for it to come out 
again? In this dream.’ 
‘I don't know. It just … pushes back in, I suppose.’ 
Now she did laugh, sharply. 
‘Well, what would Doctor Freud say.’ 
I sighed angrily. ‘Not everything is …’ Sigh. ‘Not everything …’ I gave 
it up. (E, 7) 
Hugh Haughton reads the statement ‘What would Doctor Freud say’ as grounds for 
construing the conception of the uncanny adopted in the novel via a Freudian schema, 
but this seems to overlook Cleave’s response.271 Given its parallels with the many other 
moments in the novel at which he finds himself at a loss for words, mired in the 
inexplicable (such as touched on above when he, in a similar manner, tries to explain to 
his wife his reasons for returning to the seaside home), one might complete Cleave’s 
inarticulate fumblings here with ‘Not everything is explicable’, a factor the Freudian 
enterprise, with its voracious interpretative apparatus, is less able than the Heideggerian 
phenomenological schema to entertain. The images of fertility (Easter, the egg) also 
echo the novel’s frequent emphasis on the potentially productive or creative aspects of 
the experience of the uncanny, which falls very much in line with Heidegger’s 
conception of it. 
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In the Heideggerian conception, the uncanny is the immediate experience of 
untheorized being, pure throwness. Cleave’s description of the sea quoted above bears 
all the hallmarks of an engagement with the sublime, and the explicit connection of this 
to the uncanny would suggest that the conception informing these depictions is in some 
ways analogous to twentieth-century preoccupations with the ordinary as the 
untheorizable nucleus of apprehension. It is this uncanny ordinariness, I shall argue, this 
quotidian sublime, that introduces a doubt into the confidence in the capacities of 
imagination to make a home for us in the world and hence necessitates the more ironic 
relation of mind to world, self to other, and subject to being that these later novels 
propose and explore. 
Among the more prominent causes of this shift toward a more ironic, less stable 
existential or epistemological condition is an increasing attention to and emphasis on 
memory. A structural device common to The Untouchable, Shroud, The Sea and Ancient 
Light is a crisis in the recent narrative past that induces the protagonist (who is also the 
narrator) to revisit some event or series of events in the distant past in the course of 
resolving the problems he currently confronts; the two narratives, that of the working-
through of the crisis of the recent past and that of the recollection of the distant past, 
then proceed in tandem, with the narrator’s insights into his current condition allowing 
him to remember forgotten or repressed material from the distant past. These memories 
provide insight into his current condition, and this mutually-informing process leads to 
the dual resolution of both the current and past quandaries. While Shroud complicates 
this process by including a narrative strand involving a second character, the pattern 
does nevertheless hold for the male protagonist Axel Vander. The strength of this device 
is its acuity in registering psychological change and development, the way it enables the 
author to stage and explore the evasions, deceptions, delusions and fabrications of which 
so much of self-awareness is comprised. The Sea, for example, enacts with especial 
deftness the painful and painstaking misdirections whereby the mind approaches and 
comes to terms with traumatic realities. 
While Alex Cleave’s narration in Eclipse does at times dwell at some length on 
his childhood, and despite the fact that he even conceives of his returning to his 
childhood house as a work of mourning for his parents that he failed to properly carry 
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out earlier in his life (E, 50), there is not the sense in this novel, as there is in the 
previously mentioned ones, that such acts of recollection hold the key to the particular 
problems he finds himself confronting in his present; they are rather ancillary, 
substantiating his character and providing insight into his personality, but not 
necessarily bound up with some central psychological knot. Rather, his return to his 
childhood home is inspired by an inarticulate sense that he requires some intrusion of 
the uncanny to jolt him out of his habitual deception. 
He claims that, on seeing what he takes to be a ghost, ‘I thought at once that I 
must have conjured up the apparition in order that it might … make me disoriented, and 
alienate me from my surroundings and from myself’ (E, 45). His desire for such 
disorientation is connected to what he conceives of as his purpose in returning to the 
house (which falls very much in line with Heidegger’s attitude to the value of the 
uncanny): ‘To be watchful and attentive of everything, to be vigilant against 
complacency, to resist habituation, these were my aims in coming here. I would catch 
myself, red-handed, in the act of living; alone, without an audience of any kind, I would 
cease from performing and simply be’ (E, 46). In stark contrast to Copernicus’s desire 
for the transcendent ‘vivid thing’, and even to Nicolas’s brother Andreas’s relatively 
unproblematic confidence in the virtues of unthinking embodiment, Cleave’s concerns 
here, and his understanding of the solution to them – or impossibility thereof – falls very 
much in line the problematic of the ordinary touched on above. That is, he describes the 
results of his effort thus: 
Yet almost immediately I found myself settling down in these once familiar 
surroundings and letting them be so again, with all my plans and pledges 
forgotten. … Making strange, people hereabouts say when a child wails at the 
sudden appearance of a visitor; how was I to make strange now, and not stop 
making strange? How was I to fight the deadening force of custom? In a month, 
in a week, I told myself, the old delusion of belonging would have re-established 
itself irremediably. (E, 46) 
As with understandings of the inaccessibility of the ordinary, Cleave has come to see the 
accretion of memory and habit as an impediment to engagement with the world, and his 
incitement of the uncanny is hence a method of disrupting this sediment. An analogous 
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point of view informs Heidegger’s theory of poetry, and, similarly, it is the perception of 
the ways in which metaphysical thinking impedes access to the actual, in which the 
cognitive construction of the thing comes to obstruct engagement with the thing, that 
appears to be the central problem addressed in post-Heideggerian engagements with 
categories such as the ordinary or the neuter. With Cleave, dissimulation raised to an 
ontological fact brings about the same effect. 
Importantly, the possibility of achieving such pre-constructed, unmediated 
engagement with the world is by no means considered a straightforward matter of doing 
away with certain postulates, as such a doing away will almost instantly erect itself as 
another such postulate, and hence another such impediment; Heidegger’s 
hypostatization of Being. Rather, it involves the adoption of specific strategies for 
suspending or evading them. Art, and specifically literature, is frequently invoked as an 
especially privileged means of achieving such suspension or evasion: Derrida’s 
discussion of literature’s thetic disavowal is a good example of this, and Cavell and 
Blanchot similarly emphasize the efficacy of literature in transgressing and undermining 
the restrictions imposed by metaphysical systems. The extensive interaction of 
philosophy and literature in the twentieth-century continental tradition can to a large 
extent be attributed to such concerns with the potentially dangerous consequences of 
transcendental schemata – primarily resulting from the spectre of fascism – and the 
resultant attempt to think the obverse, the undoing, of such. 
Banville has said that he considers the aim of all art the elicitation of the uncanny, 
in the sense, as described in Eclipse, of a force of disorientation and estrangement that 
hence enables a renewed engagement with the world.272 Such an understanding similarly 
emphasizes the role of art in the accession to the ordinary, in, as Heidegger attributes to 
poetry, dismantling calcified systems and allowing an unimpeded, revivified interaction 
with the world.273 Stevens is apposite here again: in contrast to Rilke, Stevens in his 
notion of a supreme fiction appreciates, in line with theorists who emphasize the 
overcoming of metaphysically inflected systems of thought, that one can only begin to 
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do this by ‘perceiving the idea / Of this invention, this invented world’.274 One cannot 
tell the Angel of things, but only of our constructions of them, the roles they play in our 
fictions. The Rilkean answer thus simply recapitulates the problem, asking for an access 
to the real that, because impossible, runs the risk of devolving into another arbitrary 
ideology of the transcendental basis of the name, such as exemplified by Nicolas in 
Doctor Copernicus. 
Of the two poles posited in the Iowa talk of 1980, exemplified respectively by 
Rilke and Stevens, the preoccupations of Banville’s own fiction seems to have grown 
closer and closer to the skepticism he identifies in Stevens’s work.275 As indicated at the 
beginning of this section, this is in large part due to the emphasis that comes to be 
placed on the fictive ground of all human constructions, the supreme fiction of the self. 
In Banville’s later fictions, as in the novels of all the other authors hitherto considered in 
this study, the protagonists are depicted in a state of breakdown, falling apart and 
coming to doubt the coherence of their identity and person. As with Molloy, the 
magistrate, and Quinn, Cleave finds himself coming apart at the seams, a physical 
dissolution proceeding in parallel with, and signifying, an existential unravelling: ‘I 
suppose I was a motley sight, with my nascent beard and unkempt hair and no doubt 
staring eyes. … What am I here, boy, youth, young-man, broken-down actor? This is a 
place I should know, the place where I grew up, but I am a stranger, no one can put a 
name to my face’ (E, 77). 
Such a depiction of a subjectivity in disarray and breakdown is clearly signalled 
in the protagonists’ relation to art, science and the products of human spirit. Where 
Copernicus and Kepler are engaged in the creation of systems of significance, Max 
Morden is a dilettante historian and critic of art and Alex Cleave an actor who has 
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ceased to be able to act. Direct agency is hence changed into a mediated attempt to make 
sense, and this attempt to make sense is depicted as being a rather fragile, vulnerable 
enterprise. Morden, for example, has been working for many years on ‘a big book on 
Bonnard’, ‘a very great painter about whom I have nothing of any originality to say’, 
and now sits ‘pushing the paragraphs about like the counters in a game I no longer know 
how to play’ (TS, 40). In The Untouchable, in a similar manner, Victor Maskell, an art 
historian and curator of the Queen’s art collection, is lured into involvement with a 
network of Soviet spies through the gift of a Poussin. He considers this the one object of 
unimpeachable value in his deeply duplicitous life – ‘In the ever shifting, myriad worlds 
through which I moved, Poussin was the singular, unchanging, wholly authentic thing’ 
(TU, 343) – but the denouement of the novel shows that even this painting is in fact a 
fake. The revelation of the inauthenticity of that on which Maskell has, to a large extent, 
based his happiness and staked his professional reputation undermines the very 
foundations of his identity, demonstrating that the deception he imagined himself to be 
engaged in consisted for the most part in he himself being deceived. 
The close connection established in the Frames trilogy between art and the 
imagination and ethical existence is of relevance in such depictions of an interrupted 
relation to art. The obverse of the epiphany described in Ghosts, such a failure to relate – 
to paintings for Maskell and Morden, to his character for Cleave – signifies an alienation 
from others and the world and a loss of subjective integrity. The novels consistently 
suggest that this is a result of a surplus of memory, of these characters’ having been too 
much themselves for too long: Alex Cleave’s programme of desisting from pretence 
indicates as much, and The Sea’s depiction of childhood as an uncanny immersion in the 
world unmediated by habit, memory and expectation provides further support for this 
reading. The perception underpinning this aspect of the novels is articulated as early as 
Birchwood (1973): ‘We imagine that we remember things as they were, while in fact all 
we carry into the future are fragments which reconstruct a wholly illusory past.’276 (B, 
12), and hence, the more past we accumulate, the more convoluted become our 
reconstructions. 
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Such a depiction and exploration of memory functions in a manner analogous to 
the irony I find in Beckett’s work in its exploration of the modes and limits of fiction. 
Where in Beckett’s trilogy the attempt to speak the self produces ever more fictions of 
the self, in later novels of Banville’s such as Eclipse and The Sea the protagonists’ 
attempts to remember themselves produce seemingly endless inventions. I find this in 
the way the three novels Eclipse, Shroud, and Ancient Light interact, and the way in 
which Ancient Light illuminates Cleave’s various failures of comprehension with respect 
to his daughter and her final days. These novels suggest that memory, and by 
implication the self, is a murky composite of fabrication and misapprehension, and the 
relations of humans so constituted necessarily something of a lottery. Which is why 
adult existence, in contrast to the barely bearable clarity of childhood, is characterized 
by confusion and estrangement, from oneself as much as from others, and a continual 
failure to apprehend a significance that lurks tantalizingly just beyond reach; in The Sea, 
such apparitions of meaning are most clearly figured in Morden’s dreams (TS, 24, 71), 
where in Eclipse the apparitions serve a similar function. These characters’ failure to 
make sense of art, to make art make sense, signifies not so much a failure to sublimate 
the world through significance, as the ninth Duino Elegy suggests is a solution, but to 
access the uncanny ordinariness of existence, unmediated by memory or expectation, as 
Notes toward a Supreme Fiction gestures toward. 
Which is not to say that the ordinary fails to access these characters from time to 
time. In line with the inversion, discussed above, of the Kantian view the beautiful as an 
intimation of human order into one in which the force of beauty arises from its alterity, 
the capacity of the natural world to interrupt subjectivity and thus facilitate an inkling of 
such access to the ordinary is consistently emphasized. Where art fails to provide 
significance, the world of mute objects provides its salutary corrective to our mania for 
meaning: 
‘It is just, you see,’ I said, ‘that my wife died.’ 
I do not know what came over me to blurt it out like that. I hoped Claire 
behind me had not heard. Avril gazed into my face without expression, expecting 
me to say more, no doubt. But what more could I have said? On some 
announcements there is no elaborating. She gave a shrug denoting sympathy, 
174 
 
lifting one shoulder and her mouth at one side. 
‘That's a pity,’ she said in a plain, flat tone. ‘I'm sorry to hear that.’ She 
did not seem to mean it, somehow. 
The autumn sun fell slantwise into the yard, making the cobbles bluely 
shine, and in the porch a pot of geraniums flourished aloft their last burning 
blossoms of the season. Honestly, this world. (TS, 58) 
Or as Mrs Rooney has it, ‘Christ what a planet!’277 
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Conclusion: Back to Beckett 
 
As Borges puts it, ‘every writer creates his own precursors. His work modifies our 
conception of the past, as it will modify the future.’278 To invoke Ezra Pound, making it 
new hence refigures what is old, too; such novelty is retroactive. Given Beckett’s 
extensive influence on subsequent literature, such modification is in his case likely to be 
considerable, and, save through some sort of Pierre Menardian endeavour, it is difficult 
now not to approach his work without some awareness of that of later writers such as 
Paul Auster, John Banville and J.M. Coetzee. In this sense, then, this study has 
implications for our understanding of Beckett’s work: the exploration of the ways in 
which Beckett’s writing is adopted, adapted, deflected and transmuted in the work of 
these later writers casts it in varying lights and opens up new avenues into it.  
 Beckett seems, however – at least at the current historical remove – a rather 
different case to the precursors of Kafka that Borges discusses, who become Kafkaesque 
by virtue of our awareness of the later writer’s achievement and the ways in which it 
alters our perceptions and attitudes. We see Beckettian strains in the work of Auster, 
Banville and Coetzee, but Beckett for the most part maintains his quiddity. Coetzee may 
have helped us see an ethical valence in Beckett’s work that would not otherwise have 
been quite as apparent, Auster a manner in which his innovations can be put to generic 
use, and Banville the outlines of a connection with broad historical currents in the 
conceptions of art and the imagination, but it would overstate the case to claim that any 
of them have fundamentally transformed our apprehension of Beckett’s work.       
 Nevertheless, during the research for this dissertation I have been particularly 
struck by two factors that might approximate to such a change. The first is what appears 
to be a generational shift in responses to Beckett’s work. Those of Auster, Banville and 
Coetzee’s generation, and especially those who met and knew Beckett, place great 
emphasis on the ethical example of his life and work (often with the former taking 
precedence), with the achievement hence viewed as something of a paradigm of the 
committed artistic existence. This is apparent in numerous of Auster’s, Banville’s and 
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Coetzee’s responses cited in chapter one, and the potential for it to shade into 
hagiography is made clear in a work such as Charles Juliet’s (‘He has the gaze of a 
seer’).279 While the historical context of his work, as well as the obvious force of his 
personality, certainly contributed to such a reception, the conception of the role of art 
and the artist promulgated by twentieth-century avant-gardism also appears to have 
played a part. The single-mindedness and integrity of his work and life corresponded 
neatly with avant-gardist conceptions of artistic commitment on the model of political 
commitment, and this prior frame hence shaped initial apprehensions of Beckett’s 
project. 
 One consequence of such a framing (in combination, again, with historical 
context) is a downplaying of the comic dimensions of the work.280 In the wake of post-
structuralism, however, we are more inclined to suspicion of neat dichotomies of 
authentic and compromised existence, and the movement has also introduced into the 
discourse on art a set of metaphors and a vocabulary that differ radically from those 
militaristic and politically engaged ones that governed avant-gardist modes, thus 
shaping a very different attitude to Beckett’s work. (The extent to which Beckett’s work 
helped bring such a change about makes for interesting consideration, given the 
strenuous political agnosticism of his work, the affinity numerous post-structuralists felt 
for it, and his living in Paris and moving in such circles at the time of the earliest 
flourishing of these attitudes.) Engagements with Beckett’s work that follow those of 
second-generation readers such as Auster, Banville and Coetzee are hence in a better 
position to appreciate the way the comedy of the work intersects with its less ludic 
concerns, and connect to political and ethical questions, as is clear in a work such as 
Laura Salisbury’s Samuel Beckett: Laughing Matters, Comic Timing. 
 In a perhaps related manner, John Banville’s sense (such as articulated in the 
Iowa University talk) of the way Beckett’s work arises out of a tension between two 
equally compelling yet incompatible possibilities gestures toward a conceptualizing of it 
as a moment in an ongoing cultural or intellectual dialectic. In contrast to a perspective 
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that views the work as something of an extreme – as writers such as Adorno or Deleuze 
do,281 and as I in some ways also do in this thesis – this makes possible an approach that 
teases out the contraries it negotiates and thus the possible syntheses of or ways beyond 
these. Such a stance would also help clarify Beckett’s place in the context of broader 
developments, contributing a richer sense of the ways in which the oeuvre relates to and 
engages with political and intellectual history and, potentially, new understandings of 
the works. A project such as that carried out in this thesis represents one way of 
approaching such questions, and further consideration of Beckett’s legacy will cast light 
on other aspects and dimensions of it. 
 The reading of Beckett presented in chapter two is inevitably coloured by my 
sense of the legacy of his work – or, more precisely, by the specific legacy I choose to 
focus on. In their art, Banville and Coetzee both adopt somewhat evasive stances in 
relation to their countries of origin, affiliating themselves more clearly with a 
cosmopolitan modernism than with any national tradition. Auster’s preoccupation with 
New York, rather than the USA, achieves a similar effect, as does, far more markedly, 
the almost complete lack of explicit engagement with questions of Jewish American 
identity in his fiction.282 My choice of such inheritors of the Beckettian tradition means 
that I am inclined to emphasize the cosmopolitan and modernist aspects of the work at 
the expense of the local and specific. Which is not to say that the focus I adopt does not 
have implications for an understanding of how such writers engage with homeland and 
national tradition: I would be inclined to argue that Beckett’s apoliticism serves as 
something of a model for these writers’ own engagements with realms of the historical, 
political, and national; and as I have attempted to demonstrate in my analysis of 
Coetzee’s fiction, it can serve as the basis for a rigorous and nuanced ethics.  
 An interesting question for future research would be to investigate the ways in 
which such attempted cosmopolitanism conceals or obscures certain modes of belonging 
or engagement with space, place, and history. Such enquiries have been made into 
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Beckett’s and Coetzee’s work, and tentatively in the case of Banville’s;283 a broader 
ranging consideration of the significance of attitudes such as these in the context of the 
post-colonial global Anglophone or European community would no doubt cast light on 
fundamental aspects of contemporary Western identity, and this would hence be an 
interesting direction for future research. A related question would be to what extent such 
attitudes persist among writers, thinkers, and artists of the generation following Auster, 
Banville, and Coetzee’s, and whether, given the significant geopolitical changes that 
have occurred since the 1980s, and which continue apace, such attitudes continue to be 
of any relevance.    
 These attitudes to factors such as nation, history, and politics are fundamentally 
informed by the vision of human being that takes shape in Beckett’s fiction over the 
course of the development from Murphy and other such early works to The Unnamable 
and How It Is. In the wake of post-structuralism the decentred nature of the self and the 
insubstantiality of subjectivity have become truisms. While these are important aspects 
of the development of this body of fiction, perhaps more crucial is the way in which it 
explores the nature and role of narration in light of them. In a novel such as The 
Unnamable, the decentring of subjectivity is taken as given, and the possibilities of and 
limitations to the telling of stories and their role in the negotiation of identity and 
attitude given such a view of human existence is in many ways the crux of the work. 
Beckett’s trilogy is, in this respect, a meta-fictional exploration of the significance of 
narrative in light of a specific vision of subjectivity, and the profoundly ambivalent 
findings he appears to derive from this echo in the work of all three later writers 
considered in this study. 
 I have characterized this ambivalence as a particularly acute form of the 
romantic irony originally identified by Friedrich Schlegel, and in a more recent 
incarnation explored by Paul de Man. As I argued in the second chapter, such irony is 
inherently resistant to definition or discursive formulation, involving as it does a non-
thetic holding open of the possibility of a thetic stance. It has to do with contradiction, 
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and the holding of the contraries of a contradiction in opposition, without collapsing into 
either/or, or neither/nor. ‘I can’t go on, I’ll go on’, as Beckett has it (UN, 134); or 
Schlegel, ‘Irony is a clear consciousness of an eternal agility, of the infinitely abundant 
chaos.’ 284  In Beckett’s case, one of the primary examples of such contradictions 
involves the simultaneous futility and necessity of the telling of stories, the simultaneous 
impotence and importance of fiction, and I have attempted to demonstrate how this 
meta-fictional preoccupation is picked up and developed in the work of Paul Auster, 
John Banville, and J.M. Coetzee, and how this irony informs their writing.       
 The three later writers’ receptions of Beckett’s work do however each follow 
rather different contours, and each thus figures forth a slightly different Beckett. Paul 
Auster’s initial response is by far the most anxious of the three, with Beckett’s 
achievement appearing an imposing and intimidating barrier to the possibility of further 
creative output. He nevertheless overcomes this by, as I demonstrated in chapter three, 
recasting typical Beckettian tropes and concerns in his own idiom and voice, and in this 
way imports certain characteristic aspects of Beckett’s work into his own. Coetzee’s 
early engagements are almost the exact opposite, taking the form of concerted, 
systematic study of Beckett’s writing – often of minute syntactic and formal detail – 
with the aim of identifying the basis of the comedy of the writing, for example, or its 
strange and evocative power. In this sense, then, Coetzee’s initial response was not at all 
anxious, but rather engaged with Beckett’s writing as a potential source of creative 
stimulus and innovation, as is clearly borne out in the early novels Dusklands and In the 
Heart of the Country.   
  For both Auster and Coetzee, the significance of Beckett’s work appears to 
decline over the course of their careers, with an initial enthusiasm steadily giving way to 
greater and greater indifference, as discussed in chapter two with reference to the writers’ 
own comments on the topic. In Auster’s case, this might be taken at face value: his 
surmounting of the challenge posed to his own creative endeavour by Beckett’s 
achievement was as much, or more, a psychological as an intellectual or technical feat, 
and even in the early novels where it is most marked the traces of Beckett’s influence 
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appear superficial rather than fundamental. Beckett was for Auster more a difficulty to 
be overcome than a potential to be engaged with. Bearing this out, the development of 
his work appears to exhibit increasingly little evidence of a Beckettian mode. Works 
such as Travels in the Scriptorium or Man in the Dark, in terms of their staging and 
situation potentially so similar to Beckett’s fiction, adopt a markedly different tone, 
register, and field of investigation. Perhaps most fundamentally, the narrative voice of 
Auster’s works does not seem at any point to be riven with the coruscating skepticism 
and self-deconstruction that is so characteristic of Beckett’s work, and, as discussed in 
chapter three, I take this to mark a substantial difference between the writers’ respective 
projects.    
 I am inclined, however, to be somewhat more suspicious of Coetzee’s claims in 
this regard. While there is a clear shift in tone from In the Heart of the Country to 
Waiting for the Barbarians, away from a pronounced Beckettian register to one 
specifically Coetzee’s own, the basic situation of the subject, with respect to language, 
the self and others, for example, remains in all of his work fundamentally analogous to 
that of the protagonists of Beckett’s novels. Where Beckett’s novels enact the 
impossibility of the self’s coincidence with itself in – and due to – language, Coetzee 
explores the impossibility of engagement with another, on and in precisely the same 
terms. Hence, while the more marked stylistic traces of Beckett’s influence are muted in 
the development of Coetzee’s oeuvre, the project of the fiction continues to be informed 
at a relatively fundamental level by what can be taken to be a Beckettian vision of the 
situation of the self in the world and in relation to itself and others. 
 The case of John Banville follows yet another pattern. Following the early, 
largely unsatisfactory, Nightspawn (1971), his work appears for a time to be almost 
entirely uninfluenced by Beckett’s: Birchwood engages with the Irish Big House novel, 
and, as discussed earlier, the early novels of the science tetralogy – Doctor Copernicus 
(1976) and Kepler (1981) – deal with the possibilities of knowledge and the imagination 
in a manner strongly marked by Romantic attitudes to them, and in diametric contrast to 
Beckett’s emphasis on ignorance, impotence, and impossibility. The Newton Letter 
(1982) marks the first appearance of a mode that typifies his later works. Focused on the 
limitations to insight and imagination rather than the potentialities of these, and on 
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failure – ethical, intellectual, interpersonal – rather than achievement, this characterizes 
the emergence of a Beckettian mode that inflects almost all of the novels that follow The 
Newton Letter and that is used to such powerful effect in later novels such as Eclipse 
(2000) and The Sea (2005).  
 A large part of the efficacy of Banville’s invocation of such a Beckettian mode, 
however, is his holding it in opposition to a Romantic sense of the redemptive capacities 
of beauty, the imagination and art, and generating from this opposition an irresolvable 
contradiction. In these later novels, the protagonists’ corrosive cynicism and mordantly 
humorous sense of their isolation in language and estrangement from others is 
occasionally pierced, as if by a shaft of light, by a glimpse of beauty or the working of 
the imagination. Without refuting such skepticism, these moments qualify it: placed in 
relation to these other, almost numinous aspects of human experience and being, 
Beckettian skepticism is opened up to various creative possibilities, as the appropriate 
attitude to our embodied being, for example, or a responsible comportment given our 
epistemological limitations. Indeed, very early in his career, Banville claims that the 
impulse to literature itself springs from this co-existence of a glimpsed transcendental 
order and a felt inadequacy of our capacities to fully engage with such.285 The latter of 
these can be understood as an ironic attitude to the possibilities of our being and doing 
that has much in common with Beckett’s, as I have argued in chapter five, and it comes 
to play a more and more significant role in Banville’s work as it develops.   
 This enquiry thus throws up three different Becketts, exercising three different 
types of influence on subsequent literature. Adopting a dialectical conceptual scheme, 
one might say that Coetzee develops Beckett’s thesis, Auster adopts an antithetical 
stance, and Banville achieves some sort of synthesis of the specifically Beckettian with 
other literary and intellectual legacies and traditions. In this respect, of these three the 
Banvillean Beckett appears to offer the most for further development and evolution, and 
there is certainly much that remains to be done in the exploration of the combinations 
and respective influences of Romantic legacies and more experimental trends in the 
development of literary and cultural modernism.  
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 The development and application of Beckettian tropes and techniques such as 
identified in Coetzee’s work offers a more ambivalent prospect. As I have traced it, 
Beckett’s influence provides Coetzee with a basically post-structuralist ethical stance 
premised on the insubstantiality of the self and a revaluation of the interpersonal relation 
as a consequence of this. While such certainly represented an important corrective to 
humanist conceptions of ethical attitudes and behaviour in mid- and late twentieth 
century thought, the intrinsic value of such schemes has been called into question by 
thinkers such as Alain Badiou,286 which does render debatable their lasting significance 
and strength. This uncertainty is supported by the development of Coetzee’s career itself: 
the works on which I focus – as well as all those I consider most compelling but do not 
deal with in this study – are all from the earliest stages of his career, much of the writing 
from 2000 on appears to lose something in the way of urgency, engagement, and 
substance. While the situation of narrators and protagonists continues to exhibit the self-
reflexive and -interrogative destabilization characteristic of the earlier novels, in a book 
such as Diary of a Bad Year these aspects appear ludic and almost habitual, rather than, 
as in an novel such as The Master of Petersburg, driven by pressing ethical and 
existential concerns.  
 There are also signs that Coetzee is in his own thinking moving toward a less 
deconstructive stance, as evidenced by a comparison of the Elizabeth Costello lectures 
or the Nobel Prize acceptance speech with the lecture given on the occasion of his 
receiving an honorary doctorate from the University of the Witwatersrand in 2012. The 
former are all acutely reflexive deconstructions of discursive forms and the assumptions 
that inform them, with the effect of placing in question a variety of attitudes to literature, 
the author, and the role of the public intellectual. The latter, in contrast, makes a strong, 
pointed, and unequivocal case for the importance of male teachers in early education, 
‘because it is good for the children to sometimes have a man’s hand guiding them’ but 
also because ‘it will be good for you [prospective male teachers], and good for our 
                                                          
 
286 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 
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common social life.’287 It is certainly possible that the current prevalence of specific 
social problems in South Africa motivated the directness of this intervention, but this 
would support, rather than undermine, the perception that post-structuralist modes of 
engagement perhaps fall short of contemporary challenges, and that, in many instances, 
something different is required. The content, and indeed the very conception, of Here 
and Now: Letters (2008–2011) indicates a similar change in outlook.    
 The example of Auster’s engagement with Beckett’s work is in some ways an 
example of the way in which ‘the Beckettian’ – which has in this way become 
something of a critical shorthand for a vaguely defined gloom, minimalism and 
experimentalism – has permeated post-modern poetics and aesthetics. In the works of 
Auster’s considered in this thesis, technical narrative devices and aspects of style that 
play a prominent role in Beckett’s work are adapted to what are ultimately rather 
different ends than those of the Irish writer. Of interest, thus, is the relative superficiality 
or profundity of Beckett’s influence on Auster’s work – and, by extension, the broader 
field of post-modern fiction, drama and art. In the case of Auster, my impression is that 
the influence is relatively superficial, and indeed temporary, fading away with the 
development of the author’s oeuvre.  
 As indicated above, of these three writers’ engagements with Beckett’s work, I 
consider John Banville’s to represent the most vital and enduring, and most likely to 
lead to further development. Banville’s holding of a typically Beckettian skepticism in 
opposition to a strongly contrary Romantic sense of the capacity of art and the 
imagination instigates an irony that is itself closely analogous to that instantiated in, and 
the effect of which is similar to some of the most poignant moments in, Beckett’s work. 
Such a conjunction of the Romantic and modernist as achieved by Banville certainly 
offers significant scope for rethinking of, and renewed engagement with, various literary, 
intellectual and cultural legacies. His recent comments on the idea of an alternative 
modernism (alternative, that is, to the experimental strand generally taken to be 
epitomized by Joyce’s work) deriving from the late works of Henry James, with the 
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various possibilities this offers for an understanding of the nature and role of 
contemporary art and literature, offer glimpses of what such renewed engagement might 
consist in: 
[James] may not be the greatest artist as a writer, but he is certainly the greatest 
novelist. If you look at the body of work that he left behind, and those last three 
novels, where his style becomes so opaque, and so cloudy, I think he may have 
found more interesting modernistic ground even than Ulysses. … James, in those 
late novels, really catches something of what it is to be conscious. That strange 
fuzzy sensation that we have, where we’re not thinking words, we’re not thinking 
in images, we’re not thinking in feelings, but we’re thinking a strange whipped-
up egg white of all of these things. We seem to claw our way through this strange 
cloud of knowing, of barely knowing. Henry James came as close as anybody has 
come to what it is to be conscious, which is an incoherent state.288     
Such a description of the task of the novel is applicable in its own way to the work of 
Beckett, Auster, Banville and Coetzee – notwithstanding the significant differences that 
obtain –, and offers something of a way into an understanding of their respective 
techniques, styles and preoccupations. It also achieves a synthesis of the mimetic and 
experimental inheritances of the form, positing a median path between naturalism and 
modernism that acknowledges the contribution both can make to a vital medium. The 
increasing application of the findings of neuroscience to literature, both the production 
and appreciation of it,289 is perhaps an indication of one way in which this might occur. 
In the case of James, irony is again a crucial aspect of the achievement, and exploration 
of this would make for fascinating comparison with the matters discussed in this thesis.  
 Which is not to say that such an exploration of James’s significance for later 
literature would invalidate the importance accorded Beckett in this thesis. These lines of 
influence and inheritance are rhizomatic, not linear, and Beckett’s irony is starkly 
distinct from James’s. While Auster and Coetzee move away from a Beckettian ironic 
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mode, Banville’s work, as I have shown, appears to be becoming imbued more and more 
deeply with the sort of skepticism and self-division that characterize the work of Beckett 
considered in this thesis. Beckett’s unique place in literary modernism – as both 
culmination and augur of what comes after, both consummation and exhaustion – means 
that those engaging with this moment and its legacies are likely to continue to need to 
account for the challenges and peculiarities of Beckett’s writing. The poignancy and 
power of these have persisted since their production, and do not appear likely to diminish.  
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